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ABSTRACT 
As a result of the Uruguay Round (UR), the impact on the international rice market is 
profound.  In addition, another round of the WTO trade negotiations has started and the impacts 
of potential policy changes on rice trade are unknown.  The major U.S. benefit of the UR has 
been the access to the Japanese market.  However, the U.S. share of this import market has been 
unstable and the share of Korean rice market is zero percent.  Therefore, this study attempts to 
analyze the potential implication of U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea. 
The Japanese and Korean rice economies as well as U.S. export demand are analyzed 
using empirical supply and demand models.  This study captures the dynamics inherent in 
supply and demand of the Japanese and Korean rice sectors.  For the study, the supply 
parameters are estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS), and the demand equations are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Since rice is a political commodity, this study incorporates the political influence of 
various interest groups in the policy-making process.  The analysis measures the pattern of the 
implicit political weights given to the interest groups, considering a Political Preference 
Function (PPF). 
In the final stage, the estimated elasticities and political weights are incorporated in a 
noncooperative dynamic game framework to analyze the possible impacts of policy changes in 
the three countries.  This study analyses various policies, including several reasonable scenarios 
regarding changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents from 2% to 8% with respect to 
U.S. export programs, such as credit guarantee and market development programs. 
The results show that the best export policy option from the U.S. perspective is obtained 
at a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under a combination of U.S. market access 
 x 
program and foreign market development program.  The results suggest that the U.S. policy 
makers might focus more on the U.S. export policy options than the tariff reduction of Japan 
and Korea.  However, it depends on how the policies are implemented, given the state trading 
enterprises and implicit trade barriers in both countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Under the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement the rules governing international trade in 
agricultural products were fundamentally changed (Gilbert and Wahl, 2000).  Members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to a process of tariffication of non-tariff agricultural 
trade barriers (NTBs), to bind those tariffs, and to subject them to reductions.  They also agreed 
to institute disciplines and reduction commitments on export subsidies and other domestic 
support mechanisms.  Significant progress has been made towards subjecting agriculture to the 
same disciplines as trade in manufactures. 
The multilateral trade agreement reached through the UR negotiations is important and 
extensive.  Besides forming the WTO, it includes general tariff reductions and new rules 
relating to services, intellectual property, trade related investment and general subsidies.  It also 
includes important new procedures for dispute settlement (Tangermann, et. al., 1997). 
As a result of the multilateral trade negotiations, the world rice economy is becoming 
more market oriented.  The impact of trade liberalization on the international rice market is 
profound because rice trade has been highly restricted in both developed and developing 
nations.  In addition, another round of the WTO trade negotiations has started and the impacts 
of potential policy changes on rice production and trade flows in the world rice industry are 
unknown.   
Japan and South Korea are industrial market economies with agriculture contributing less 
than 5% of their gross national products.  These two countries are also major markets for U.S. 
agricultural exports (Wailes, et al., 2000). 
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The agricultural systems of Japan and South Korea have been largely focused on rice 
production with major political and economic support given to rice producers.  Because of the 
special importance of rice, these countries have followed similar policies of high levels of 
protection in their rice economies to achieve self-sufficiency in production.  These policies 
include banning foreign rice imports and maintaining their domestic rice price level above their 
border price.  A result of this strong protection is that Japan has incurred rice surpluses for two 
decades, requiring expensive acreage diversion programs to help curb the over-supply.  South 
Korea has also developed a surplus rice problem with burdensome stock levels since 1987 (Lee, 
1997). 
The situation surrounding the Japanese and Korean rice industries has changed 
drastically.  The biggest change was the partial opening of the rice market.  As a result of the 
UR agreement, Japan and Korea were required to guarantee some minimum access (MA) level 
of rice imports on regular basis.  
This partial opening of these rice markets had a significant impact on the domestic rice 
industries in both countries, especially on prices and production.  In fact, the reality is that 
farmers and the governments of Japan and Korea are suffering from the larger minimum access 
(MA) imports through suppressed domestic rice prices.  In addition, imported rice is supposed 
to be used partially as foreign aid, but this cannot be a long-run solution for either country. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in agreement by Japan and South Korea to 
relax their rice import bans with minimum access requirements.  Japan agreed to imports equal 
to 4% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 8% by the year 2001.  Korea agreed to a minimum 
access of 1% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 2% by 2000 and 4% by 2004 based on the 
consumption of the year of 1986-88.  These minimum access requirements are essentially 
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treated as mandatory import quotas, although either country is free to import more than the MA 
if they wish.  
The minimum access quotas in Japan have been implemented using two mechanisms: 1) 
state trade purchases under the Food Agency of Ministry of agriculture, Fishery, and Forestry 
(MAFF) and 2) the simultaneous buy and sell (SBS) auctions for private trade (USDA/Attaché 
report, 1996).  Food Agency purchases have been largely isolated from direct food markets, 
with purchases going to food aid, industrial use, animal feed and stocks.  The share of the quota 
allocated to the two mechanisms has largely been an internal policy matter.  However, 
burdensome stocks and external pressures have motivated MAFF to increase the share of the 
MA quota through the SBS from an initial 3% to 22% more recently. 
Rice imports are a very emotional and political issue in Korea, leading the government to 
spend a great deal of resources in trying to ensure self-sufficiency. Korea has not imported any 
significant amounts of rice since it was forced to import over 2.0 million metric tons (MMT) in 
1981/82 over a two-year period after the 1980 crop was severely damaged due to unusual cold 
weather. 
In the UR agreement, Korea insisted that there should be some exemption from the 
tariffication in the case of basic foodstuffs such as rice and beef.  However, Korea committed a 
full range of market liberalization at the UR negotiations with only the exception of rice, of 
which tariffication was postponed 10 years. 
Despite protests from the U.S. government, Korean MAFF has announced that all rice 
imported during the initial years was for processing purposes only.  The U.S. government’s 
position is that this is against the spirit if not the rules of the UR agreement. 
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Among competitors, many local experts expect China to be a major supplier over the 
long term.  China has reportedly developed new varieties of rice to meet Korean taste.  This rice 
is being grown by ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and 
Heilongjinag (USDA, 1998). 
The price of Chinese rice is about one-eighth that of similar rice produced in Korea, and 
has been a major rice exporter to Korea.  China also has the obvious advantage of lower 
transportation cost due to its close proximity to Korea. Vietnam and Thailand are also 
reportedly making plans to export their long-grain rice.  Australia is also aggressively seeking to 
gain a share of any medium-grain rice imported by Korea. 
Korea imported 51,000 MT of Indian rice to meet its Market Access requirements in 
1996.  This rice was intended to meet its 1995 obligations.  Since then, Korea imported an 
additional 64,000 MT of medium grain rice from China to meet it 1996 MA requirements in 
1996.  In addition, Korea imported 81,000 MT from China and 13,000 MT from Thailand in 
1999 (USDA, 2000).  
Korea’s MA commitment is in effect until 2004.  Korea’s strategy for meeting its 
commitment includes the purchase of only lower quality rice, equivalent to U.S. No. 3 or lower.  
This is done in order to avoid table competition for its heavily subsidized domestic rice. 
1.1.1 Recent Changes 
In December 1998, the Japanese government notified the WTO of its decision to 
introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999.  Under tariffication, a specific duty of 
351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA volume.  In and after 
Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen per kg was applied 
to imports outside of MA (MAFF, 1999).   
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Japan’s tariffication agreement has three components. First, a secondary tariff applied to 
rice imports above the MA import levels where the mark-up associated with the tariff 
equivalent of the MA is considered the primary tariff.  The initial secondary tariff rate is set at 
351.17 yen per kg for 1999 (approximately $3,000MT) followed by a 2.5% reduction to 341 
yen in 2000.  Second, in agreeing to the possibility for over quota imports, Japan was allowed to 
reduce the annual increase in MA imports from 0.8% to only 0.4%.  Third, the new policy adds 
a safeguard tariff of an additional 33%, triggered at 125% of the previous 3-year moving rice 
import volume (USDA, 2000). 
The result of tariffication is lower import volumes than what would have occurred with 
the original MA quota, 38 thousand MT less in 1999 and 76 thousand MT less in 2000.  The 
prohibitive tariff essentially results in capping of Japanese rice imports until reductions in the 
tariff rate are negotiated in the next round.  Japan’s MA quota will remain at the 7.2% of base 
period use until another agreement is reached (Table 1.1).  Despite the negative effect on trade 
volume of Japan’s recent tariffication, the MA quotas have resulted in an expansion of total 
world rice trade of approximately 5% and over 30% more trade of high quality medium grain 
rice (Wailes, 2000).  Opening of the import market, along with domestic market reforms in 
Japan, has resulted in lower domestic market prices by 10 to 15% (USDA/AttachP report, 
2000).   
  Table 1.1 Japanese MA Obligation for Rice (MT). 
                                        Without Tariffication                          With Tariffication 
                                Volume     % of consumption          Volume        % of consumption  
      JFY* 1998         606,000             6.4 %                      606,000                6.4 % 
      JFY   1999         682,000             7.2 %                      644,000                6.8 % 
      JFY   2000         758,000             8.0 %                      682,000                7.2 % 
  *:Japanese fiscal year (April to March) 
  Source: USDA 
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1.1.2 U.S. Exports to Japan and Korea 
The United States accounts for less than 2% of global rice production, but exports more 
than 12% of world trade.  Most countries produce only one type of rice.  However, the United 
States produces both types (japonica in California, and indica in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, 
Mississippi, and Missouri) and is in a unique position in that it can export significant amounts 
of both types (Song and Carter, 1996).  Despite this, the U.S. rice programs, marketing loan 
payments and marketing loan programs, essentially treat rice as a homogenous product (Wailes, 
2000) and do not provide clear market signals corresponding to changing market conditions by 
subspecies (Childs and Lin, 1989).  Rice is treated as a homogenous crop in the sense that (a) a 
single target price and acreage reduction program (ARP) rate is applied to all rice types, and (b) 
the rice grading system does not distinguish California medium grain (japonica) from southern 
long grain (indica) (i.e., it applies the same loan rate and marketing loan repayment rate).  This 
distinction becomes more critical under freer trade, because the largest potential importers, 
Japan and Korea, have strong preferences for japonica rice. 
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice 
exports supplied 65% of that market, mostly from California (Schnepf and Just, 1995).  
However, by the mid 1980s, Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous government 
programs, while imports were essentially banned.  After losing its largest importer, Korea, in 
1983, California accumulated rice stocks, relative to the southern states.  Since 1983, the U.S. 
has exported no rice to Korea. In the meantime, the U.S. market share in the Japanese import 
market has been about 50% since 1995.  However, the U.S. market share in Japan decreased in 
recent years due to heavy competition among the major export countries, such as Australia, 
China, and Thailand.   
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1.2 Problem Statement  
Traditional leading rice exporters, such as Thailand and the United States, have gradually 
lost market share to newly emerging exporters, primarily Vietnam and India. The U.S. lost 
second position to India in 1995 (USDA, 2000) and was the fourth leading exporter in 1996 
(Wailes, 2000).  With unexpected reductions in exports by India, the U.S. moved up to third 
place in 1997 and 1998.  
The impact of the UR agreement on the U.S. rice industry has been favorable.  The major 
benefit has been the access to the Japanese market.  The U.S. share of this market has been 
about 50% as opposed to the Korean market, in which its market share is zero.  However, the 
U.S. share of the Japanese market has gradually decreased and been unstable due to strong 
competition with major exporters as mentioned above.  
The uncertain factors in Korea, in terms of potential U.S. rice exports, are Korea’s stock 
and political situations.  How these factors will affect future U.S. exports is still uncertain at this 
time.  In the past, in terms of stock, the Korean government has kept a minimum four-month 
reserve for both price stabilization and food/military security reasons and the policy-making 
process in rice trade is a politically sensitive matter.   
Nevertheless, the U.S. rice industry can potentially increase its market share in Japanese 
and Korean rice import markets, given that both countries will likely be required to expand their 
imports in the next round of the WTO negotiations.  Expanded market access remains one of the 
most important issues for rice trade.  The UR can claim credit for part of the expansion in rice 
trade in the 1990s, but the two rice markets remain highly protected.  For instance, the tariff rate 
quota (TRQ) for Japan will remain at 682 thousand MT until a new agreement is negotiated.  
Tariffication established a prohibitive tariff and reduced the terms of MA quota that would have 
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resulted without tariffication.  Both the tariff level and quota will receive considerable attention 
in the next round.  Similar pressure will be on the MA quota for South Korea along with a push 
for tariffication (Wailes, 2000; Cramer, et al., 1999; Koo, et al., 1996). 
Looking at the historical and recent structural changes in both countries, it is useful for 
the U.S. rice industry, especially the export market, to examine how much market share the U.S. 
can potentially obtain in the Japanese and Korean markets.  In addition, it is important to 
examine how changes in Japanese and Korean rice policies, as related to their WTO 
commitments, will impact the U.S. market. 
Japanese and Korean imports have stimulated resource adjustments in the rest of the 
world, including Australia, China and the United States, countries that have been the primary 
beneficiaries of Japanese and South Korean market access.  This has occurred because Japan 
and Korea are the primary consumers and importers of japonica rice.  Therefore, changes in 
both countries rice policies have a large impact on the U.S. rice industry as well as the world 
rice market.  
1.3 Justification 
The existing research on Japan, Korea, and the U.S. export market is quite limited and is 
not linked, in the sense that the existing studies focus specifically on either the Japanese or 
Korean rice market (Im, 2000; Koo and Taylor, 1999; Park, 1996; Kako, et al, 1995).  In 
addition, some studies examined implications of the rice trade liberalization for U.S. rice 
policies and the world rice market, considering Japanese and Korean markets as a part of their 
studies (Wailes, 2000; Cramer, et al., 1999; Lee, 1997; Song and Carter, 1996).  However, these 
studies did not examine nor forecast potential U.S. market share in Japanese and Korean 
markets.  Furthermore, there is no analysis that examines the linkage between U.S. exports and 
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the other two countries’ imports.  Therefore, this study focuses specifically on Japanese and 
Korean rice markets from the U.S. perspective, considering the linkage between U.S. rice 
export policies and the other two countries’ potential import policies.  This study can help 
policy makers in these three countries and the people engaged in international rice trade to 
better understand and improve decision-making with regard to the rice economies of Korea and 
Japan. 
Since the U.S. share of the Japanese rice import market has been relatively unstable in 
recent years, an analysis of the Japanese import market from the U.S. perspective is needed.  In 
addition, Korea imported rice from the U.S. until the early 1980s.  However, prior to the GATT 
negotiations, the Korean government suspended rice imports, with the exception of years when 
they had unusual bad weather.  As a result of the GATT negotiation, Korea must meet its MA 
commitment each year until 2004.  Korea has had tremendous pressure from rice exporting 
countries such as the Cairns group and the U.S. concerning its MA requirement.  Nevertheless, 
Korea has not imported its MA commitment from the U.S.; India and China have been the 
major rice suppliers for Korea.  However, China and India are volatile exporters, moving from 
net importers in one year to net exporters in the next (Wailes, 2000).  Therefore, an analysis of 
the Korean rice economy and import policy will benefit the U.S. rice industry. 
1.4 Objectives 
The issue of uncertainty regarding potential U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea will be 
analyzed by combining an econometric analysis with game theoretic-model to determine the 
impact of various policies.  To conduct the game theoretic analysis, econometric models of 
supply and demand for Japan and Korea and an export demand model for the U.S. will be 
estimated.  The estimated elasticities will be used to initialize the simulation model, which uses 
 10
the game theoretic approach.  In addition, political weights of various interest groups will be 
determined, and the weights will be incorporated into the model.  For the policy analysis, 
several potential import policies of Japan and Korea will be considered for U.S. rice export 
policies. 
The general objective of this study is to determine the potential U.S. rice exports to Japan 
and Korea.  The goal of the analysis is to determine the implications for U.S. export policies.  
The specific objectives to accomplish this are: 
1) To estimate econometric models of supply and consumption behavior for Japan and Korea, 
and export demand for the U.S. as an input to initialize the empirical model; 
2) To determine the political weights of relevant interest groups of the three countries as an 
input to initialize the empirical model; 
3) To conduct a game theoretic analysis to determine the optimal policy options of Japan and 
Korea for U.S. rice exports, incorporating econometric estimates and the political weights of 
different interest groups determined in specific objective 2) and; 
4) To analyze the potential policies of Japan and Korea and determine the best export policy 
options for the U.S. 
1.5 Literature Review 
An extensive literature has evolved in the past decades using economic theory to 
determine the impact of policy reform and trade liberalization of agricultural commodities.  
This section outlines recent studies concerning Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. rice industries, 
including econometric analyses, political economic analysis of rice in the three countries, and 
game theoretic analyses. 
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Wailes, Ito and Cramer (1991/a) have provided a comprehensive study of the Japanese 
rice market prior to the GATT reforms.  The Japanese rice economy is described in the context 
of the 1991 trade liberalization discussions.  This study examined the high-cost Japanese rice 
production structure that is supported by managing the rice surpluses.  They also analyzed the 
implications of trade liberalization for the world rice market in another study (1991/b).  The 
authors used a multi-product quadratic programming model to investigate the impacts on the 
world market.  The study focused on the changes in Japan s rice market.  Dyck, Huang and 
Wailes (1993) reviewed South Korea, Japan and Taiwan s farm structures and rice economies.  
Kako, Gemma and Ito (1995) have estimated a Japanese rice model adopting two scenarios, 
which were analyzed with respect to future per capita expenditure, rice prices and meat prices. 
Myung (1989) analyzed the effects of the government s price intervention in Korea s rice 
economy.  The study used a partial equilibrium approach to examine the effects on the rice 
markets with and without government intervention.  In this study, the author used a Nerlovian 
supply model in the logarithmic form.  The Nerlovian lagged supply function was fitted to the 
observed data in order to obtain supply elasticity estimates.  For the demand model, the study 
used the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model.  Park (1995) estimated supply and 
demand models for the Korean rice economy over the period from 1965 to 1993.  the analysis 
was conducted for three scenarios; 1) no imports of rice, 2) imports assumed to follow the UR 
agreement (2-4%), and 3) both rice imports and processing use assumed to increase to 10% of 
domestic consumption.  However, a limitation of his study is that he did not evaluate the 
international impacts.  A study by Koh (1996) analyzed recent changes in Korea s rice acreage, 
yield, consumption and government policy.  Koh also provided a brief historical background of 
Korean rice policy and the import situation.  
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Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984) estimated U.S. acreage response by each state instead of by 
grain types.  They have estimated state-by-state rice-planted acreage for the five major 
producing states using the effective farm price and a lagged dependent variable.  They also have 
estimated rice demand for seed, food, brewing, commercial exports, government exports, and 
rough rice exports.  However, they did not consider the effects of government policy details 
such as acreage set-aside programs or deficiency payments.  Chen and Ito (1992) estimated U.S. 
rice demand and supply models using the implicit revenue function approach.  The study also 
demonstrated the utility of a switching procedure that allows evaluation of supply response 
behaviors for time periods governed by multiple farm programs in a system of equations.  
However, they treated rice as a homogeneous crop.    Song and Carter (1996) estimated U.S. 
supply and demand disaggregating types.  They analyzed several scenarios according to the 
GATT agreement and the impacts of the global rice trade liberalization on the U.S.  Wailes, 
Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen (2000) constructed a model called Arkansas Global Rice Model 
that consists of 22 sub-models and the rest of the world (ROW).  The model is a representation 
of the world rice economy, and is used to simulate world rice trade.  They disaggregated rice 
types such as indica and japonica solving for Thai 5% f.o.b. rice price and California price.  
They used econometric and partial equilibrium approach to closed the model such that world 
imports and exports are equal in each year.  
The new political economy or endogenous theory of economic policy recognizes that 
policy-makers are rational agents who select policy-maximizing objectives, subject to political 
and economic constraints.  There has been interest from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective in examining the effects of government price stabilization (or support) programs on 
commodity market performance.  The main issue in this area has been the desirability of price 
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stabilization in terms of its welfare effect on interest groups. Different approaches have been 
adapted to analyze income support and price stabilization policies.  
For agricultural policies, much of the literature focuses on the integration of political and 
economic markets and the endogenization of government policies (Zusman and Amiad, 1977; 
Anderson and Hayami, 1986).  The approach, called new political economy, shows that the 
government as a rational agent may be manipulated by powerful interest groups.  A fast 
growing literature on the political economy of agricultural policy has introduced new analytical 
methods for dealing with the political influences of special interest groups in the policy making 
process (Rausser and Foster, 1990).  The political economy approach to agricultural policy has 
developed along two paths, which depend on how the political process is viewed.  These two 
approaches to modeling the political economy of farm programs are the political preference 
function (PPF) approach and the clearing-house government (CHG) model. 
The PPF approach assumes that policymakers maximize a political preference function in 
which different interest groups in society have different weights in the function.  The 
fundamental assumption of the PPF approach is that current policies reflect a political economic 
equilibrium summarizing all the relevant political power among interest groups.  Empirical 
work began in this area with Rausser and Freebairn (1974) who estimated political preference 
weights under the U.S. beef import quota.  Similar studies are Lianos and Rizopoulos (1988) for 
the Greek cotton sector, and Oehmke and Yao (1990) for the U.S. wheat sector.  Multi-country 
and single-commodity political preference function studies are Sarris and Freebairn (1983) and 
Paarlberg and Abbott (1986) for the world wheat market.  Tyers (1990) applies estimated 
political weights to the welfare incidence of EC agricultural policy reforms and evaluates their 
political feasibility.  Recently, some theoretical assessments of the political preference function 
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approach have been discussed in the literature (von Cramon, 1992; Bullock, 1994, 1996).  
Bullock provides a theoretical explanation of the PPF methodology and assumptions.  He 
argues that one can estimate political power with a PPF only if observed policies are Pareto-
efficient, which may depend on the assumed number of interest groups and policy instruments.  
To ensure that observed policies are efficient, he shows that PPF studies must choose the 
number of policy instruments to be exactly one less than the number of interest groups.  
Game theory has appeared in agricultural economics research primarily in studies of 
international trade and political economy problems that inherently deal with collective action.  
In trade models, countries formulate policies considering other countries’ alternative behaviors 
that affect access to markets or prices received in those markets (Karp and McCalla, 1983).  In 
political economic models, producer groups formulate and argue for price/production policies 
and argue against the policies supported by rival producer and consumer groups; in so doing, 
they must anticipate demands made by rival groups and actions undertaken by other law 
makers.   
Agricultural trade research has for a long time recognized the importance of imperfect 
competition.  McCalla (1966) first argued that wheat trade should be explained as a duopoly 
involving the United States and Canada.  Carter and Schmitz (1979) claimed that in the wheat 
market, power resided with the buyers, who were able to extract rent by imposing a tariff or 
some other kind of trade barrier.  Carter, McCalla, and Sharples (1990) examined the linkage 
between imperfect competition and political economy of trade policy.  Most approaches have 
utilized the conjectural variations method (Paarlberg and Abbott, 1986; Kolstad and Burris, 
1987), an approach not included by strict game theorists among their tools (McMillan, 1986; 
Tirole, 1988).  Some recent approaches have followed explicit game theoretic methods (Karp 
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and McCalla, 1983; Hillberg, 1988; Johnson, Mahe, and Roe, 1993; Kennedy, von Witzke, and 
Roe, 1994). 
In addition, Kydland (1975) compared open loop and feedback solutions for suitable 
equilibrium solutions for cooperative and dominant player dynamic games.  He argued that the 
feedback solution is generally more appropriate as an equilibrium concept.  For the 
interdependency of trade, Karp and McCalla (1983) provide an application of dynamic 
difference game to the world corn market.  The difference game provides a plausible model for 
evaluating the effects of trade restrictions.  These effects include the direct impact on prices and 
quantities and the retaliation of trading partners.  The total effect can be disaggregated to 
determine the impact on various interest groups within nations. 
In trade policy debates, it is often argued that domestic industries should receive 
temporary protection from import competition (MAFF, 1997).  Immediate trade liberalization 
and ensuing inflows of foreign products and capital would jeopardize domestic firms, while 
protection would allow the domestic industries to introduce new technologies and products, 
thereby effectively competing with their foreign rivals.  Any such protectionist measure should 
be temporary, because, under permanent protection, the lack of competitive pressure reduces 
incentives for domestic firms to rationalize their operations and to hold down costs (Matsuyama 
and Itoh, 1986; Matusyama, 1990).  A similar argument arises in the context of infant industry 
protection.  Temporary support by governments sometimes helps new industries grow strong 
enough to meet international competition.  But indefinitely imposed protection often results in 
perpetual industrial stagnation (WTO, 1997).  In that sense, game theory is a fruitful ground for 
conceptualizing micro-level transactions, particularly those that take place in more isolated 
markets or among cooperating groups (Horowitz, Just, and Netanyahu, 1996).   
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These various studies described in the above literature review give an overall picture of 
the concerns associated with the rice markets, and provide a sense of the magnitude of the 
issues involved with the government rice policies and international rice trade. 
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will be organized into five chapters. Chapter One consists of the 
research problem statement, justification of the research, objectives of the study and a 
description of research procedures. Chapter Two reviews the rice economies of Japan, Korea 
and the U.S. export market. The theoretical framework for the econometric estimation, the PPF 
determination, and the game theoretic approach will be discussed in Chapter Three.  The 
empirical approach will be conducted to determine the Nash Equilibrium import and export 
policies for these three countries, and the results will be discussed in Chapter Four. The 
summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further study will be contained in Chapter Five.  
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CHAPTER 2 
JAPANESE AND KOREAN RICE ECONOMIES 
2.1 Japanese and Korean Rice Economies 
The rice economies of Japan and Korea are distinguished by small-scale rice farms.  The 
two countries radically reformed their land tenure systems in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
(Dyck, et al., 1993).  The land reforms were important economic and social changes during the 
postwar period since they resolved long-simmering class conflicts in rural society and enabled 
millions of households to become freeholders, with economic status, at least by the 1950’s, 
comparing favorably to that of the urban working class (Tweeten, 1993).  The two economies 
taxed agriculture to some extent in the earlier decades of the post-WWII era.  All shared a 
common experience of suffering poverty and hunger before they became industrially developed.   
In Japan, there were 4,661 thousand farm households in 1980, among which 3,721 
thousand rice farm households.  The number of rice farm household accounted for 79.8 % of 
total farm households in 1980.  However, the number of farm household decreased dramatically 
to 3,239 thousand households and 2,134 thousand rice farm households, accounting for 71 % of 
the total farm households in 1999 (Table 2.1).  
For Korea, there were about 1.38 million farm households cultivating 1.9 million 
hectares of agricultural land in 1999, implying that the average farm size is about 1.37 hectare 
(Table 2.1). 
The agricultural statistics of MAFF (ministry of agricultural, fishery and forestry) and the 
USDA indicate that the average area of farms in the two countries has grown only slightly since 
those countries  land reforms in the late 1940s.  The average arable land per farm household in 
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these two countries increased from 1.02 ha in 1980 to 1.5 ha in 1999 (Table 2.1).  On rice 
farms, the average area has been less than 1 hectare even though it has been increasing. 
 Table 2.1. Farm Structure in Japan and Korea, Selected years. 
                                                       1980       1985        1990        1995        1999 
       Total farm households (A) 
          (1000 households) 
     Korea                                        2,155      1,926       1,767       1,501       1,382 
     Japan                                         4,661      4,376       3,835       3,444       3,239   
       Total arable land (B) 
          (1,000 ha) 
     Korea                                        2,196      2,144       2,109       1,985       1,899 
     Japan                                         5,461      5,379       5,243       5,038       4,866 
       Average arable land   
          (per household (ha), B/A)                                          
     Korea                                          1.02        1.11         1.19         1.32         1.37 
     Japan                                           1.17        1.23         1.37         1.46         1.50 
       Rice farm households          
          (1,000 households) 
     Korea                                        1,837     1,649       1,525       1,205       1,064 
     Japan                                         3,721     3,437       3,063       2,301       2,134 
       Land for rice  
          (1,000 ha)  
     Korea                                        1,233     1,237       1,244       1,056       1,066 
     Japan                                         2,377     2,342       2,074       2,118       1,788 
       Average rice land   
          ( per household, ha) 
     Korea                                         0.52       0.75         0.82         0.88          1.00 
     Japan                                           0.64       0.68         0.68         0.77          0.84  
    Source: MAFF, Republic of Korea, various years. 
                 MAFF, Japan various years. 
These two countries’ governments have adopted diversion programs to reduce 
government stocks and program costs, to increase the average rice area per farm, and to reduce 
the higher production costs compared with those of U.S.   
Most of the farm households are headed by an aging population, 55 to 65 years of age or 
older, who have poor prospects for earning comparable incomes in other occupations and whose 
assets consist largely of high-valued farm land (Wailes, 1994). 
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A general feature of both countries is an aging farm population (generally over 55) with 
rice farming being mostly a part-time farming operation with high dependence on off-farm 
income.  Currently these two countries have high rice production costs compared to border 
prices due to the small scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, and high land costs. 
 Table 2.2. Rice Production Cost for Selected Years in Japan, Korea, and the U.S. 
                                              Japan                     South Korea                    U.S.  
                    Year                (US$/ha)                     (US$/ha)                   (US$/ha) 
                    1981                  7,527                          2,616                         877.8 
                    1983                  7,350                          2,932                         867.8 
                    1984                  7,326                          2,971                         875.7 
                    1986                10,545                          2,996                         875.2 
                    1991                12,520                          5,456                         968.0 
                    1992                13,200                          5,089                         932.9 
                    1993                15,576                          4,953                         982.2 
                    1994                16,106                          4,984                      1,046.3 
                    1995                17,989*                        5,341                      1,058.4 
                    1996                15,529                          5,497                      1,130.6 
                    1997                13,877*                        4,818                      1,130.4 
                    1998                12,988*                        3,651*                    1,105.2  
  Source: MAFF, various years, and USDA 2001. 
  *: due to exchange rate. 
The economic conditions of rice farm households and the rice markets in Japan and 
Korea are much more complex since the structure of rice agriculture in both countries has 
changed markedly over the last two decades and continues to change.  
Given their similar backgrounds and the importance of rice production, the rice 
economies of Japan and Korea have many characteristics in common.  These two countries 
experienced hunger during war years and land reform conflicts, creating strong pressure to 
continue the status quo of small farm ownership and self-sufficiency in rice production.  These 
two countries taxed agriculture as a national policy to successfully help develop the industrial 
sector.  Therefore, there is strong public support to preserve agriculture now.  The farm 
structure is dominated by small scale rice farms and mostly operator-owned rather than rented 
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rice farms.  They produce high quality japonica medium-grain rice as a staple food.  During the 
past several decades, they have been experiencing a decrease in per capita rice consumption, 
and normally produce rice surpluses as a result of highly protectionist government programs.  
2.1.1 Korean Rice Farm Structure  
More than 65 percent of rice farm households operate less than 1 hectare of farmland in 
1999, as shown in Table 2.3.  The number of rice farm households in each class of farm size has 
been decreasing.  However, the number of rice farm households with more than 2.0 hectares has 
been fluctuated.  This implies that the structural changes in rice farm sector has been affected by 
Korean financial crisis occurred in 1997.  Rice farmers need to get any type of loan from the 
government, agricultural cooperation, and banks to expand their rice farmland.  However, it was 
extremely difficult to get a loan from any financial organizations since the financial crisis.  In 
spite of all efforts for structural changes, the majority of the farmers are still operating small-
scale farms. 
 Table 2.3. Number of Korean Rice Farm Households by Farm Size, Selected Years 
                                                                                                   (Units: 1,000 households (%)). 
    Year         Below 0.5ha       0.5-1.0 ha        1.0-2.0 ha       Above 2.0 ha         Total* 
    1980          529(28.8)           646(35.2)         543(29.6)         119(6.5)          1,837(100.0) 
    1985          467(28.4)           601(36.5)         483(29.3)           96(5.8)          1,647(100.0) 
    1990          422(27.6)           475(31.1)         475(31.2)         150(9.9)          1,525(100.0)  
    1995          354(29.4)           353(29.3)         341(28.4)         157(13.1)        1,205(100.0) 
    1996          355(30.3)           339(29.0)         327(27.9)         151(12.9)        1,172(100.0) 
    1997          353(30.9)           332(29.0)         308(27.0)         150(13.1)        1,143(100.0) 
    1998          381(34.7)           312(28.4)         274(25.0)         131(11.9)        1,098(100.0) 
    1999          380(35.8)           304(28.5)         260(24.5)         120(11.3)        1,064(100.0) 
  Source: Korean MAFF, various years. 
  *: Non-crop farm households are excluded. 
In Korea, the family farm is broadly defined as a farm, which is operated by a farm 
household, meaning that both the farm operator, and all farm laborers, are family members.  
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This concept of a family farm was first adopted by the Korean government in the process of 
enacting the Farmland Reform Law in 1948-50 (Park, 1996).  The fundamental structure of 
Korean agriculture, the owner-operated family farm system, was established during this period.  
In the Farmland Reform Law, the maximum farmland holding by a farm household was limited 
to 3.0 ha of cropland (MAFF, 1995).  In fact, it was not possible for a farm family to manage 
more than three hectares of farmland in the 1950s, due to the low level of farm mechanization.  
The proportion of part-time rice farm households has been increasing, while the 
proportion of full-time farmers has been decreasing until 1996 as shown in Tble 2.4.  For 
example, the proportions of full-time and part-time households in total farm households were 
76.2 percent and 23.8 percent respectively in 1980.  In 1996, they were 56.5 percent and 43.5 
percent, respectively (Table 2.4).  This suggests that the part-time household was an inevitable 
solution to the problem of income parity with non-agricultural households given the small farm 
size. 
 Table 2.4. The Number of Rice Farms by Type in Korea (Unit: 1,000 households). 
                 Year                  Total*                    Full-time                   Part-time 
                 1980             1,837(100.0)             1,399(76.2)                 438(23.8)  
                 1985             1,649(100.0)             1,299(78.8)                 350(21.2) 
                 1990             1,525(100.0)                909(59.6)                 616(40.4) 
                 1995             1,205(100.0)                682(56.6)                 523(43.4) 
                 1996             1,172(100.0)                662(56.5)                 510(43.5) 
                 1997             1,143(100.0)                671(58.7)                 472(41.3) 
                 1998             1,098(100.0)                694(63.2)                 404(36.8) 
                 1999             1,064(100.0)                677(63.6)                 387(36.4)  
  Source: MAFF, 2000. 
  *: Non-Marketing farm households are included. 
In the end of 1997, however, the Korean economy confronted with the worst financial 
crisis in its history. The underlying causes of the Korean financial crisis are intermingled by 
internal and external factors (Han, 1999).  Financial shocks resulted in a lot of self-employment 
bankruptcies and a sharp increase in unemployment rate, almost to 10%.  As a result, people 
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who previously engaged in general economic sector as part-time farmers started becoming full-
time farmers.  As a result, the proportion of the full-time rice farms has increased since 1997 
when the financial crisis occurred. 
In addition, most young capable farmers have been migrating to urban areas to find more 
highly paid jobs, leaving only the older and less occupationally mobile farmers in rural areas.  
In 1990, approximately 56 percent of the Korean farmers were more than 50 years old as shown 
in Table 2.5.  The proportion increased to 68 percent in 1999.  The substantial proportion of 
older farmers may be a primal cause of the lack of vitality and international competitiveness of 
Korean agriculture because it is unrealistic to expect that the older farm operators will adopt 
new farm technology, and invest more to improve their farm operations.  Therefore, a dramatic 
increase in productivity and farm income cannot be expected in the near future. 
 Table 2.5. Rice Farm Labor Trends in Korea (Unit: %). 
                               1990           1995          1996            1997           1998         1999  
        Total             100.0           100.0         100.0          100.0           100.0        100.0  
            – 19            0.00             0.00           0.00             0.00             0.00          0.00 
       20 – 29            0.06             0.03           0.03             0.03             0.03          0.03  
       30 – 39            15.3             12.8           11.7             10.5             10.5            9.7 
       40 – 49            21.6             19.7           19.6             18.6             18.4          18.2   
       50 – 59            32.6             28.0           26.8             26.8             27.2          25.3   
       60 –                 23.7             36.1           39.0             41.5             40.6          43.3    
  Source: Korean MAFF, various years. 
In general, production costs are much higher than those of the U.S. because of the high 
farmland prices (Table 2.2).  Therefore, small size farms find it difficult to purchase farmland 
for enlarging their farm size.  As shown in Table 2.2, the production cost in Korea is 
approximately five times higher than that of the U.S. in 1996, but decreased to three times 
higher in 1999. This did not mean that the Korean production costs decreased dramatically due 
to the structural reform.  This was mainly due to the Korean currency depreciation since the 
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financial crisis in 1997.  The exchange rate was 805 Won/$1 in 1996, but it was 1400 Won/$1 
in 1997 (MAFF, 1998). 
2.1.2 Japanese Rice Farm Structure  
Japan s agricultural land reform, rigorously implemented throughout the country, 
abolished absentee ownership by 1950 and transferred two million hectares of farmland into the 
hands of small-scale cultivators, mostly former tenants (Goto and Imamura, 1993).  Ceiling 
provisions for individual holdings were set at 12 hectares in Hokkaido and 3 hectares in the rest 
of the country.  However, the agricultural land reform in 1950s did not change the average size 
of individual farms (Tweeten, 1993).   
 Table 2.6. Number of Japanese Rice Farm Households by Farm Size* 
                                                                                         (Unit: 1,000 households (%)). 
          Year          Below 1.0 ha         1.0 ha – 2.0 ha          Above 2.0                 Total 
         1990           1,753(60.8)                782(27.2)               348(12.1)          2,883(100.0) 
         1995           1,740(75.6)                380(16.5)               180(7.8)            2,301(100.0) 
         1996           1,689(74.9)                382(16.9)               183(8.1)            2,254(100.0) 
         1997           1,687(75.8)                366(16.4)               174(7.8)            2,227(100.0) 
         1998           1,658(75.9)                357(16.4)               169(7.7)            2,184(100.0) 
         1999           1,643(77.0)                334(15.7)               156(7.3)            2,133(100.0) 
  Source: MAFF, Japan, 2000. 
  *: Non-marketing farm households are excluded. 
The area of arable land in Japan decreased from 5,461 thousand ha in 1980 to 4,866 
thousand ha in 1999 (Table 2.1).  Table 2.1 shows that the number of farm households was 
4,661 thousand households in 1980 and decreased to 3,239 thousand households in 1999, 
resulting in an average farm size of about 1.5 hectare. 
Most Japanese rice farms are very small in size (Table 2.6).  The share of farms of less 
than 1.0 hectare was 60.8 percent and that of over 2 hectares was only 12.1 percent in 1990.  In 
1999, the farms below 1 hectare increased to 77 percent and the number rice farming over 2 
hectares were decreased to 7.3 percent due to the diversion program and trade liberalization.  As 
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shown in Table 2.1, the Japanese farm size has been increasing gradually but it is still small.  
For rice farms, the number of farms has been decreasing due to the diversion program and trade 
liberalization as well.  The average rice farm size is still less than 1 hectare although it has been 
increasing. 
 Table 2.7. The Number of Farms by Type* in Japan, 1990-1999 
                                                                                          (Units: 1,000 households, %). 
                                                                  Marketing Farms         Non-marketing Farms* 
            Year               Total                Full-time        Part-time 
           1990          3,835(100.0)          473(12.3)       2,497(65.1)           865(22.6)  
           1995          3,444(100.0)          428(12.4)       2,224(64.6)           792(23.0) 
           1996          3,388(100.0)          432(12.8)       2,171(64.1)           785(23.2) 
           1997          3,344(100.0)          436(13.0)       2,133(63.8)           775(23.2) 
           1998          3,291(100.0)          434(13.2)       2,088(63.5)           769(23.4) 
           1999          3,239(100.0)          433(13.4)       2,041(63.0)           764(23.6) 
  Source: MAFF, various years. 
  *: Non-marketing farmers, as part-time, produce agricultural products to consume, not to sell. 
Small farm size has contributed to the fact that rice in Japan is produced predominantly 
by part-time farmers (Table 2.7).  More than 80 percent of Japanese farmers are part-time 
including non-marketing farms.  Therefore, the importance of part-time farming has to be 
considered in the Japanese farm structure.   
The rapid decrease of new entrants to rice farming beginning in the 1960s is consistent 
with the aging of the current population of farmers.  More than 50 percent of farmers in Japan 
are 50 years of age or older (Immamura, 1993).  Younger generations fail to enter farming not 
because of low income from farming.  Even if they can become high-income earners in farming, 
or they are the inheritors of high-income family farms, many of them still will not enter farming 
because they prefer to work in non-farm corporations, which provide more satisfying work for 
them. 
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 Table 2.8. Japanese Rice Farm Labor by Age, 1999 (Unit: thousand people). 
                Total               19 – 29              30 – 59             60 – 64               64 <   
                6810                  484                   3295                  805                 2227 
              (100.0)               (7.1)                  (48.4)                (11.8)              (32.7)  
  Source: MAFF, 2000. 
As shown in Table 2.8, approximately 45 percent of rice farmers were older than 60 
years of age in 1999.  Therefore, we cannot expect either fast productivity increase adopting 
cutting-edge technology or dramatic changes in their rice farm structure. 
Table 2.9 shows production costs by farm size in 1998.  Total costs per hectare decrease 
as size increases from less than 0.5 hectares to more than 5 hectares.  Labor cost per hectare 
decreases from US$ 6,425 for farms less than 0.5 hectares to US$2,640 for farms greater than 5 
hectares.  In addition to labor, more efficient utilization of equipment contributes to economies 
of size. 
 Table 2.9. Rice Production Costs by Farm Size in Japan, 1998 (U.S.$/ha). 
                        Average   < 0.5    0.5-1.0    1.0-1.5    1.5-2.0    2 .0-3.0    3.0-5.0   > 5.0 
     Equipment*  6,192     8,134     6,911      6,225      5,762       5,495       4,989     4,836 
     Labor            4,353     6,425     5,121      4,385      3,947       3,734       3,234     2,640 
     By-product    -258      -267       -264        -236       -245         -248         -252       -288 
     Interest           394       164         190         233          452          533          677         805 
     Rent             2,307     2,573      2,459       2,434      2,368       2,314       2,112    1,702 
     Total          12,988   17,028    14,416     13,041    12,284     11,828     10,760    9,695 
  Source: MAFF, 2000, Japan. 
  *: Including fertilizer, chemicals, and machine. 
Large-scale farms may be able to cut costs substantially.  Table 2.9 shows that farm 
size/structure is a major constraint to lowering the national average cost of rice production and 
the substantial cost reductions could be achieved in Japan by enlargement of farms.  However, 
current average rice production costs in Japan are several times higher than those in major rice 
exporting countries such as Thailand and the U.S. 
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2.2 Rice Supply and Demand in Japan and Korea  
Rice supply and demand in Japan and Korea share many similarities. The production 
structure and policies for the rice sector have many common characteristics.  As these countries 
have become more wealthy industrial countries, they have experienced a similar long-term 
decline in per capita rice consumption. 
In terms of production, rice is the major crop grown in Japan and Korea, accounting for 
37 percent and 56 percent of the total planted acreage in 1999, respectively.  Although rice 
production has been relatively stable during the past 20 years, it has come from improved yield.  
The supply of paddy land for rice production has been stable over time due to the limited 
availability of land, as well as the low substitutability in land use between paddy and upland.  
Improvements in rice yields are mainly due to the adoption of new varieties, mechanization, and 
improved production practices in both countries (Im, 1999; Park, 1996).  Table 2.10 and 2.11 
indicate that the yield in Japan and Korea has increased by 31 percent and 52 percent in 2000, 
compared to 1980, respectively.      
On the consumption side, an increase in per capita income created a change in food 
consumption patterns in both countries. In addition, as per capita income has grown, per capita 
consumption of rice has declined gradually.  This is mainly due to the change in the dietary 
pattern of consumers in favor of protein food such as meat and vegetables (MAFF, 1995).  
However, the total consumption in rice has been stable in both countries due to an increase in 
population and higher demand in processing industries.   
2.2.1 Japan 
Rice production in Japan has decrease gradually with changes in food consumption 
patterns and with the recent changes in the rice marketing system. 
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As rice consumption began to decrease, the build-up of rice stocks began to place 
pressure on the government budget.  Due to this pressure, the rice diversion program was 
initiated in 1970 on a trial basis with an incentive subsidy for areas diverted from rice 
production.  Rice area declined to 2,377 ha by 1980.  Since 1970, several types of diversion 
programs have been implemented depending upon the level of rice stocks and the government 
budget situation (Ito, et al., 1997).  As a result, the area planted to rice in Japan decreased from 
2,377 thousand ha in 1980 to 1,788 thousand ha in 1999 (Table 2.1).  Total production declined 
to 8,636 thousand metric tons (MT) (milled) in 2000 from 10,612 MT (milled) in 1985.      
Rice yields increased by more than 20% from the level of 3.73 MT/ha (milled) in 1980 to 
a level of 4.88 MT/ha (milled) in 2000 (Table 2.10).  Since 1985, yields have been relatively 
stable ranged between levels of 4.53 to 4.93 except for the crop failure in 1993, when yields 
declined to 3.33 MT/ha due to cold weather.  Yield growth has been primarily due to varietal 
improvements and chemical inputs but also due to the diversion programs as less productive 
rice land has generally been diverted to alternative crops (Kako, et al., 1997; MAFF, 1998). 
 Table 2.10. Supply and Utilization of Rice in Japan, 1980-2000. 
                Area     Yield   Production  Consumption  Per Capita  Stocks   Imports   Exports 
  Year    1,000ha  MT/ha        --- 1,000MT ---                Kg                 --- 1,000MT ---  
  1980     2,377     3.73        8,873           10,100            78.9           4,000          75        909 
  1985     2,342     4.53      10,612           10,150            74.6           1,110          20            0 
  1990     2,074     4.61        9,554             9,620            70.0           1,005          17            0 
  1993     2,139     3.33        7,129             9,400            69.2              731     2,623            0 
  1994     2,212     4.93      10,903             9,350            66.3           1,883           9         410 
  1995     2,118     4.62        9,781             9,300            67.8           2,615        451        200 
  1996     1,977     4.77        9,413             9,250            67.3           3,078        600        300 
  1997     1,953     4.67        9,123             9,200            66.7           3,094        499        574 
  1998     1,801     4.53        8,154             9,100            62.5           2,492        554        210 
  1999     1,788     4.67        8,350             9,450            N/A           1,831        639        200 
  2000     1,770     4.88        8,636             9,300            N/A           1,297        730        600 
  Sources: MAFF, 2000; USDA/PS&D, 2000. 
  N/A: not available. 
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Annual per capita rice consumption decreased from 78.9kg in 1980 to 62.5kg in 1998.  
The Japanese diet has shifted to larger shares of dairy products, meats, and wheat products, 
although the government has tried to increase rice consumption with a school lunch program 
and other promotional activities (Wailes, et al., 1999).  The total consumption has decreased 
from 10,100 thousand MT (milled) in 1980 to 9,300 thousand MT (milled) in 2000 (Table 
2.10).  While rice has not lost it s significance as a food staple, it has become a less important 
component of the Japanese diet.  The decline in rice consumption is continuing in spite of high 
government expenditures to promote rice consumption, such as the school lunch program. 
The Japanese rice market was closed to imports except for processed rice products and 
for occasional severe domestic production shortfalls as occurred in 1980 and 1993 before the 
GATT agreement was reached on Japanese minimum access imports (USDA, 1995).  However, 
the Japanese refused to eat imported rice in 1980 because the imported rice was not the japonica 
type.  Therefore, the Japanese government reexported the rice imported in 1980.  In 1993, rice 
imports reached a peak of 2,623 thousand MT (milled) (Table 2.10).  Stocks have been 
normally about 10 to 15 percent of production, and production has been controlled by an 
elaborate supply management program in Japan involving fixed delivery quotas for producers 
and massive rice diversion programs with heavy subsidy payments (MAFF, 1994). 
Japan had a turbulent year for rice production and trade in 1993/1994.  Because of cool 
and rainy weather, the 1993/1994 rice harvest plunged to 7.129 million metric tons (MMT), the 
lowest in almost 50 years (Lee, 1997).  Faced with a disastrous crop and low domestic stocks, 
Japan temporarily abrogated its almost total ban on rice imports and signed contracts to import 
2.45 million tons.  When Japanese traders began to import rice, the impact on world rice prices 
was immediate and strong but fleeting: in the fall of 1993, prices initially soared, but dropped 
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considerably by $80/MT in 1994 (Figure 2.1).  A recovery in Japan s 1994/1995 rice crop, to 
10.9 MMT, along with large rice crops for most of the major exporters in 1994, led to 
significantly lower world rice prices in 1994. 
      Figure 2.1 Japanese and Korean Imports and the World Rice Price. 
Japan has imported all its rice from the United States, China, Australia, and Thailand.  
The first three countries provided mainly short-to-medium grain (japonica) rice, while Thailand 
supplied mainly long-grain (indica) and some glutinous rice (USDA/Attaché report, 1997).  
Thai and Chinese rice has sold at a significant discount to the U.S. and Australia rice as Chinese 
japonica is of very poor quality, while Thai indica rice has not been well received by Japanese 
consumers, who prefer high-quality japonica rice.  Domestically grown rice has sold at a large 
premium to all imported rice, but U.S. rice has fared well compared with rice from other 
countries.  Consumers have reluctantly purchased blended domestic and foreign rice as many 
customers preferred to buy domestic and imported rice packaged separately (MAFF, 1999). 
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2.2.2 Korea 
The South Korean government has intervened in the rice market through both output and 
input pricing.  The government has intervened in the rice market because rice is a very 
important part of both Korean culture and economy.  The total planted acreage of rice decreased 
from 1,233 thousand ha in 1980 to 1,072 thousand ha by 2000.  Rice yields increased from 3.24 
kg/ha in 1980 to 4.94 kg/ha by 2000 (Table 2.11). 
Rice yields fluctuated until the 1960s, with either floods or droughts seriously affecting 
the yields.  In the 1970s, the government invested in large-scale irrigation projects for paddy 
fields, developed new high-yielding varieties (Tongil), and also improved traditional japonica 
varieties.  Consequently, rice yields increased in the mid 1970s and became stable thereafter, 
except for 1980 when unusually cold weather was detrimental to yields (Song, et al., 1995).    
 Table 2.11. Supply and Utilization of Rice in Korea, 1980-2000. 
                Area     Yield   Production  Consumption  Per Capita   Stocks     Import   Export 
  Year   1,000ha   MT/ha         --- 1000MT ---               Kg                   --- 1000MT --- 
  1980    1,233       3.24       4,000          5,432              132.4        1,495        2,245           0 
  1985    1,237       4.55       5,626          5,807              128.1        1,251               0           0 
  1990    1,244       4.51       5,606          5,490              119.6        2,151               2         17 
  1993    1,136       4.18       4,750          5,300              110.2        1,393               4           0 
  1994    1,102       4.59       5,060          5,300              108.3        1,006               3       150 
  1995    1,056       4.45       4,694          5,200              106.5           615           115           0 
  1996    1,050       5.07       5,320          5,100              104.9           912               0           0 
  1997    1,052       5.18       5,450          5,112              102.4           805             77           0 
  1998    1,059       4.82       5,100          5,038                99.2           980           113           0 
  1999    1,066      4.94        5,263          5,003                96.6        1,355           115           0 
  2000    1,072      4.94        5,291          5,000                N/A        1,776           130           0  
  Source: PS&D, MAFF. 
  N/A: not available. 
Due to this production shortfall in 1980, the government imported more than 2.2 MMT 
of rice from the United States, mostly from Louisiana and California (Song and Carter, 1996).  
The actual shortfall was only 1.4 MMT.  The excess rice imports resulted in excess stock 
problems.  The ending stocks jumped to 1.5 MMT in 1980 (Table 2.11). 
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Good harvests followed after 1980, so the self-sufficiency rate exceeded 100 percent 
throughout the 1980s.  A poor harvest in 1993 reduced self-sufficiency to 86 percent but it 
recovered to 100 percent by 1996.  On the other hand, Korean rice production has increased 
from 3.0 MMT in the early 1960s to more than 5.0 MMT since late 1970’s, and this was 
possible due to the introduction of the Tongil high-yielding variety.  Acreage planted to Tongil 
accounted for 15.8% of the total rice acreage in 1972 and 76.2% in 1987.  Beginning in 1992, 
the government refused to buy Togil and farmers immediately stopped production, resulting in 
some rice yield decline (Rainey, 1993; MAFF, 1994). 
Total paddy rice production has ranged from 4 MMT in 1980 to 5.6 MMT in 1990, and it 
was 5.3 MMT in 2000.  Significant reductions in production in 1993 and 1995 prompted the 
government to import 115 thousand MT in 1995.  This import level was in excess of MA 
required by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
During the period of 1980-2000, Korean rice consumption has decreased from 5.43 
MMT in 1980 to 5.0 MMT in 2000.  Ending stocks fell to 0.98 MMT in 1998, but increased to 
1.78 MMT in 2000 (Table 2.11). Overall per capita consumption of rice in the 1980 was 
132.4kg, but it has decreased gradually to only 119.6 kg by 1990.  In the 1990s, the overall per 
capita consumption has continued to decline to 96.6 kg by 1999.   
2.3 Japanese and Korean Rice Policy Changes 
2.3.1 Japan 
Japan s current rice policy has its roots in the country s economic development policy 
following World War II.  At that time the government sought to encourage rice production 
through investment in rural infrastructure, research, and extension, while keeping producer rice 
prices low (Coyle, 1981).  The government s policy was carried out under the Staple Food 
 32
Control Law ($The 42 Act#).  The purpose of the law was to control food and to carry out the 
adjustment of supply, demand and prices and also to control distribution in order to secure food 
for customers and to ensure stability in the national economy.  The 42 Act gave the government 
exclusive control over the purchase, sale, and pricing of major foods such as rice, wheat, barley, 
and potatoes (MAFF, 1995; Kako, et al., 1997).   
In addition, Japan s agricultural development initially was further stimulated by land 
reform.  The reform measures transferred ownership of approximately one-third of all farmland 
to former tenants, imposed maximum sizes on farms, prohibited non-farm residents from 
renting out more than one hectare, and effectively outlawed the sale of land between farmers.  
The average family farm size, approximately 1 hectare, was considered a reasonable size for 
family labor in view of the labor productivity of that time (Susumu and Ito, 1993).  Since then, 
however, Japan s rice policy has had the effect of (1) curtailing the establishment of more 
efficient and larger farms and (2) encouraging cultivation of rice on a part-time basis. 
During the early 1960s, the producer price was roughly at parity with the world price.  
Producer rice prices subsequently began to increase rapidly, however, ultimately doubling 
between 1960 and 1969.  This rapid increase far exceeded the modest increase in prices paid in 
the international market.  In 1969, the Japanese producer price was more than double the world 
price (Tweeten, 1993). 
Resale prices for rice set by the Japanese Food Agency (JFA) were also high.  Just as 
higher producer rice prices were encouraging production, rising retail price levels also 
dampened demand, thereby contributing to a decline in total as well as per capita rice 
consumption in Japan.  Under this artificial stimulus, Japan became $self-sufficient# in rice by 
the late 1960’s.  The increase in the resale rice price above world market levels was made 
 33
possible by restrictions on imports.  Japan s imports from the United States, which had averaged 
around 162 thousand MT of milled rice annually from 1964-1967, were sharply curtailed to an 
average of about 2 thousand MT in 1968 and 1969 (Wailes, et al., 1993).  
High support prices not only resulted in the accumulation of increasing levels of surplus 
rice in government stocks, but also contributed to increasing government budget deficits. 
To cope with excess production, the government sought to divert farmers to other crops 
and to dispose of surplus government rice stocks.  The JFA responded to overproduction 
primarily in two ways: diversion programs and surplus disposal schemes.  These efforts failed 
as rice stocks again doubled by the end of the decade (MAFF, 1992). 
Beginning in 1969, the government implemented a series of diversion programs designed 
to induce rice farmers to divert land planted as paddy to the production of other crops.  
However, this program did not work as expected.   
With per capita rice consumption decreasing and excess production remaining at high 
levels, in 1971, the JFA established a new, long-term program, the Rice Production Control and 
Diversion Program.  The JFA s goal was to cut annual rice production by 2 million tons by 
inducing farmers to shift about 15 percent of the total paddy field area to other crops. 
The diversion program operated through a combination of $administrative guidance# and 
economic incentives.  This consisted of recommendations, advice, or directives issued by the 
JFA.  The JFA supplemented its administrative guidance with a package of economic 
incentives.  The principal measure consisted of direct incentive payments for diversion to other 
crops.  The JFA also took measures to subsidize additional investment costs associated with 
switching from rice to other crops, such as the acquisition of new machinery and livestock and 
land improvement to transform paddy to upland fields.  Despite the JFA s efforts, however, rice 
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production, stimulated by the high producer prices, continued to exceed target levels in four of 
the five years the program was in effect.  During this period, the JFA also sought to use a rice 
purchase program to reduce production. 
The JFA launched a second diversion program in 1976, the Comprehensive Paddy Field 
Utilization Program.  Target levels of the second diversion program were reduced somewhat.  
Under the new plan, incentive payments also varied depending on the crop selected.  
Nonetheless, production in 1977 again exceeded the JFA s target level. 
The JFA initiated a third program in 1978, the Paddy Field Utilization Reorientation 
Program, a diversion plan scheduled to operate through 1987.  The program set an annual 
reduction target of 1.7 MMT of rice for the first two years of the program, and increased 
upwards to 2.45 MMT in 1980.  Japanese imports of U.S. rice during that period averaged only 
about one thousand MT per year for a total domestic market of about 10 MMT. 
In 1986, the government announced that it would divert a total of 70 thousand hectares 
each year between 1987-1989.  This was necessary because of higher than normal rice stocks 
held as a result of three consecutive bumper harvests from 1984 to 1986.  With a fourth bumper 
crop in 1987, and increasing stock levels, the government decided to expand the rice land 
diversion by an additional 52 thousand hectares for the 1988 crop (Ito, et al., 1997).  The 
oversupply problem had been further exacerbated by declining consumption as the Japanese 
diet diversifies further away from rice to other grains and to red meat.  
Recently, the situation in the Japanese rice industry has been changing drastically 
because of the implementation of the GATT Uruguay Round agreement.  The GATT agreement 
allows Japan to exempt rice from tariffication for the period 1995-2001. Even this partial 
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opening of Japanese rice market has been shown to a large impact on the domestic and 
international rice industry (Cramer, et al., 1996). 
Besides the MA rice imports, the Japanese rice sector faces the following emerging 
issues.  First, domestic rice production costs are far above the international prices due to the 
small scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, high land costs, and over investment in farm 
machinery. Since Japan has partially opened the rice market, it became critically important to 
reduce the gap between domestic production costs and those of the major rice exporting 
countries.  The government has implemented various measures to reduce the production costs 
by promoting structural improvement policies and accelerating technological change.  However, 
Japan s rice farm size has been static.  Although the number of large scale farms has increased 
slightly, the average rice harvested area per rice farm household was 0.64 ha in 1980 and it has 
not increased significantly since then. Rice production costs in Japan still far exceeds that of 
rice exporting countries (Table 2.2). 
Second, rice is an inferior good in Japan, and a decrease in rice consumption will likely 
continue in the future (Ito, 1996).  On the other hand, rice supply would increase as a result of 
the MA rice import and rice yield increase.  Therefore, the rice diversion program may have to 
be strengthened in the future in order to maintain a balance between supply and demand.  The 
rice diversion program requires all rice producers to divert the same proportion of paddy field 
from rice production regardless of their farm size.  Thus, the rice acreage diversion program 
discouraged full time and core farmers from trying to expand their scale of operations.  Many 
researchers pointed out the importance of improving the rice diversion programs not to provide 
disincentives for more efficient large scale rice farms (Kako, et al., 1996). 
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Third, the average age of rice farmers has been increasing because of the decline in the 
number of young farmers staying on the farm.  This is due to the inferior income from rice 
farming and less favorable working conditions compared with non-agricultural economic 
activities.  Most of the rice is produced by small scale part-time farm households with a high 
dependence on off-farm income. 
Under the Uruguay Round minimum access agreement for rice, the government of Japan 
(GOJ) committed to purchase 379 thousand MT of rice on a milled basis.  Of the total minimum 
access rice, 9,811 MT were allocated for the Simultaneous Buy and Sell (SBS) tenders.  The 
U.S. captured 53 percent market share under the SBS tenders and approximately 46 percent of 
the minimum access tenders.  These tenders were completed in December 1995, and actual 
imports were completed by the end of the Japanese fiscal year 1995.  The GOJ also used 560 
thousand MT of foreign rice, which was imported in 1994 on an emergency basis, as food aid to 
North Korea and other developing countries.  The GOJ also implemented the New Food Law in 
November 1995 replacing the Staple Food Control Law, which had existed over the previous 50 
years.  Under the new law, some market-oriented principles were introduced into the Japanese 
rice market but the Japanese Food Agency (JFA) of the MAFF continues to control rice 
importation, and continues to exert strong influence over domestic distribution. 
In the meantime, as mentioned in Chapter one, the Japanese government notified the 
WTO of its decision to introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999. Under tariffication, 
a specific duty of 351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA 
volume. In and after Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen 
per kg was applied to imports outside of MA (MAFF, 1999).  Japan’s tariffication agreement of 
April 1 has three components: (1) a secondary tariff applied to rice imports above the MA 
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import levels (where the mark-up associated with the tariff equivalent of the MA is considered 
the primary tariff).  The initial secondary tariff rate is set at 351.17 yen per kg for 1999 
(approximately $3,000/MT) followed by a 2.5% reduction to 341 yen in 2000; (2) in agreeing to 
the possibility for over quota imports, Japan was allowed to reduce the annual increase in MA 
imports from 0.8% to only 0.4%; (3) the new policy adds a safeguard tariff of an additional 
33%, triggered at 125% of the previous 3-year moving rice import volume (USDA, 2000). 
2.3.2 Korea  
Agricultural prices have been unstable and low during the past half century.  Low wage 
rates kept food prices from increasing.  In addition, low inflation rates and high savings were 
needed to achieve high economic growth and to increase the export of industrial products.  In 
particular, low domestic food prices were forced by imported agricultural products, not by the 
highly increased productivity of domestic agriculture (Song, et al., 1995). 
As a result, the domestic agriculture system experienced severe damage.  Naturally, 
farmers had a low income growth rate compared with the non-farm sector.  An international 
comparison of the ratio of revenue from agriculture shows that the GNP decreased from 40% to 
7% in the Netherlands over took 165 years, 110 years in Denmark, 113 years in Great Britain, 
96 years in the U.S., 94 years in France, 92 years in Germany, and 73 years in Japan; however, 
only 26 years in Korea (Lee, 1996).  Korea s rapid decrease in the ratio of agricultural revenue 
to the GNP resulted in a harsh sacrifice for the agricultural sector through reduced agricultural 
prices.   
Low rice prices continued in the 1960’s, and the export of industrial products was 
accelerated.  The manufacturing sector became highly developed as well, therefore changing the 
whole economy of Korea.  But agricultural development lagged behind the industrial sector.  In 
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the late 1960’s, the government procurement price was lower than the market price.  
Subsequently, Two Price Systems for Barley (1969) and Rice (1970) were begun in the early 
1970’s.  These policies were aimed at upgrading the self-sufficiency rate of domestic food-
grains.   
The purpose of rice policy in Korea is to contribute to food security and the stability of 
the national economy, achieving self-sufficiency of table rice (MAFF, 2000).  This policy has 
the following objectives: efficient production of rice, alignment of demand and supply of rice 
and maintenance of reasonable prices.  In order to achieve its goal of self-sufficiency of table 
rice, MAFF has strengthened its rice production policy, focusing on improving quality.   
Since the 1970s, the rice policy has been changed to a mixed market system aimed at 
solving food shortages by adoption of a two price system, and the procurement and distribution 
of the higher yielding (but lower quality) Tongil rice variety.  In the 1970s, the rice policy was 
designed to achieve self-sufficiency for rice and to protect the producers and consumers by the 
two price system. 
In the 1980s, a surplus of rice developed.  Although, in 1981, the government imported 
substantial volumes of rice to deal with the crop shortage in 1980.  In this period, agricultural 
markets were based on the theory of liberalization of comparative advantage and the 
stabilization of agricultural price.  As a result, agricultural imports into Korea increased 
drastically during this period (Lee, 1997). 
From 1990, the rice policy was more concerned with the burdensome rice stocks and a 
deficit in the government grain account.  The government intervened in the rice market and 
began to sell the government stocks for price stabilization.  As a result, the market price of rice 
declined and the private market system became extremely unstable.  At that time, direct 
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management by the government was changed into an indirect management system, including 
agricultural cooperative associations.  The main components of the indirect management system 
were: 1) allowance of seasonal variation in price, 2) introduction of the deficiency payment 
system that the government supplements the difference between the purchase and the market 
prices, and 3) abolition of the rice control fund (MAFF, 1997). 
During this period, the full scale import of agricultural products was initiated under 
pressure by developed countries.  For instance, !The Super 301’ trade legislation in the U.S. 
forced Korea to open its agricultural markets.  Another international legal code that led to the 
liberalization of Korean agricultural markets was the Uruguay Round agreement of the GATT.  
Accordingly, liberalization was made for 234 commodity areas. 
Thereafter, the main stream of agricultural policy was transformed from the policy of 
self-sufficiency to the policy of import liberalization, from price policy to structure policy, and 
from agricultural income policy to non-agricultural income policy, etc. 
Since the early 1980s, as mentioned earlier, several steps have been taken to dismantle 
barriers to imports and to reduce export promotion measures.  This policy was aimed at 
improving the efficiency and competitiveness of the Korean economy as it moved into a 
transitional phase of economic development. 
Perhaps equally disturbing is the apparent change in direction in MAFF s basic policies.  
As mentioned earlier, MAFF has focused almost entirely on rice production policy, as 
evidenced by the fact that over 90 percent of support expenditures are to rice farmers.  A change 
occurred in 1994 following the Uruguay Round agreement, with resources being gradually 
shifted from rice to other areas, including production of cash crops, marketing facilities and 
rural infrastructure. 
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Traditionally, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has focused almost entirely on 
rice production policy.  A more forward-looking policy was adopted in 1994 following the 
Uruguay Round agreement, with resources being gradually shifted from rice to other areas, 
including production of cash crops, marketing facilities and rural infrastructure as mentioned 
earlier.  This past year, due in large part to political considerations, these forward-looking 
policies have been modified in favor of a renewed emphasis on rice production.  This is seen as 
an attempt to minimize the highly politically-sensitive issue surrounding rice imports. 
Starting in 1997 the Korean government introduced a new program, a direct payment 
system to encourage small and medium-sized rice farmers to retire and transfer productive lands 
to form larger operations.  Productivity would then be enhanced through greater economies of 
scale (USDA/Attaché report, 1998).   
As of 1999, rice income accounted for 39.1 percent of farm income.  In 1999, the average 
rice income per farm household was $6,125, agricultural income was $15,662, and farm income 
was $18,759.  The average rice acreage per farm was 1.0 ha and the rice income/ha was $7,919 
(MAFF, 2000).  Rice remains as the most important agricultural crop. Accordingly, Korean rice 
growers are experiencing a general consensus of alarm.  The main reason for alarm is because 
the Korean rice price is very high compared to the foreign rice price, thus Korean rice does not 
have a competitive edge over the foreign rice.  In 1999, the annual average producer price of 
Korean rice was $1,616/mt, whereas the international price was $499/MT (f.o.b., California 
Medium No.1), which means the Korean price is over 3 times higher than the international 
market price.  Naturally, the domestic rice industry is challenged to become more cost efficient 
if it is to develop a competitive rice production system. 
 41
According to the UR agreement, Korea was bound to specified import levels under the 
minimum access rules.  Korea has to increase rice imports under the minimum access rules 
from 1.0 % in 1995 to 4.0% of base year consumption (1986-1988) by 2005.  In 1995, Korea 
was supposed to import 51 thousand MT of rice for the first year of UR/GATT agreement 
implementation. However, Korea imported 115 thousand MT in 1995, which is mainly due to 
production shortfall.  In 2000, Korea imported 130 thousand MT of rice as the UR agreement 
commitment.  
Despite protestations from the U.S. government, Korean MAFF has announced that all 
rice imported during the initial years was for processing purposes only.  The U.S. government’s 
position is that this is against the spirit if not the law of the UR agreement. 
Among competitors, many local experts expect China to be a major supplier over the 
long term.  China has reportedly developed new varieties of rice to meet Korean taste.  This rice 
is being grown by ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Liaoning and 
Heilongjinag (USDA, 1998). 
The price of Chinese rice is about one-eighth that of similar rice produced in Korea.  
China also has the obvious advantage of lower transportation cost due to its close proximity to 
Korea.  Vietnam and Thailand are also reportedly making plans to export their long-grain rice.  
Australia is also aggressively seeking to gain a share of any medium-grain rice imported by 
Korea.  As a matter of fact, China has been a major rice exporter to Korea.  For example, Korea 
imported 51 thousand MT of Indian rice to meet its MA requirements in 1995. This rice was 
intended to meet its 1995 obligations. Since then, Korea imported additional 64 thousand MT of 
medium grain rice from China to meet its 1996 MA requirements in 1997. In addition, Korea 
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imported 81 thousand MT from China and 13 thousand MT from Thailand in 1999 (USDA, 
2000).  
Korea’s MA commitment is in affect until 2004. Korea’s strategy for meeting its 
commitment includes purchase of only lower quality rice, equivalent to U.S. No. 3 or lower, to 
avoid table competition for it’s heavily subsidized domestic rice. 
The WTO Agreement also requires a reduction of domestic production subsidies, which 
is also leading to a further reduction in rice production in Korea.  While the Agreement allows 
for decoupled income compensation, which means a production-neutral subsidy, Korea is not 
implementing this direct payment system for all farmers yet (MAFF, 2000). 
2.4 U. S. Rice Exports 
The U.S. is a leading exporter of rice in the international market, accounting for about 12 
percent of global rice trade although the U.S. accounts for less than 2 percent of global rice 
production.  The U.S. currently ranks fourth among major exporters, behind Thailand, Vietnam, 
and China.  More than 40 percent of the U.S. rice crop is exported each year, making the U.S. 
market sensitive to movements in international prices (USDA, 2000).  
Most countries produce only one type of rice, but the United States produces both types 
(japonica in California, and indica in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and Missouri) 
and is in a unique position in that it can export significant amounts of both types (Song and 
Carter, 1996).  However, the U.S. rice programs, marketing loan payments and marketing loan 
gains, essentially treats rice as a homogenous crop (Wailes, 2000) and does not provide clear 
market signals corresponding to changing market conditions by subspecies (Childs and Lin, 
1989).  Rice is treated as a homogenous crop in the sense that (a) a single target price and 
acreage reduction program (ARP) rate is applied to all rice types, and (b) the rice grading 
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system does not distinguish California medium grain (japonica) from southern long grain 
(indica); i.e., it applies the same loan rate and marketing loan repayment rate.  This distinction 
becomes more critical under freer trade, because the largest potential importers, Japan and 
Korea, have strong preferences for japonica rice (Wailes, 2000; Haley, 1992). 
The total volume of U.S. exports ranged from 2.5 MMT to 2.8 MMT (milled basis) from 
1995/96 to 1999/2000.  However, this is well below the 1994/95 record of 3.3 MMT.  The U.S. 
was the largest exporter of rice most years from the late 1960’s through 1980, with Thailand 
occasionally out-shipping the U.S.  However, Thailand has been the leading exporter of rice 
every year since 1981, largely due to expanded area.  By the mid-1990’s, Vietnam had 
recovered enough from decades of war and political upheavals to become the second largest 
exporter.  The country had returned as an exporter only in the late 1980’s after a 30-year 
absence.  In the late-1990’s, China emerged as a major exporter due to declining per capita 
consumption and several years of bumper crops, making the country the third largest exporter.    
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice 
exports supplied 65% of that market-mostly from California (Schnepf and Just, 1995).  
However, by the mid-1980’s, Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous 
government programs, and imports were essentially banned.  After losing its largest importer, 
Korea, in 1983, California accumulated rice stocks, relative to the southern states. Since 1983, 
the U.S. exported no rice to Korea.  
In the meantime, Japan accounts for the bulk of U.S. medium grain brown rice exports.  
In 1999/2000, Japan imported nearly 150 thousand MT of medium grain brown rice from the 
U.S., down from a year earlier record 250 thousand MT.  Japan divides its rice purchases 
between milled and brown rice, with each type’s share varying each year.  The U.S. typically 
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supplies half of Japan’s total rice purchases.  The U.S. exports about 10 thousand to 14 
thousand MT of short grain brown rice each year.  Japan accounts for two-thirds, most of it sold 
under the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) portion of their total WTO commitments.     
The U.S. market share in Japanese import market has been about 50% since 1995. 
However, the U.S. market share in Japan decreased in recent years due to heavy competition 
among the major export countries, such as Australia, China, and Thailand.  For example, the 
U.S. has recently lost substantial market share in the SBS to Australia and China. 
2.4.1 Government Rice Programs 
Rice farming in the U.S. has been affected by federal legislations since the enactment of 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  The main objectives of U.S. rice policy have been to 
support farm price and income, and thus to provide the safety-net for rice farming.  To achieve 
the policy goals, various policy instruments have been adopted that can be classified by three 
basic categories: (1) price support programs, (2) supply control programs, and (3) income 
support programs.  
Price support has been provided by non-recourse loan program since 1941.  Under this 
program, producers may pledge their production as collateral for obtaining loans from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).  Once they have placed their rice under loan, producers 
have a 9-month period in which to redeem their loans.  At the end of that period, they must 
decide whether to redeem the loan or forfeit their rice to the CCC.  Producers have incentives to 
redeem the loan if the market price rises above the loan rate plus interest charges.  
Alternatively, they may default on the loan and forfeit the collateral rice to CCC without 
penalty, when the market prices are unfavorable.  Thus, the loan rate may serve as a guaranteed 
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minimum farm price to producers.  Only farmers participating in the government farm programs 
are eligible for such loans. 
During the early 1980’s, loan rates well above market prices deteriorated U.S. 
competitiveness in world markets by serving as a “floor price” for U.S. rice.  Loan rates in 
excess large quantities of rice to be forfeited to the government and a large U.S. price premium 
in international markets.  As a result, the price support program was modified to introduce the 
marketing loan program for rice in the 1985 farm legislation. 
The marketing loan program links loan repayment rates to the prevailing world price of 
rice rather than the higher announced loan rate (ALR).  Rice producers can repay loans at the 
lower of a USDA-calculated world price (loan repayment rate or LRR) or a set percentage of 
the loan rate.  Alternatively, producers can receive an equivalent loan deficiency payment with 
agreement to forgo placing their crop under loan.  The difference between the ALR and the 
world price (LRR) is called the marketing loan gain, when the world price is below the ALR.  If 
the world price is above the ALR, the LRR equals the ALR (Livezey, 1993). 
Supply control programs for rice were changed by the 1981 farm legislation, which 
terminated acreage allotments and introduced the concept of crop acreage base for individual 
farms that is eligible for government program benefits.  For rice, the acreage base is the average 
of the acreage planted to rice and the acreage considered planted to rice on the individual farm 
in the 3 preceding crop years (Schnef and Just, 1995).  Supply controls have been implemented 
through acreage control programs such as the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) and the Paid 
Land Diversion (PLD) program, and planting flexibility programs such as the 50/92 program, 
the normal flex acres (NFA) program, and the optional flex acres (OFA) program. 
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The ARP has been used as supply control method since 1982, requiring land to be 
diverted from a farm’s rice base acreage and put into approved conservation uses.  Compliance 
was required for eligibility for loans and deficiency payments.  Acres reduced under ARP are 
not eligible for program payment but are considered planted to rice for acreage base purposed.  
The Secretary of Agriculture has discretion in setting an ARP level, which can range from zero 
to 35 percent of base acres.  Other measures, such as the PLD program and the Payment-in-kind 
(PIK) program were used together with ARP in 1983 to reduce rice acreage and the large 
government stocks.  The PIK was an acreage reduction program under which farmers received 
the commodity normally grown on acreage they withdrew from production. 
Planting flexibility programs were introduced to allow producers to plant another crop 
without a reduction in the established crop acreage base so that producers can make production 
decisions in response to market conditions, rather than being locked into certain crops to 
maintain acreage base.  Specific programs of planting flexibility were the 50/92 program in the 
1985 farm legislation and the triple base provisions in the 1990 farm legislation. 
Under the 50/92 program, rice growers who under plant their permitted acreage by 
planting between 50 and 92 percent of the permitted acreage and devoting the remaining 
permitted acres to a conservation use would receive deficiency payments on 92 percent of the 
permitted acreage.  The 50/92 program was changed to the 50/85 program in 1994 under which 
farmers are eligible to receive payments on only 85 percent of maximum payment acres 
(Broussard, 1992). 
The concept of “triple base” increased planting flexibility. Normal flex acres (NFA) 
made up the 15 percent of crop acreage base, which is not eligible for deficiency payments.  
Crops other than rice can be planted on NFA without decreasing established base.  Optional flex 
 47
acres (OFA) are an additional 10 percent of maximum payment acres that can be planted to rice 
while receiving deficiency payment or to other crops without losing established acreage base.  
Thus, maximum payment acreage is equal to the crop acreage base less NFA or any ARP.  
Under a combined NFA and OFA, up to 25 percent of crop acreage base can be flexed out of 
rice and planted to another crop while the crop acreage base is protected for future years 
(Salassi, 1991).  As shown in Table 2.13, the ARP was used as a major tool for supply controls 
during 1982-1990, while the 50/85-92 program and the NFA/OFA provisions became more 
important starting 1991.  However, as a result of the UR agreement, the U.S. agreed to lower its 
rice tariffs by 36 percent in six equal installments by 2000 starting in 1995.  The United States 
also agreed to establish quantity and budgetary ceilings for export subsidies and reduce these 21 
percent and 36 percent by 2000.  The U.S. does not currently provide direct export subsidies for 
rice exports.  The U.S. continues to include rice in international food aid shipments the Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP) provided targeted export assistance in former U.S. markets, but 
there have been no EEP sales for rice in 4 years.  
The 1996 Farm Act, enacted more than a year after the UR was concluded, contained 
important policy reforms that reduced trade-distorting domestic support policies eliminating 
50/85-92 and NFA/OFA programs in 1996.  Under the 1996 Farm Act, producer support in the 
U.S. is provided in the form of direct payments that are not tied to current planting levels, thus 
fitting in the UR “Green Box” category where policies are exempt from the UR reduction 
commitments.  
Since rice is a program crop, participating rice producers are eligible for production 
flexibility contract payments (PFCs).  In 1997/98, the PFC payment rate was $2.71 per cwt, 
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compared with a market price of $9.70.  Participating producers received payments on 85 
percent of their contract acreage based on their program yield. 
In addition to annual PFC payments, a marketing loan program is provided to U.S. rice 
producers.  Producer support under the marketing loan program includes both loan deficiency 
payments and marketing loan gains.  Payment rates are based on the difference between the 
announced world price and the established loan rate, with payments resulting when the 
announced world rice price is less than the loan rate.  The marketing loan program fits the UR 
“Amber Box” category. 
Table 2.12. Farm Program Base Acres, Program Acres Idled, and Participation,     
       1982/83-1999/2000. 
                 Contract acres         Partici-   ARP               Acres idled / Diverted / Flexed      *   
  Crop     Total   Enrolled 1/     pation     as a       ARP    CRP   50/85-92  NFA/OFA  Total    
  Year                                        rate     percent     
              --- 1,000 acres ---         --- percent ---                         --- 1,000 acres ---            
  82/83     3,969      3,093          77.9        15          15        NA        NA          NA             0 
  83/84     3,946      3,857          97.7        15        547        NA        NA          NA         739 
  84/85     4,183      3,517          84.6        25        785        NA        NA          NA         785 
  85/86     4,234      3,814          90.1        20        682        NA        NA          NA      1,241 
  86/87     4,249      3,978          93.6        35     1,305           1        174           NA      1,480 
  87/88     4,160      3,998          96.1        35     1,325           3        241           NA      1,569 
  88/89     4,155      3,918          94.3        25        950           4        138           NA      1,092 
  89/90     4,168      3,906          93.7        25        939           9        245           NA      1,193 
  90/91     4,154      3,890          93.7        20        735         13        287           NA      1,035 
  91/92     4,155      3,947          95.0         5         196         13        654           454      1,143 
  92/93     4,139      3,989          96.4         0             0         13        446           448         907 
  93/94     4,143      4,000          96.5         5         199         13        481           469      1,162 
  94/95     4,158      3,969          95.4         0             0         13        258           433         703 
  95/96     4,182      3,962          94.7         5         197         13        279           427         916 
  96/97     4,176      4,158          99.6     2/NA     2/NA         6       2/NA        2/NA     2/NA 
  97/98       ---         4,157          99.9     2/NA     2/NA         4       2/NA        2/NA     2/NA 
  98/99       ---         4,161          99.9     2/NA     2/NA         4       2/NA        2/NA     2/NA 
  99/00       ---         4,152          99.9     2/NA     2/NA         3       2/NA        2/NA     2/NA 
  *: Diverted acres are excluded. 
  1/ Enrolled for area reduction or contract payments. 
  2/ Eliminated under the 1996 farm act. 
  Source: USDA, Rice Situation and Outlook yearbook, 2000. 
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There were no marketing loan payments from 1996/97 through 1997/98, and payments 
were negligible in 1998/99.  However, low world prices are responsible for sizable marketing 
loan payments in 1999/2000.  Because of economic hardships stemming from falling farm 
incomes and weather-related disasters, the U.S. Congress provided supplemental emergency 
assistance payments to recipients of PFC payments in both 1998/99 and 1999/2000.  These 
emergency payments increased payments to rice producers by 50 percent in 1998 and doubled 
the total level of direct payments in 1999 (Child and Hoffman, 1999). 
2.4.2 Government Programs for U.S. Rice Exports 
There are four types of government programs for U.S. rice exports.  First, under PL 480, 
the U.S. sells rice on concessional credit terms and donates rice to needy countries either 
bilaterally or through the World Food Program.  Second, USDA provides export credit 
guarantees (GSM-102) and intermediate Export Credit Guarantee (GSM-103) for commercial 
financing of U.S. agricultural exports.  Third, the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) 
facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized exports from 
other countries.  Finally, USDA funds the creation, expansion, and maintenance of foreign 
markets for U.S. agricultural products.  In addition, several other programs can assist U.S. rice 
exports such as the Emerging Market Program, the Qualities Samples Pilot Program, and the 
Cochran Fellowship Program. 
PL 480 
The PL 480 food aid program is comprised of three titles.  Title I is administered by 
USDA.  Titles II and III are administered by the Agency for International Development (AID).  
Each title has different objectives and provides agricultural assistance to countries at different 
levels of economic development. 
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Title I provides government-to-government sales of agricultural commodities to 
developing countries under long-term credit arrangements.  Title II provides for donations of 
U.S. agricultural commodities by the U.S. government to meet humanitarian food needs in 
foreign countries.  Commodities may be provided to meet emergency needs under government-
to-government agreements, through public and private agencies, including intergovernmental 
organizations such as the World Food Program, and other multilateral organizations.  Non-
emergency assistance may be provided through private voluntary organizations, cooperatives, 
and intergovernmental organizations.  Commodities requested may be supplied from the 
Commodity credit Corporation (CCC) inventory acquired under price support programs or 
purchased from private stocks.  Title III provides for government-to-government grants to 
support long-term economic development in least-developed countries.  
Credit Guarantees 
The programs encourage exports to buyers in countries where credit is necessary to 
maintain or increase U.S. sales, but where financing may not be available without CCC 
guarantees. 
GSM-102 and GSM-103 underwrite credit extended by the private banking sector in the 
U.S. to approved foreign banks using dollar-denominated, irrevocable letters of credit to pay for 
food and agricultural products sold to foreign buyers.  New and experienced exporters can 
benefit from export guarantee programs.  Theses programs promote exports by providing 
exporters greater access to credit and credit risk protection.  The GSM-102 covers credit terms 
for up to 3 years, and the GSM-103 covers longer credit terms for up to 10 years (USDA, 2000). 
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Under Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, the CCC guarantees a portion of payments 
due from importers under short-term financing, up to 180 days, that exporters have extended 
directly to the importers from the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities and products.   
Market Access Programs 
The Market Access Program (MAP) uses funds from the CCC to aid in the creation, 
expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products.  The MAP forms 
a partnership between non-profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, U.S. agricultural 
cooperatives, non-profit State-regional trade groups, small U.S. businesses, and the CCC to 
share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities such as consumer promotions, 
market research, trade shows, and trade servicing. 
Foreign Market Development Program 
The Foreign Market Development (FMD) program uses funds from the CCC to aid in the 
creation, expansion, and maintenance of long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural 
products.  The program fosters a trade promotion partnership between USDA and U.S. 
agricultural producers and processors who are represented by nonprofit commodity or trade 
associations called Cooperators (Childs and Burdett, 2000). 
Export Enhancement Program 
The EEP facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized 
exports from other countries.  The EEP was originally intended to counterbalance subsidized 
exports by the European Union (EU).  Thus EEP has traditionally been used to assist medium 
grain exports to countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea.  In recent years, the EEP’s purpose 
is to counterbalance subsidized exports from specified exporters, i.e., not just the EU.  
However, with declining EU rice exports in recent years, the importance of EEP subsidies has 
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diminished.  In fact, EEP has been eliminated by 1996 FAIR Act.  Therefore, there have been 
no rice EEP sales since August 1995 and no shipments since late 1995 (USDA, 1999). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this study, the linkage of the Japanese and Korean rice imports and U.S. rice exports 
are analyzed using a game theoretic approach along with econometric supply and demand 
models and the political preference function (PPF) determination. 
The Japanese and Korean rice economies are analyzed using empirical supply and 
demand models and the elasticity estimates.  For the U.S., the export demand will be estimated 
using an empirical econometric model. The elasticities are estimated as well.  For U.S. rice 
exports, the domestic supply and demand will not be estimated because this study focuses on 
the linkage between the Japanese and Korean imports and U.S. exports, not on the U.S. 
domestic rice economy.   For the reason, U.S. export demand will be estimated. 
In addition, a political preference function (PPF) approach is applied to measure the 
implicit political weights of interest groups of these three countries that represent the policy-
influencing powers.   
This study analyzes the possible impacts of policy changes in these three countries 
incorporating the econometric and the PPF determination approaches into a game theoretic 
approach.  Game theory is useful in understanding the nature of market outcomes when such 
policies matter.   
3.1 Supply and Demand Specification 
To conduct the analysis for U.S. rice exports, it is essential to coherently estimate the 
market models for the two countries and export demand for the U.S. In describing the structure 
of the domestic rice economy, the essential components of the Korean and Japanese rice market 
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models are supply and demand functions. Producer supply and consumer demand are based on 
microeconomic foundations. 
For producers, we assume that there is a profit maximizing producer with the production 
function f(x), where x∈Rn is an input vector.  Furthermore, assume
 
the output price, p, and 
input costs w ∈Rn+ are exogenous.  Then the producer’s profit maximization problem can be 
written as: Max π (x) = pf(x) – wx.  A set of input demand functions are derived by solving the 
first order conditions as: x* = x*(p,w) which are the producer’s factor demands that express 
optimal choices as functions of output price (p) and factor prices (w).  Output supply can be 
derived from the maximum profit functions by applying Hotelling’s lemma: y* = y*(p, w). This 
set of equations shows output supply of the profit maximizing producer, which is a function of 
output price and input prices, and is homogeneous of degree zero in all prices.  
Consumer demand is derived from a utility function that defines consumer preferences. 
Defining the utility function as U(q), where q ∈Rn, then the consumer utility maximization 
problem is  Max { U(q): q∈Rn , pq≤M}.  Solving the first order necessary condition for q, the 
Marshallian market demand is derived as a function of price (p) and income (M): q*= q*(p, M) 
(Varian, 1992). 
Agricultural producers operate in an environment with uncertain yields and prices. 
Farmers typically make production decisions at the beginning of the season, knowing neither 
the market price for their products at harvest time nor the weather conditions during the season 
that will determine their yields. Various models could be applied to the commodity markets 
depending on the objective of research and the market structure. For the purpose of this study, a 
distributed lag structure is specified to describe the dynamic responses of supply and demand 
caused by the price expectations and adjustment process. The assumption that the economic 
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system has a distributed lag structure is often justified on the ground that changes in an 
endogenous variable caused by an exogenous shock may occur through time, and the impacts of 
exogenous changes on the dependent variable take time to work.  
Various theories lead to specific distributed lag models. Initially, such a model was 
associated with Koyck’s (1954) study of investment. However, the Koyck model is ad hoc since 
it is obtained by a purely algebraic process and has no theoretical underpinning. Two 
approaches are developed to specify the lag model: the theory-based approach and the data-
based approach (Judge et al, 1985). The theory-based distributed lag model includes Nerlove’s 
partial adjustment model. In this approach, the forms of the lag are the result of behavioral 
assumptions. 
In this study, Nerlove’s partial adjustment model is hypothesized as an appropriate model 
for capturing the dynamics inherent in supply and demand of the Korean and Japanese rice 
sectors. Since rice farmers tend to have a lagged response to market prices due to the fixity of 
costly inputs and imperfect information, the partial adjustment model can be hypothesized as an 
appropriate model for the study.  The partial adjustment model has been widely used in the 
analysis of the supply and demand for particular commodities. Among the most typical studies, 
the work of Nerlove (1958, 1983), Rao (1989), Fan, Wailes and Cramer (1994), Song and 
Carter (1996), Love and Rausser (1997), Cramer, et al. (1999) are related to agricultural 
commodities. This short selective list suggests that the partial adjustment model is particularly 
appropriate for the analysis of agricultural commodities.   
Dynamic specifications of supply and demand response models have been popular since 
Nerlove (1958) used the partial adjustment model of supply response. In the partial adjustment 
model, the actual value of the dependent variable adjusts by some constant fraction of the 
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difference between the actual and desired values. This can be justified by citing technological, 
institutional or psychological inertia.  
In Korea and Japan, adjustment inertia may be directly related to an unfavorable 
production structure and heavy regulation in the rice sector.  In addition, Eckstein (1984) shows 
that a dynamic rational expectations supply equation derived from the farmer optimization 
problem is equivalent to the Nerlovian supply response model in that both models have the 
same reduced forms. Eckstein (1984) shows that the dynamic supply equation derived from the 
farmer optimization problem, which considers dynamic constraints on land allocations through 
the cost function, can justify the Nerlovian supply equation.  
Furthermore, habit formation seems to be a predominant characteristic of agricultural 
demand behavior, particularly for a national staple food like rice in Japan and Korea. With rice 
being an important staple food, consumers may also buy stable quantities that are different from 
the equilibrium quantities indicated by their static demand equation. This implies that 
consumers tend to adjust only partially to changes in optimal purchase quantities. Thus, the 
partial adjustment model is also thought to be an appropriate model for explaining the dynamic 
nature of the Korean and Japanese rice consumption. In consumer demand it is assumed that 
consumers do not adjust their consumption behavior instantaneously to changes in price and 
income due to habit formation.   
The dynamic econometric model specified in this study is characterized by a combination 
of a partial adjustment process both in supply and demand, and cobweb type price expectations 
in supply response. The long-run adjustment responses are embodied in this model due to factor 
fixity in supply and habit formation in demand.  
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Supply and demand responses for rice are specified in terms of domestic production and 
consumption. The dynamics and the relationship between short-run and long-run responses can 
be seen by the specified market model within the partial adjustment model framework. 
3.1.1 Supply Model  
We assume that the supply of rice is determined by profit-maximizing producers.  They 
maximize their net revenue received from their outputs subject to technical and regulatory 
constraints. Based on the theory of the producer, the relationships can be expressed as functions 
of expected output price and input prices. Like other agricultural producers, however, rice 
farmers tend to have a lagged response to the market price because of fixed inputs such as land 
and machinery. Also, the rice price in the previous year may be a major factor in the current 
year’s planting decision, since the price of rice has been controlled by both countries’ 
governments after the harvesting season. Thus, the previous period’s price is used as an 
expected price. When this naive expectation is combined with the partial adjustment behavior, 
the acreage response equation can be derived.  
A Nerlovian expected price and partial adjustment model is used to specify each country 
model.  Nerlove (1958) assumed that farmer’s reactions are based on price expectations and/or 
area adjustments.  In the partial adjustment model, the actual value of the dependent variable 
adjusts by some constant fraction of the difference between the actual and desired values. The 
basic concept of the Nerlovian model is as follows: Models of supply response can be 
formulated in terms of yield, area harvested, or output response of individual crops.  For 
instance, the desired area to be allocated to a crop in period t is a function of expected relative 
prices and a number of shifters: 
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Q*t  β P*t +λ Zt +U t             (3.1.1) 
In equation (3.1.1), Q*t is the desired cultivated area in period t; P*t is the expected price; Zt is a 
set of other exogenous shifters, principally private and public fixed factors and truly exogenous 
variables such as the price of major inputs; and Ut accounts for the unobserved random variable 
DIIHFWLQJ WKH DUHD XQGHU FXOWLYDWLRQ ZLWK H[SHFWHG YDOXH RI ]HUR 7KH  β , and λ  are 
parameters (or elasticities if the variables are expressed logarithmically) and β  is the long-run 
coefficient (elasticity) of supply response. 
Because full adjustment to the desired allocation of land may not be possible in the short 
UXQWKHDFWXDODGMXVWPHQWLQDUHDZLOOEHRQO\DIUDFWLRQ RIWKHGHVLUHGDGMXVWPHQW 
Qt ! Qt-1 =  (Q*t ! Qt-1)             (3.1.2) 
where QtLVWKHDFWXDODUHDKDUYHVWHGRIWKHFURS LVWKHSDUWLDO-adjustment coefficient. 
Equation (3.1.3) and (3.1.4) indicate the producer’s price expectation mechanism linking 
P* and W* to observable P and W values. 
Pt* = Pt-1                (3.1.3) 
Wt*= Wt-1                (3.1.4) 
The reduced-form equation relating acreage and prices is found by solving equations 
(3.1.1)-(3.1.4) for acreage in terms of the observable variables of the system, yielding  
Qt = b1 + b2Pt-1  + b3Zt-1 +b4Qt-1+ et           (3.1.5) 
where b1 = αδ ,   b2 =βδ , b3 =λδ ,  b4 = 1-δ  and  et =δ Ut. 
This hypothesizes that the current acreage response depends on the expected output and 
input prices as well as on the acreage in the previous year.  The larger the coefficient of 
adjustment (δ ), the faster the acreage adjustment is completed. If δ = 1, then complete 
adjustment occurs in the current period so that the short-run acreage response is equal to the 
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long-run equilibrium. The short-run supply elasticity with respect to the output price is easily 
derived from equation (3.1.5).  
The lagged dependent variables are used in some specifications since it is assumed that 
producers adjust to changes in market condition over time rather than instantaneously following 
Nerlove.    
In addition, the area harvested affects rice yield.  When a government implements a 
diversion program, producers divert less productive land first if they are given a choice.  The 
other factors affecting yield is technology (TT).  
The domestic yield equation is specified as: 
YHAt = f(AHAt, TT, D)             (3.1.6) 
PDt  = YHAt * AHAt             (3.1.7) 
where AHAt = area harvested in time period t 
YHAt = yield in time period t 
TT = time trend  
PDt  = production 
D = dummy variable to indicate a natural disaster and/or other unexplainable variations. 
3.1.2 Demand Model 
We assume that the demand for rice is determined by utility-maximizing consumers 
subject to the budget constraint. Based on the neoclassical theory of utility maximization, 
consumer demand for rice is described as a function of the own price, prices of substitutes, and 
income. The dynamics of demand, which is postulated as resulting from habit formation in this 
study, is analyzed similar to the producer case. For example, if we assume that rice 
consumption is gradually affected by the consumer’s price through a geometric lag, one-year 
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lagged consumption could be selected to impose a lagged distribution effect on the current 
consumption behavior. Then, the consumption function is derived as follows: 
CONt* = δ 0 + δ 1Pt + δ 2 PSt + δ 3 It +ut            (3.1.8) 
CONt – CONt-1 = π ( CONt* - CONt-1)            (3.1.9) 
where CONt* is desired consumption which depends on consumer price (Pt), substitute prices 
(PSt), income (It), and a disturbance term (ut).  
Equation (3.1.9) is the partial adjustment process arising from habit formation. The 
coefficient of adjustment is denoted by π . Combining the above two equations yields a first-
order difference equation, 
CONt= δ 0 π+ δ 1 π Pt + δ 2 π  PSt + δ 3 π It + (1-π )CONt-1+ π ut.     (3.1.10) 
The observable and estimable consumption equation is as follows: 
CONt= c1 + c2 Pt + c3 PSt + c4 It + c5 CONt-1+ et         (3.1.11) 
where c1= δ0π , c2=δ 1 π , c3=δ 2 π , c4= δ 3 π , c5 =1 -π , and et = π ut. 
The short-run and long run elasticities with respect to the retail price are defined as: η LR 
= η SR/π .  One would expect that the own-price effect will be negative and that the income 
effect will be positive in the case of normal goods, with the sign reversed if rice is an inferior 
good.    
In this study, consumption is specified in terms of per capita demand rather than the 
aggregate consumption level. An important issue in empirical work on market demand is the 
aggregation problem. Estimating the aggregated consumption parameters with any reliable 
confidence is not easy. The difficulties encountered when proceeding from individual demand 
equations to aggregate demand equations are generally referred to as ‘the aggregation problem’. 
 61
Per capita relationships have the additional advantage of being more meaningful and stable 
relationships (Varian, 1992; Houthakker and Taylor, 1970)  
Actually it has often been argued that regression analysis of aggregated consumption 
could not give plausible estimation of parameters. Therefore, in this study, the domestic rice 
consumption is specified in terms of per capita rice demand. When we use aggregate 
consumption data divided by population to implement models derived from the theory of an 
individual consumer, we think of them as relating to a representative consumer whose behavior 
reflects the average consumer. Domestic consumption is defined as per capita consumption 
times population. Then, the aggregated consumption is calculated as 
TCONt  = CONt* POPt             (3.1.12) 
where TCONt represents the total rice domestic consumption and POPt is total population 
determined exogenously in year t.  
3.1.3 The Specification for U.S. Export Demand 
Product differentiation is considered a critical factor in understanding rice trade flows 
(Siamwalla and Haykin, 1983; Cramer, et al., 1991). One difficulty in trying to differentiate 
among rice products is that there is no standard classification in use. Strong preferences for 
particular rice types are based primarily on cooking and taste characteristics (Wailes, 2000). 
In this study, especially for the export demand model, U.S. rice is modeled as a 
heterogeneous commodity, and is categorized into two groups: California rice (japonica), and 
southern states’ rice (indica) to avoid aggregation bias that may occur when rice is treated as a 
homogeneous product (Batemen, 1988; Cramer, et al., 1993; Song and Carter, 1996; Wailes, 
2000).  
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California short/medium grain rice is acceptable in Japan and Korea. Therefore, 
California short/medium grain rice is considered as japonica and southern states’ rice is 
considered as indica. In fact, It could be argued that since Korea imported Louisiana medium-
grain rice in the early 1980s, southern medium–grain can be considered japonica, which Korea 
and Japan would consume. However, Korea imported Louisiana rice when threatened with an 
extreme food shortage. At that time Korea actually produced high-yielding varieties of a 
japonica-indica hybrid. In addition, Japan imported 2.6 million MT from the U.S., China, and 
other countries in the early 1980s when unusual cold weather caused a food shortage. But 
Japanese refused to eat the imported rice and the Japanese government reexported the imported 
rice to developing countries. Therefore, the way we differentiate the type of rice described 
above would be reasonable.    
The export demand is specified as a function of the relative price of rice types (i.e., the 
ratio of the domestic price of type i to the world price of type i), quantity of rice exported via 
specific government export programs for both types of rice, world ending stock, and other 
exogenous variables. The specification is as follows: 
EXPit = f (Pdit/Pwit, GOVit, ESTWit, EXit)        (3.1.14) 
where EXPit = the Export quantity for type i 
Pdit/Pwit = ratio of the domestic price of type i to the world price of type i 
GOVit = quantity of government-assisted rice exports for type i; Export Enhancement  
          Program (EEP) and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
ESTWit = world ending stock for type i 
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EXt = other exogenous variables that affect export demand, Japanese japonica imports  
      and beginning stocks for indica, and so forth (Song and Carter, 1996; Watanabe, et  
      al., 1990; Goldstein and Khan, 1976). 
3.1.4 Estimation and Evaluative Statistics 
There are two equations in the supply system and the error terms are correlated with each 
other. As a result, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the regression coefficients are 
inconsistent because quantities allocated to the separate supply components take place 
simultaneously (Green, 2000; Kennedy, 1998, Judge, et al, 1985).  For the study, the supply 
parameters are estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS).    
The demand equations, per capita consumption and U.S. export demand, are estimated by 
ordinary least square (OLS). The OLS is chosen over other estimators to derive empirical 
results for the adaptive expectations model for the following reasons. Kennedy (1998) suggests 
that it is possible to use the OLS estimator and simply accept its asymptotic bias. This can be 
defended in several ways. First, although the OLS estimator is biased in small samples so also 
are all alternative estimators. Furthermore, the OLS estimator has minimum variance compared 
with alternative estimators such as two-stage least squares (2SLS), and instrumental variable 
(IV).  Second, according to Monte Carlo studies, the properties of the OLS estimator are less 
sensitive than the alternative estimators to the presence of estimation problems such as 
multicollinearity, errors in variables or misspecifications.   In addition, there is substantial 
justification for the continued use of OLS in relationships containing lagged dependent 
variables, provided the disturbance term is serially independent (Green, 2000; Judge, et al., 
1988).      
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In addition to the estimated structural coefficients of the model, the estimation 
approaches used in this study generate several statistics.  These include Durbin’s h test (DW-h), 
t statistics, and others where appropriate. 
Based on various statistical tests for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and normality, 
the model specification tests are conducted in the single equation context to determine if the 
estimation method employed in this study is appropriate.  DW-h test is conducted for 
autocorrelation, the White’s test are carried out for heteroscedasticity. In addition, the Bera-
Jarque normality test is conducted as well (Judge, et al., 1985). 
For model validation, the rms (root-mean-square) simulation error, the rms percent 
error, and the mean simulation error are used.  In addition, Theil’s inequality coefficient, a 
useful simulation statistic related to the rms simulation error and applied to the evaluation of 
historical simulations, is used for the study (Green, 2000; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; Judge, 
et al., 1985).  
3.2 Determination of Political Weights 
3.2.1 Political Preference Function (PPF) 
In choosing agricultural policies, governments consider the effects of their policies on the 
welfare of various groups such as producers, consumers, and taxpayers.  In addition, since 
agricultural policies can make some groups better off at the expense of others, governments 
must weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare losses of others. These trade-offs 
can be represented by a Political Preference Function (PPF), a weighted, additive function of 
commodity quasi-rents, indirect utility of consumers, and the costs of agricultural policies to 
tax-payers (Roe, 1993).   
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The political preference function approach views policy decisions as the outcome of a 
political bargaining process.  It claims that an appropriate political preference function can 
reveal the role of interest groups in determining endogenous policies, which leads to the 
policymakers’ political willingness to redistribute income through policy adjustments.  In the 
political preference function, it is assumed that there exists a rice policymaker who acts to 
arbitrate the conflicting objectives of interest groups that seek to maximize their own benefits 
from the rice policy.  As an arbitrator of competing interest groups, the policymaker selects the 
levels of a set of rice policy instruments so as to maximize his/her political preference function.  
With this assumption, the political preference function approach can measure the political 
willingness to redistribute income among interest groups in the course of setting the levels of 
rice policy instruments.  This implies that the policy decision is determined endogenously 
according to the pattern of the implicit political weights given to the interest groups (Bullock, 
1994; Gardner, 1987; Paarlberg and Abbort, 1986).  
The political preference function approach typically assumes that the government 
chooses policy instruments so as to maximize a welfare criterion function consisting of interest 
groups’ welfare measures. Formally, the government problem can be expressed as: 
Max PPF( ω (x, b))             (3.2.1) 
subject to ω  (x, b) ∈ F={ω ω =ω  (x), x∈X},  
where PPF is the government’s political preference function, which is assumed to be 
monotonically increasing in its arguments. ω  represents a vector of welfare levels of interest 
groups. Also, let b denote a vector describing market structure, which is assumed to be 
exogenously given. X denotes the set of policy instrument levels from which the government 
can feasibly choose x, and F denotes the set of technically feasible policy outcomes. 
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Since ω  indicates the vector of interest groups’ welfare that can be brought about by 
government policy, the constraint in equation (3.2.1) implies that a rational government 
operates its policy level along a transformation contour, denoted as F. The first order necessary 
conditions for the above maximization problem imply that the contour of the PPF should be 
tangent to the boundary of F. Therefore, a political preference function approach can measure 
the political weights only by assuming that the observed policy is Pareto optimal.  
Consider the general case of a policymaker who has m≥ 1 policy instruments and n ≥ 2 
interest groups. The vector ω (x)=(ω ω ω1 2, ,..., n ) represents a vector of welfare levels of interest 
groups such that each group’s welfare depends on the level of policy instruments, and x=(x1, x2, 
…, xm ) is the policy instrument vector.  
Under the assumption of PPF maximization, the relevant first order necessary conditions 
for x* to maximize the PPF as in (3.2.1) are derived by: 
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where PPFi = 
∂
∂ω
PPF
i
, which represents the marginal value that the policymakers place on the 
economic surplus accruing to interest group i( i=1,…,n) and ∂ω∂
i
jx
 denotes the marginal welfare 
change of interest group i according to the change in the level of policy instruments j.  
The above optimal condition (3.2.2) can be expressed in matrix form as: 
(3.2.2)/ A 
-1 * λ i1=A1 
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where A
-1 is an m by n-1 matrix whose elements are 
∂ω
∂
i
jx
, λi1 is an n-1 by 1 vector whose 
elements are − PPF
PPF
i
1
, i=2…n which indicate the marginal rates of substitution along the 
indifference contour (Im, 1999).  
PPF studies generally define λ i1 as the political weight for interest group i, relative to the 
weight for interest group 1.  A1 is an m by 1 vector whose elements are 
∂ω
∂
1
x j
, j=1, 2, …,m.  
Now, our interest is to find a political weight vector (λi1) from the equation (3.2.2) or (3.2.2)/. 
The first order necessary conditions for the above maximization problem imply that the PPF 
approach can measure the marginal rates of substitution from observed data to infer the implicit 
political weights of interest groups that are not directly observable.  
The nature and number of arguments that can be included in a political preference 
function is unrestricted. Basically, the political preference function originates from the social 
welfare function and can be expressed in various functional forms, such as exponential, 
additive, logarithmic, and multiplicative. In practice, however, the linear-additive form is 
almost always used for reasons of mathematical simplicity.  In addition, we need to consider 
which policy instruments and interest groups are important. In reality, many policy instruments 
are available or used by governments, and many interest groups influence policy decisions. 
Therefore, we need to aggregate or omit some interest groups, or ignore the availability of some 
policy instruments, and use a simplified econometric model to estimate parameters. In other 
words, empirical PPF researchers have to decrease the dimension of the true political economy 
(Gardner, 1987).  
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The approach is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1 with the help of the surplus 
transformation curve formulated by Gardner (1983, 1987). Figure 3.1 represents a surplus 
transformation curve for one policy instrument (m=1) and two interest groups (n=2).  For 
simplicity, assume that taxpayers get the same welfare weight as consumers. The surplus 
transformation curve is the locus of all Pareto-optimal combinations of producer and 
consumer/taxpayer surplus that policymakers can generate given the constraint of only one 
instrument available.  Such a curve (AA) is shown in figure 3.1 for the case of a policy, which 
improves the welfare of producers of a commodity at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. 
This curve represents the supply side of the market for intervention; its shape and location 
depend not only on the underlying supply and demand functions, but also on the type of policy. 
The demand side of the market for intervention is represented by W, which might be called 
political indifference curves. The political indifference curve can be derived by totally 
differentiating the government’s political preference function and setting d(PPF) equal to zero. 
Point b is where policymakers maximize their political utility such that the political indifference 
curve is tangent to the surplus transformation curve. 
In the absence of government intervention in the commodity market, economic surplus is 
distributed between producers and consumers as indicated by point e. The policy adopted has 
the effect of reducing the welfare of consumers and taxpayers by the amount ce and increasing 
the welfare of producers by bc. The dead-weight loss generated by the policy is bd. 
However, with the political preference approach, the political equilibrium is found at 
point b where the government maximizes its utility and the marginal rate of transformation is 
the slope of aba.  At the political equilibrium, aba is also the marginal rate of substitution 
between producers and other interest groups’ welfare in the policy objective function.  If we  
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  Figure 3.1 Determination of optimal policy with political weights. 
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assume that the set of policy choices available to the policymaker is continuous and unbounded, 
and if the Pareto frontier is strictly concave, we can determine the equilibrium weights from the 
first-order conditions of the policymaker’s maximization problem. Observed policy levels reveal 
the weights on the policy preference function, given the structure of the economy. Although a 
major limitation of this model is that the underlying political process that determines the 
preference weights is not specified, this approach can be a useful tool for explaining policy 
selections, predicting future policy paths and normatively evaluating alternative policy reforms. 
For the PPF model of the political economy of the rice markets, we must identify interest 
groups and policy instruments. This study uses a group distinction employed in conventional 
welfare economics (n=3): producers, consumers and taxpayers, which have their own 
independent objective functions.  Rice producers are assumed to maximize producers’ surplus 
(PS), consumers maximize consumers’ surplus (CS), and taxpayers minimize net government 
expenditures (GS) on the rice policy.  
For policy instruments, a two-price policy (m=2) is considered for Japan and South 
Korea, which has been an integral part of the both rice economies and has undoubtedly created 
large welfare effects on interest groups, and producer price and retail price for the U.S.  Rice is 
often sold to consumers at prices below purchase prices, although the consumer price is much 
higher than the international price in Japan and South Korea.  In fact, the two-price policy 
influences the private market through the operation of purchase and release price levels, and the 
amount associated with the government’s stock and import management. In this study, the 
producer and consumer prices, which reflect the results of a combination of price and quantity 
operation, are regarded as the policy instruments.  
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The policymaker is assumed to set consumer and farm prices for rice in order to 
maximize a political preference function, which includes each interest group’s welfare measure. 
It is consistent with the maximization of the following political preference function: 
Maximizep U = U(PS(P), CS(P), GS(P): α ),           (3.2.3) 
where U represents the policymaker’s policy preference based on producer surplus (PS), 
consumer surplus (CS), and government budget surplus (GS), where the latter represents 
taxpayers’ welfare. P= (PS, PD) is a vector of rice price levels, where PS and PD are producer and 
consumer prices, respectively. α  denotes a vector of parameters representing the underlying 
commodity model.  
Each group’s welfare depends on the level of policy instruments. Expressions for 
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government surplus are derived from the commodity 
model. Based on this structure, the government chooses the optimal producer and consumer 
prices so as to maximize equation (3.2.3). The optimal price policy can be obtained by 
differentiating the political preference function with respect to the producer price, PS and the 
consumer price, PD.  The first order conditions are: 
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where λ P =  ∂∂
U
PS
 , λ C =  ∂∂
U
CS
 and λ G =  ∂∂
U
GS
 
Each  λ i (i= P, C, G) is a political weight that the government places on the interests of 
producers, consumers and government budget.  The political weights represent the results of 
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competing policy influencing efforts of interest groups and measure the degree of 
policymaker’s political willingness to favor a group.  
3.2.2 Derivation of the Political Weights   
It has been widely recognized that the political (or welfare) weights reflecting the 
bargaining power and policy-influencing efforts play an important role in determining 
government behavior in agricultural policy. There are three general approaches to obtaining the 
political weights in a model of political economic behavior: 1) the direct approach, consisting of 
interviews with policymakers to determine the political weights, 2) the indirect approach, also 
known as the revealed preference method, in which policy decisions are assumed to optimize 
the political preference function subject to appropriate constraints so the policy preference 
weights can be inferred, 3) the arbitrary approach, in which the researcher simply chooses 
political weights according to his own beliefs (Sloof, 1998).  
It has been accepted that the usefulness of the direct and arbitrary approach for policy 
setting and evaluation is limited (Love, Rausser and Burton, 1990).  Along this line, the 
revealed preference approach has been developed to quantify the invisible policy influencing 
efforts of the interest groups. Within this structure, it is assumed that political weights of 
interest groups are inferred from past policy action.  The basic assumption of the revealed 
preference method is that past levels of policy instruments are outcomes of optimizing the 
political preference function by the policymaker.  
3.3 Game Theoretic Approach 
This study analyzes the possible impacts of policy changes in these three countries using 
a game theoretic approach.  Game theory is useful in understanding the nature of market 
outcomes when such policies matter.  Agricultural policy games are now played on a 
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transaction-by-transaction basis in an uncertain market environment and where payoff functions 
are also changing over time (Johnson, et al., 1993).  The policy analysis in the game theoretic 
approach looks specifically at the behavior of the rice price, import policy, and export policy 
variables. This study addresses policy analysis including several reasonable scenarios with 
respect to tariff equivalents.  Overall, a game theoretic approach is adopted to determine 
potentially possible policy options for U.S. exports on each policy change in Japan and Korea. 
The game theoretic approach focuses on the equilibrium for Japanese and Korean rice import 
policies and the U.S. export policies.  
3.3.1 Axioms of Game Theory 
Game theory is concerned with the study of situations involving two or more decision 
makers such as individuals, organizations, or governments.  Decision makers are designated as 
players.  The players often have partly conflicting interests and make individual or collective 
decisions (Dockner, et. al., 2000).  In a game, the fortunes of the players are interdependent: the 
actions taken by one particular player influence not only his own fortune but also the fortunes of 
the other players.  Such interdependence is well known from many areas of economics and 
international trade. 
Game theorists make a distinction between two kinds of games: cooperative and 
noncooperative.  Supposing that a game is played in a noncooperative way means that the 
institutional environment is one in which the players cannot or will not make binding 
agreements to follow some joint course of action.  Players are rivals and all players act in their 
own best interest, paying no attention whatsoever to the fortunes of the other players.  A 
fundamental problem for any player in a noncooperative game is that of strategic uncertainty: 
when a player must act, he does not know for sure how the other players will act.  
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Noncooperative game theory offers a formal methodology to try to resolve the strategic 
uncertainty and predict what could be the outcome when rational players have acted in 
accordance with their plans. 
The categorization of games as cooperative and noncooperative should be seen as a 
recognition of the fact that often there is more than just one way in which a particular game can 
be played.  It is less advisable to think that the set of all games in some exogenous way has been 
divided into cooperative and noncooperative ones.  Depending on the underlying institutional 
characteristics, a game may be analyzed as cooperative or noncooperative. 
The main part of game theory takes its starting point in a set of hypotheses concerning 
the kind of behavior that players are assumed to have.  Fundamental axioms are that players are 
rational and think strategically.  Being rational means that a player has clear preference, 
represented by a payoff function.  Payoff can be expressed in terms of utility, profit, sales 
revenue, negative cost, or any other quantitative measure.  Rationality includes that a player 
knows the number of opponents and the set of all possible strategies that are available to them, 
and that he can form probabilistic expectations about any uncertainty that may influence the 
play of the game. 
The number of players, the sets of strategies available to them, and the payoffs are 
essential elements of what game theorists call the rules of the game.  The rules are the theorist’s 
formal description of a game and they should be derived from the institutional environment in 
which the game is supposed to be played, rather than being chosen on an ad hoc basis.  The 
theory includes the assumption of common knowledge, which means that all players know the 
rules of the game and each player knows that his opponents know the rules, and that the 
opponents know that he knows the rules, and so forth.  All players are aware that they face 
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rational opponents and all players think strategically.  The latter means that, when designing his 
strategy for playing the game, a player takes into account any knowledge or expectation he may 
have regarding his opponents’ behavior. 
At the same time, game-theoretic models are sometimes criticized for employing too 
many unrealistic behavioral assumptions and for including only a small number of the features 
of a real-world institutional environment.  People who insist on realistic models say that this 
produces the right solution to the wrong problem.  Here we should be aware that models 
sensations of real world phenomena, but even very simplified models do not necessarily 
produce useless predictions.  The predictions that result from simple models are correct on their 
assumptions and one strength of formal modeling lies in the fact that everyone can verify the 
validity of the conclusions derived from the model.  In contrast, a fair part of the strategic 
recommendations offered by policy makers on strategic decision-making cannot be verified and 
any faith placed in such advice is largely a matter of trust (Dockner, et. al., 2000; Norman and 
Thisse, 2000; Sloof, 1998; Gardner, 1995). 
Usually there are three elements of a game theoretic study.  First, it is necessary to 
scrutinize the institutional environment in which the game is supposed to be played in order to 
obtain a plausible set of rules of the game and to select the relevant variables and their 
relationships.  Next, a mathematical structure must be designed, a game theoretic model that 
reflects in a simplified way the pertinent aspects of the strategic problem.  Third, the interesting 
properties of the model must be rigorously deduced. 
3.3.2 Basic Noncooperative Game Theoretic Model 
Noncooperative game theory uses two types of models: the strategic form and the 
extensive form.  The strategic form includes the following three elements: 
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(1) A set of players { }N N= 1 2, ,..., .  
(2) For each player i N∈ a set of feasible strategies U i .  
(3) For each player i N∈ a real-valued function J i such that the value ( )J u u ui N1 2, ,...,  
   represents the payoff of player i N∈  if the N players use the strategies 
  ( )u u u U U UN N1 2 1 2, ,..., ... .∈ × × ×  
The notion of a player’s strategy is fundamental in game theory.  We may think of a 
strategy as a player’s contingent plan, to be determined before playing the game.  A strategy is a 
function that tells the player how to select one of his feasible actions whenever he must make a 
move, for all possible events as the history of the game.  Thus, a strategy is a mapping from the 
set of possible histories of the game to the set of feasible actions.  It is important to note that a 
strategy prescribes a player’s choice of action for all possible histories of the game, including 
those histories that will never be observed. 
When the strategic form is used, the game theoretic model includes a list of all possible 
strategies of all players.  Each player is supposed to select before the play of the game one of 
his feasible strategies.  Each player makes this choice independently of any other player and 
there is no communication or cooperation among the players when they make their strategy 
choices.  No player is informed about the choice of strategy of any other player and this is what 
causes the problem of strategic uncertainty. 
There is no explicit element of time involved in a strategic form game.  Nevertheless, a 
strategic form game can represent a game that is played over several time periods.  In a game 
played over time, a rational player can determine in advance a complete, contingent plan for all 
his actions that he must take during the whole game.  Such a plan, a strategy, specifies what 
particular action the player should take in any situation that may occur at any instant of time 
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during the game.  The actual play of the game then amounts to the implementation of the 
players’ predetermined strategies. 
The extensive form of a game is used for games played over time and is represented by a 
game tree.  The extensive form includes a description of the sequence in which possible chance 
events will occur during the game.  Although these questions of timing are only implicit in the 
strategic form,  the concept of a player’s strategy can be seen as an object of both an extensive 
and a strategic form game.  In the extensive form, a player waits to take his action until the 
game has reached a certain instant.  The rule by which he chooses his actions, depending on the 
information he has gathered up to that instant, is his strategy. 
Depending on the specific game model one wishes to analyze, each of the two forms has 
its advantages and disadvantages.  In most games that evolve over time, the extensive form is 
superior to the strategic form since the extensive form explicitly depicts the order of moves, 
which information is revealed during the course of the game, and how players take such 
information into account.  On the other hand, in dynamic games of some complexity, the 
extensive form becomes unmanageable. 
3.3.3 Dynamic Game 
Many strategic problems in economics and international trade are not properly modeled 
as static games since policy makers can make decisions at more than one point of time.  A first 
question would be: How does one distinguish between dynamic and static games? There is no 
general agreement on the use of the terms ‘static game’ and ‘dynamic game’.  One might say 
that a game in which time is not explicitly involved is a static game, supposing that ‘dynamic’ 
refers to the fact that variables are explicitly dated.  However, let us consider a Cournot duopoly 
game played in the following way.  The firms have to choose their respective output levels 
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independently of each other at each of T successive time instants 1 2, ,..., .T   After the firms have 
made their output choices at time instants { }s t∈ 1 2, ,..., , these choices will be known to both 
firms when they have to choose their outputs at the subsequent time instant t + 1.  Now suppose 
that, before the game starts, each firm must make an irrevocable choice of every output quantity 
that the firm will produce at time instants 1 2, ,...,T .  Thus, each firm must commit itself in 
advance to a fixed sequence of outputs.  This game certainly includes time but one could 
maintain that such a game should not be called a dynamic game.  The argument is that during 
the play of the game the firms get no opportunity to react strategically to the rival’s actions, 
using incoming information on actions taken. 
The following definition of a dynamic game takes into account the reasonable 
requirement that players should be able to select strategies that are based on information being 
revealed during the play of the game.  A game is said to be dynamic if at least one player can 
use a strategy that conditions his single-period action at any instant of time on the actions taken 
previously in the game.  Previous actions are those of the rivals but also a player’s own actions. 
To analyze a dynamic game, we need to start by describing in which order the players 
take their actions and what information is available to a player when he takes action.  In what 
follows we confine our interest to dynamic games in which all players’ actions are observable 
by all players.  The game is said to be one of perfect information.  Hence any player, when 
taking an action at time t, has perfect knowledge of all previous actions.  These are his/her own 
past actions and those of his rivals, but can also include acts of nature if there are exogenous 
uncertainties in the game.  In such a game we say that players move simultaneously at time t if 
no player knows about the actions that the other players take at time t.  Notice that this 
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terminology is not meant to exclude games in which no two players make decisions at the same 
time, since one can include ‘inaction’ as a feasible action at a particular instant. 
Since all past actions till time t-1 are common knowledge among the players at decision 
time t, it makes sense to speak of the history of actions by time t.  The history of actions by time 
t is a sequence of action profiles u u ut1 2 1, ,..., − , where any such profile is a set of N individual 
actions of the players.  The initial history is the history before the starting point of the game and 
is an empty set (Norman and Thisse, 2000; Sloof, 1998; Gul, 1997; Karp and McCalla, 1983).  
The terminal history is the one after which no more actions occur.  Payoffs of the players can be 
defined as functions of the terminal history but could also be taken as sums of per period 
payoffs. 
3.3.4 The Difference Game 
The imperfections of the markets and the government interventions in the three countries 
raise questions about results obtained from models of the limiting cases of perfect competition.  
This kind of market involves power, reaction functions, strategies, and feedback and is 
inherently dynamic.  The game theoretic approach, which models the interaction of two or more 
agents with conflicting objectives, provides a method for analyzing imperfectly competitive 
markets such as rice markets in Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. 
In addition, in actual life the instruments of the economy can be under the control of 
different policymakers who each may have conflicting view on target values or the relative 
importance of the targets.  In the U.S., for instance, it is unlikely that the Congress or the 
Administration, controlling fiscal policy, and the Federal Reserve Board, controlling monetary 
policy, hold the same views on what the targets of their policies should be.  It is also not clear 
that much cooperation is taking place between these entities.  
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What particularly complicates the situation, is that one cannot just predict the policy of 
the other policymaker and go ahead taking that as a given.  One must also, if one is rational, 
take into account the effect that one’s own policy will have on the other policymaker’s policies 
in the future.  Since trade policies are interdependent, some sort of game framework is attractive 
(Dockner, et.al., 2000). If games are discarded, the model must assume that traders do not 
respond to their partners’ policies (no interdependence) or assume that their response is known.  
The first assumption is unacceptable, and the second simply postulates reaction functions when 
the goal is to derive them. 
The difference game addresses these criticisms described above.  First, we can include 
any number of players, on either one side or on both sides of the market, as well as a residual 
sector which may be either a net importer or exporter.  Second, the dynamic nature of supply 
and demand is explicitly taken into account by means of the state equation.  Finally, the solution 
gives us endogenously determined reaction functions and resulting tariffs/taxes, prices, and 
quantities traded (Karp and McCalla, 1983). 
There are n players, each with control vector uit where i = 1, 2, …, n and t = 1, 2, …, T-1, 
where T is the end of the game.  The evolution of the state, yt, is given by the difference 
equation 
y A y B u C yt t t it it t
i
n
= + +
−
=
∑1 0
1
; given      `      (3.3.1) 
The objective of player i is to maximize V yi ( )0 , where  
V y r y y R yi it t t it t
t
T
( ) ( );0
1
= ′ + ′
=
∑   i = 1, 2, …, n.          (3.3.2) 
The vectors and matrices A, Bi, C, ri, and Ri are given.  They indicate the effect on the 
current state of the previous state (A) the current controls (Bi), and the exogenous changes (C); 
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ri and Ri give the effect of the current state on player i’s single-period payoff.  Equation (3.3.1) 
is written as a first-order difference equation, but by imbedding previous values of yt and ut in 
the state vector, higher-order difference equations can be reduced to this form.  The inclusion of 
the controls in the state vector allows the function Vi to depend on both the controls and the 
state (Karp and McCalla, 1983; Kydland, 1975). 
In this game, we need to specify upon which information a player conditions his strategy.  
This issue is referred to as the choice of a strategy space or an information structure. 
Suppose that player i chooses action uit at time t.  This choice can be based upon different 
sets of information, but we always assume that all players know the value of the initial state 
vector.  An open-loop strategy is a strategy that is conditioned on current time only, that is, a 
minimal information.  Like any other type of strategy, an open-loop strategy is fixed at the start 
of the game.  This implies that each player believes that his actions have no effect on his 
opponents.  In an open-loop Nash equilibrium each player is right about what his opponents will 
do, but he is wrong in that they would not respond to deviations from his strategy. 
The use of open-loop strategies has been criticized for being static in nature, not allowing 
for genuine strategic interaction between the players during the play of the game (Sloof, 1998). 
For feedback solution we assume that at each time period a noncooperative solution is 
chosen as a function of the state variable at that time.  This means that each player, instead of 
taking as given a sequence of decisions for the other players, takes as given decision rules for 
each time period t that are functions of the state variables yt-1.  In making his decision, player i 
know that it will affect the state variables.  A change in the state variables will change the other 
players’ decisions in the future.  This change in the other players’ decisions will have an effect 
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on future losses for player i.  This fact is taken into account in the feedback solution when 
player i makes his decision. 
Feedback controls incorporate a conjectural variation.  Each player knows that his 
actions will affect his opponents’ actions, and he considers this in choosing his rules.  In a 
feedback Nash equilibrium each player’s conjecture about how his opponents will respond to 
changes is correct (Karp and McCalla, 1983; Breshahan, 1981).  Feedback controls allow the 
player more rationality and flexibility; therefore, we choose to use them rather than open-loop 
controls.  A further advantage of the feedback controls is that in obtaining them we can derive 
the reaction functions u*i(t, yt-1) (Paarlberg and Abbott, 1986). 
It seems reasonable in many models to assume that each decision maker will determine 
the effect of his decision on the state variables and consider how other players will react in the 
future.  For example, in an oligopolistic industry each firm may take into consideration the 
effect of its decision on market shares and assume that the other players will react in certain 
ways to different sizes of the market shares.  This seems particularly reasonable if we think in 
terms of stability, that is, view the equilibrium solution as the end result of a process with all the 
players groping for decision rules that are such that, given the others’ actions, nobody has any 
incentive to change the rule, and where forecasting errors are corrected as the players learn 
more about the other players’ behavior. 
It is known from control theory that when the objective function is quadratic and the 
equation of motion linear, optimal controls can be expressed as a linear function of the state 
(Dockner, et.al., 2000).  Therefore, it is not surprising that in the difference game the Nash 
equilibrium reaction functions are also linear in the state.  In fact, the algorithm used to 
determine these functions is a generalization of the method of dynamic programming used in 
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the control problem.  The stacked vector of controls in period t is determined by the reaction 
function 
u d E yt t t t= + −1               (3.3.3) 
where dt and Et are independent of the state which means the initial condition, y0 , does not 
affect the reaction function; it does, however, affect the value of the controls.   
Let supply in any country be a linear function of last period’s domestic price, and 
demand a linear function of this period’s domestic price.  Domestic price equals world price 
plus the tariff imposed by the nation.  If we take the nation’s single-period objective function to 
be the sum of consumer and producer surplus and tariff revenues, then that function is 
composed of linear and quadratic terms involving world price and the tariff in the current and 
the previous period.  If we imbed the current and lagged controls and the lagged state in a new 
state vector, the single-period objective is the sum of a linear and quadratic term involving the 
augmented state.  The total payoff is then the discounted sum of these single-period objective 
functions and has the form of equation (3.3.2).  Excess supply or demand for any nation is 
linear in the current and previous period’s price and tariff. 
The linear-quadratic Nash difference game can be used to model trade of a commodity 
like rice.  A simple case involves two players, each with a single control ui, a unit tariff or 
export tax.  The two active players can be both importers, both exporters, or one of each.  There 
is a third, passive player, which comprises the rest of the world (ROW).  The response of ROW 
is assumed known and exogenous.  Domestic supply in country i, qi
s
, is a function of last 
period’s producer price, and domestic demand in country i, qi
d
, is a function of the current 
period’s domestic price as mentioned in section 3.1.  These functions are given by equation 
(3.3.4). 
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1 1
             (3.3.4) 
World price in period t is given by Pwt , so that country i’s domestic price is P uwt it+ .  
Country i’s objective is to maximize the discounted sum of producer and consumer surplus and 
tariff/tax revenue.  The single-period payoff to country i involves terms which are linear and 
quadratic in P P u uwt wt it it, , ,− −1 1 , plus a term that involves only intercepts and coefficients of 
(3.3.4). 
The evolution of world price, Pw, is given by setting supply equal to demand.  Therefore, 
if we rearrange equation (3.3.4), equation (3.3.5) can be derived (Karp and McCalla, 1983; 
Kydland, 1975). 
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where h is ( ) /a bit it it− α , θ  is − βit itb/ ,  and δ δ δ β1 2 3 1 11 1= − = − = −, , / ,t tb and δ β4 2 2= − t tb/ .  
The parameters θ , δi , and h are obtained from the parameters in (3.3.4).  Now we have a new 
state, ′ =
− − −
y f P u u P u ut wt t t wt t t( , , , , , )1 2 1 1 1 2 2 .  The equation of motion for y is given by  
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A supply utilization accounting identity, or trade balance in an open economy, captures 
the effects of producer and consumer behavioral adjustments to policy and, hence, prices on 
trade:  
E q P u q P uit it
s
wt it it
d
wt it= + − +− −( ) ( )1 1            (3.3.7) 
where Eit  is exports from country i (imports if negative); qits  is supply (production) in country i, 
which depends on P uwt it− −+1 1 , producer support prices (decoupled producer subsidy offered via 
price intervention) in country i, and qitd  is demand (consumption) in country i, which depends 
on P uwt it+ , the domestic market price in country i, according to a demand function.  World 
market equilibrium requires 
Eit∑ = 0.                (3.3.8) 
Price linkages relate border prices to domestic market prices using policy instrument 
settings (export subsidies and producer support via price interventions): 
P P Sw u Cd i wt i it i= + + +( )             (3.3.9) 
where Pwt  is the world price, Swi  is the export subsidy (import tariff) offered by country i, and 
C is other government intervention via price control, and  
P P Sq DSi d i i i= + +( )            (3.3.10) 
where Sqi  is a decoupled producer subsidy in country i, and Di is other government support to 
rice producers via price intervention.  Furthermore, we can incorporate political payoff 
functions into the dynamic game of each player to maximize each country’s welfare.  The 
reason is that each country would try to maximize its own welfare considering different interest 
groups political weights in the policy making process.  Therefore, incorporating the dynamic 
game into the dynamic game political payoff functions gives equation (3.3.11).  
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where Vpi is the political payoff in country  i, Vsi is producer surplus for region i, Vdi  is 
consumer surplus for region i, and Sqi  is decoupled producer support (or direct payment) in 
region i as mentioned earlier.  Welfare weights are Wqi  for producer, Wdi , for consumers, and 
Wgi  for government budget expense (Abbott and Kallio, 1996). 
Initial equilibrium quantities, prices, and supply and demand elasticities are taken from 
the econometric estimation and the weights are taken from the political preference function 
(PPF) analysis for this game theoretic approach.  
Solving this model, assuming that governments set export subsidies or tariffs to 
maximize political payoff in a manner corresponding to the UR agreement, may represent 
alternative institutional arrangements.  The United States is examined by specifying objectives, 
which are related to exports. Nash equilibria will be found, assuming the United States, Japan, 
and Korea independently maximize their own welfare, with the subsidy or tariff level of its 
opponents as given. The GATT agreement is represented by imposing subsidy expenditure 
limits in each player’s maximization problem. Nash equilibria are solved for the intersection of 
these best response functions by iteratively solving each region’s problem given the opponents’ 
strategies, subsidy, and tariff, using GAMS. 
In addition, the goal of this analysis is to look at the implications of a change from 
minimum access to the tariffication of imports in Korea, continuation of tariffication in Japan at 
an alternative different tariff equivalent than the current tariff equivalent, and export policy 
options toward Japan and Korea for the U.S.   
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the empirical models for the three 
countries.  This chapter will be divided into three sections, and organized as follows.  The first 
section is devoted to a discussion of the empirical results of the econometric models.  In 
particular, the section focuses on the estimation methods and evaluative statistics.  The second 
section presents the derivation of the political weights for the three different interest groups for 
Japan and Korea, and for exporters from the U.S.  An empirical game theoretic approach is 
presented and discussed in the final section. 
4.1 Econometric Estimation  
4.1.1 Empirical results and interpretation 
Based on the theoretical considerations and the market structure concerning the dynamic 
commodity model in the previous section, the empirical econometric models for the three 
countries’ rice markets are specified for the period 1960-1999. 
According to economic theory, supply can be influenced by prices, technology, costs and 
other factors. For domestic consumption, it can be hypothesized to be influenced by prices, 
income levels, and the price of substitutes according to economic theory.  For Japan and Korea, 
the model is composed of three equations: domestic acreage response, yield, and per capita 
consumption.  Two identities are defined to impose the aggregate domestic production and 
consumption.  Domestic production is defined by acreage response times yield, and domestic 
consumption is defined by multiplying population times the estimated equation for per capita 
consumption and adding in other use.  The general functional forms and variables for the rice 
supply and demand estimation are presented as follows: 
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Japanese Yield: 
JYIED = f(TECH, D, u1t)             (4.1.1) 
Japanese Area Harvested: 
JARHV = f(JARHVt-1, JPRODPt/CPIt, JPRODCt/CPIt, u2t)          (4.1.2) 
Japanese Per Capita Consumption: 
JPCCON = f(JRETPt/CPIt, JINCOMt/CPIt, JPCCONt-1, u3t)        (4.1.3) 
Korean Yield: 
KYIED = f(TECH, D, u4t)             (4.1.4) 
Korean Area Harvested: 
KARHV = f(KARHVt-1, KGPOPt-1/CPIt-1, KDIVRt, u5t)         (4.1.5) 
Korean Per Capita Consumption: 
KPCCON = f(KRETPt/CPIt, KINCOMt/CPIt, KPCCONt-1, u6t)       (4.1.6) 
U.S. Export Demand: 
UEXDEM = f(WOLDPJt/UPROPIt, UGEXPt, WENSTt, D, u7t)        (4.1.7) 
Production: 
JPROD = JYIED * JARHV             (4.1.8) 
KPROD = KYIED * KARHV             (4.1.9) 
Consumption: 
JCONP = JPCCON * JPOP + OTHER         (4.1.10) 
KCONP = KPCCON * KPOP + OTHER         (4.1.11) 
where TECH = Technology 
JARHVt-1 = Lagged Japanese Area Harvested (1000 ha) 
JPROPt = Japanese Producer Price (yen/MT) 
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CPIt = Consumer Price Index 
JPROCt = Japanese Production Cost (yen/ha) 
JRETPt = Japanese Retail Price (yen/MT) 
JINCOMt = Japanese Income ($) 
JPCCONt-1 = Lagged Japanese Per Capita Consumption (kg) 
KARHVt-1 = Lagged Korean Area Harvested (1000 ha) 
KGPOPt-1 = Lagged Korean Government Purchase Price (won/MT) 
KDIVRt = Lagged Korean Diversion program (ha) 
KRETPt = Korean Retail Price (won/MT) 
KINCOMt = Korean Income ($) 
KPCCONt-1 = Lagged Korean per capita Consumption (kg) 
WOLDPJt = World Price ($/MT) 
UPRODPIt = U.S. Producer price ($/MT) 
UGEXPt = U.S. Government Export Program (1000 MT) 
WENSTt-1 = Lagged World Ending Stock (1000 MT) 
D = Dummy Variables 
uit = Error Terms 
POP = Population 
OTHER = Other Consumption (1000 MT) 
The structural model in this study is estimated based upon annual time series data from 
1960 to 1999 with all prices and income variables deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
The rice yield and area harvested equations are estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
and the per capita consumption and U.S. export demand equations are estimated by 
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conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) and the autoregressive degree of one (AR(1)) as an 
attempt to correct for autocorrelation. 
The estimation results of the model are shown in table 4.1.  The consumer price index is 
omitted for convenience.  In addition, the value of the Durbin’s h statistic is also given for each 
equation since the lagged dependent variable appears as an independent variable. 
Equations (4.1.1) and (4.1.4) indicate that the yield is a function of technology and a 
dummy variable for Japan and Korea.  The dummy variable is used to explain poor weather 
conditions in 1980 and 1993.  A time trend is used as a proxy for technological developments 
and advancements.  Japanese and Korean yield equations have a coefficient of adjusted R2 of 
0.80 and 0.87, respectively.  All of the variables are statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance.  D-W statistics of the equations, 1.78 and 2.13, respectively, show that there is no 
autocorrelation in the equations. 
The results of the acreage response estimation show the expected signs for all 
explanatory variables that are implied in the theory of production.  Except for the constant 
terms, all parameter estimates are different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  The 
prices received by rice farmers in both countries have a positive impact on the acreage response, 
as expected.  The production costs for Japan and the diversion program for Korea have a 
negative impact on the supply response.  The coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent 
variables show a stable geometric lag process and supports the existence of a lagged distribution 
of the dependent variables.  The high estimates of the lagged acreage variables for Japan and 
Korea, 0.84 and 0.93 respectively, imply that it takes time for farmers to change the paddy land 
for rice cultivation in response to the price signals.  The short-run supply elasticities with 
respect to the output at the mean for Japan and Korea are 0.11 and 0.13, respectively.  However, 
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the long-run supply elasticities are estimated as 0.75 and 0.89, respectively.  The high values of 
the long-run elasticities are caused by a high estimate of the lagged dependent variables.   
Except for the constant terms, all independent variables in the per capita consumption 
equations show strong statistical significance and expected signs.  All coefficient estimates are 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  Rice consumption is negatively related to own price 
as well as income, which implies that rice is an inferior good in Japan and Korea.  This is a 
phenomenon, which has been experienced over the last decade in Japan and Korea as their 
income levels have risen.  The coefficients on the one year lagged dependent variables are also 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  It implies that there exist gradual changes in diet 
patterns, which impact rice consumption.  In fact, the increases in the income levels have 
transformed the Japanese and Korean diet by substituting rice with consumption of meats, 
fruits, and vegetables. 
The price elasticities for Japan and Korea are computed at -0.096 and -0.23, respectively.  
The income elasticities are also computed at -0.029 and -0.56, respectively. 
For the equation of U.S. export demand, all of the independent variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level except for government export program.  U.S. export demand 
estimation shows the expected signs for all explanatory variables.  A reduction in world price 
relative to the U.S. domestic price received by U.S. producers make U.S. rice less competitive 
in the world market.  A dummy variable for the years of 1980 and 1994 is used to explain 
unusual high exports caused by Japan and Korea due to unexpected cold weather in 1980 and 
1993.  In addition, there is no autocorrelation in the equation (D-W = 1.7). 
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 Table 4.1 Empirical Results of Production and Consumption. 
  Production: 
  JYIED = 3.5579 + 0.0313*TECH – 0.8874*DM8093 
                  (54.84)              (11.52)                (-5.96) 
  AdjR2 = 0.80  D-W = 1.78  Method = 2SLS 
 
  KYIED = 3.7415 + 0.0293*TECH – 0.8369*DM8093 
                   (18.04)                (4.10)                (-4.41) 
  AdjR2 = 0.87  D-W = 2.13  Method = 2SLS 
 
  JARHV = 294.176 + 0.843*JARHVt-1 + 0.175*JPRODP – 0.027*JPRODC 
                      (1.63)                 (13.07)                 (2.35)                   (-2.57) 
  AdjR2 = 0.96  D-h = 0.59  Method = 2SLS 
 
  KARHV = 50.76 + 0.932*KARHVt-1 + 0.000059*KGROP – 0.006*KDIVR 
                    (0.42)                (10.93)                        (2.34)                  (-4.34) 
  AdjR2 = 0.96  D-h = 0.97  Method = 2SLS 
  Consumption: 
  LnJPCCON = 1.8133 + 0.8202*LnJPCCONt-1 – 0.0963*LnJRETP – 0.029*LnJINCOM 
                          (4.77)                     (15.42)                       (-3.65)                     (-2.15) 
  AdjR2 = 0.99  D-h = 1.25  Method = OLS/AR(1) 
 
  LnKPCCON = 5.461 + 0.7203*LnKPPCCONt-1 - 0.23*LnKRETP  
                          (4.1)                       (10.27)                     (-2.42)         
                         - 0.56*LnKINCOM + 0.2073*DM1 
                                      (-3.4)                      (2.96) 
AdjR2 = 0.99  D-h = 0.72  Method = OLS/AR(1) 
  U.S. Export Demand: 
  LUEXDEM = 2.681 + 0.4902*LWENSTK + 0.036*L(WOLDP/UPRODP) 
                                       (3.26)                    (6.09)                              (1.97) 
                         + 0.031*LUGEXP+ 0.274*DM8094 
                                      (1.72)                        (3.2) 
  AdjR2 = 0.84  D-W = 1.7  Estimator = OLS/AR(1) 
  Note: numbers in the parentheses represent t-statistics. 
 
4.1.2 Model Specification and Validation 
In this section, tests for detecting error structure in the single equation context are 
conducted to identify whether the estimators used in the models are appropriate.  Statistical tests 
for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and other specification problems are described. 
Autocorrelation usually occurs in the analysis of economic time series where random 
shocks have effects that persist for more than one time period.  Although estimates from the 
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estimators, especially from the conventional OLS, and forecasts for those estimates are still 
unbiased and consistent with serially correlated errors, they are no longer minimum variance 
among all linearly unbiased estimators.  There are several ways of testing for autocorrelation.  
By far the most widely used test is the Durbin-Watson (D-W) test.  However, the D-W test is 
not likely to be valid here because of a lagged dependent variable in the equations.  When one 
or more lagged endogenous variables are present, the D-W statistic will often be close to 2 even 
when the errors are serially correlated.  Of course, one could simply look at the D-W statistic as 
providing an indicator of serial correlation when the D-W statistic is low, but this approach is 
strongly biased against finding serial correlation.  Fortunately, there is a relatively easy 
alternative test provided by Durbin, which is strictly valid for large samples of data but can be 
used for small samples as well (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991; Judge, et. al., 1988).  In this 
circumstance, the Durbin’s h statistic is used for the autocorrelation test. 
Heteroscedasticity arises in numerous applications.  In this study, the White’s test for 
heteroscedasticity is conducted, which is the most common procedure for detecting 
heteroscedasticity in the error term.  White’s test for the general structure of heteroscedasticity 
is general since it does not require any prior knowledge of the structure of the 
heteroscedasticity.  This test could be regarded as a general test for misspecification as it is 
likely to pick up other specification errors such as multicollinearity and zero mean of 
disturbance (Judge, et.al., 1985). 
In addition, it is convenient to assume that errors are distributed normally, but there 
exists justification for this normality assumption.  When errors are not distributed normally, the 
estimators used in this study, particularly the OLS, are no longer efficient or asymptotically 
efficient.  The respective distribution of the estimators is no longer normal and chi-squared, and 
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consequently, the F and t test on the estimated parameters are not necessarily valid in finite 
sample.  The consequences of non-normality of the fat-tailed kind, implying infinite variance, 
are quite serious since hypothesis testing and interval estimation cannot be undertaken 
meaningfully.  Because of the possible consequences of non-normal disturbances, it is worth 
testing to see if the disturbances could have come from a normal distribution.  Several tests for 
normality exist.  In this study, Bera and Jarque test is used to test the normality assumption for 
the OLS residual (Judge, et.al., 1988). 
Based upon these various statistical tests for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and 
normality, the model specification tests are conducted in the single equation context. 
A criterion that is commonly used to evaluate a simulation model is the fit of the 
individual variables in a simulation context.  One would expect the results of a historical 
simulation to match the behavior of the real world rather closely.  One way to test the 
performance of the model is to perform historical simulation and examine how closely each 
endogenous variable tracks its corresponding historical data series. It is therefore desirable to 
have some quantitative measure of how closely individual variables track their corresponding 
data series.  The measure that is most often used is called the rms (root-mean-square) simulation 
error.  The rms simulation error for the variable Yt is defined as 
( )rmse T Y Yt s tat
T
= −
=
∑1 2
1
           (4.1.12) 
where Yts = simulated value of Yt 
Yta = actual value of Yt 
   T = number of periods in the simulation 
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The rms error is thus a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its actual 
time path (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).  Of course, the magnitude of this error can be 
evaluated only by comparing it with the average size of the variable in question. 
Other measures of simulation fit exist and are often used.  Another simulation error 
statistic is the rms percent error, which is defined as 
rms percent e
T
Y Y
Y
t
s
t
a
t
a
t
T
=
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


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=
∑1
2
1
         (4.1.13) 
This is also a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its actual time path. 
but in percentage terms.  Other measures are the mean simulation error, defined as 
Mean ( )e
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= −
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           (4.1.14) 
and the mean percent error, defined as 
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The problem with mean errors is that they may be close to 0 if large positive errors 
cancel out large negative errors.  Therefore, the rms simulation error is considered to be a better 
measure of the simulation performance. 
Low rms simulation errors are only one desirable measure of simulation fit.  Another 
important criterion is how well the model simulates turning points in the historical data.  A 
model must predict turning points to be judged better than a simple trend model (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991).  Thus the ability of a simulation model to duplicate turning points or rapid 
changes in the actual data is an important criterion for model evaluation. 
A useful simulation statistic related to the rms simulation error and applied to the 
evaluation of historical simulations is Theil s inequality coefficient.  Note that the numerator of 
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U is just the rms simulation error, but the scaling of the denominator is such that U will always 
fall between 0 and 1.  If U = 0, Yst = Yat for all t and there is a perfect fit.  If U = 1, on the other 
hand, the predictive performance of the model is as bad as it possibly could be (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991).  The Theil’s inequality coefficient can be shown with a little algebra that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 12 2 2
1T
Y Y Y Yt
s
t
a s a
s a s a
t
T
− = − + − + −
=
∑ σ σ ρ σ σ       (4.1.16) 
where ,Y ,Y as σ s , and σ a  are the means and standard deviations of the series Yt
s 
 and Yta , 
respectively, and ρ  is their correlation coefficient.  The proportions of inequality are defined as 
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The proportions, UM, US, and UC are called the bias, the variance, and the covariance 
proportions, respectively, and they are useful as a means of breaking the simulation error down 
into its characteristic sources (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
The bias proportion UM is an indication of systematic error, since it measures the extent 
to which the average values of the simulated and actual series deviate from each other.  
Whatever the value of the inequality coefficient U, it is preferred that UM would be close to 
zero.  A large value of UM (above .1 or .2) would be quite troubling, since it would mean that a 
systematic bias is present, so that revision of the model is necessary. 
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The variance proportion US indicates the ability of the model to replicate the degree of 
variability in the variable of interest.  If US is large, it means that the actual series has fluctuated 
considerably while the simulated series shows little fluctuation. Finally, the covariance 
proportion measures what we might call unsystematic error; i.e., it represents the remaining 
error after deviations from average values and average values have been accounted for.  Since it 
is unreasonable to expect predictions that are perfectly correlated with actual outcomes, this 
component of error is less worrisome (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
 Table 4.2 Specification and Model Validation Test. 
             Specification Tests 
                              Autocorrelation                 Heteroscadasticity               Normality 
                               D-W       D-h               White        Breusch-Pagan       Bera-Jarque 
        JYIELD         1.78                           3.12(9.49)         4.10(5.99)           1.55(5.99) 
        JARHV         2.01     0.59(1.65)     1.23(9.49)          3.27(5.99)           1.41(5.99) 
        JPCCON       1.78     1.25(1.65)      2.02(9.49)         2.11(5.99)           2.41(5.99) 
        KYIELD       2.15                           3.51(9.49)         1.14(5.99)           1.42(5.99) 
        KARHV        1.88      0.97(1.65)     4.31(9.49)         2.06(5.99)           1.41(5.99) 
        KPCCON      2.13      0.72(1.65)     4.51(9.49)         4.25(5.99)           1.50(5.99) 
        UEXDEM     1.70                           4.65(9.49)         2.21(5.99)          0.94(5.99) 
             Model Validation Tests  
                             rms % error     UM           US           UC       Theil-U1        U 
        JYIELD            5.01           0.00         0.06        0.94         0.047         0.024 
        JARHV             3.18           0.00         0.01        0.99         0.030         0.015 
        JPCONP           0.26           0.00         0.00        1.00         0.003         0.001 
        KYIELD           4.05           0.00         0.04        0.96         0.065         0.032 
        KARHA            1.86           0.00         0.03        0.97         0.019         0.009 
        KPCCON          2.41           0.00         0.00        1.00         0.022         0.011 
        UEXDEM         1.44           0.00         0.04        0.96        0.014         0.007 
  Note: 1. numbers in the parentheses represent the critical values of each testing statistic. 
           2. we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation, heteroscadasticity, and the error 
               terms are distributed normally in all of specification tests at the 5% level of significance. 
 
This study uses two goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the overall predictive ability of 
the model: 1) root-mean-square percent error (rms %) and 2) Theil s inequality coefficient (U). 
The validation statistics show that the models basically do an excellent job of 
representing the rice economies.  The rms and Theil-U measures indicate that the models 
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simulate the data well over the historical period.  The rms indicates that the models have rms 
from 0.26% root-mean-square error to 5.01%.  And UM, US, UC and Theil-U illustrate that we 
are able to use the models to explain the historical rice economies with very low values for UM 
reflecting no systematic bias in the models. 
4.2 Derivation of Political Weights 
To derive the political weights of interest groups in the three rice sectors, it is assumed 
that there are three interest groups: producers, consumers, and taxpayers.  We are interested in 
the net effect on producers and consumers of price policies in the three countries.  Hence if PS 
and PD are the prices for producers and consumers, then the net producer benefit from having a 
price PS instead of PW, which is defined as no intervention or border price, is measured by the 
change in producer surplus.  Similarly, the net consumer welfare is measured by the change in 
consumer surplus.  On the other hand, the taxpayers or government net expenditure is defined 
as: GS= PD*QD - PS*QS - PW*M; where QS, QD and M denote the levels of production, 
consumption, and net imports, respectively.  The first term on the right hand side of the 
equation is the government revenue from selling to consumers, the second term is the cost of 
purchasing from producers, and the third term is the payment for imported rice.  
Now suppose that the policy maker seeks to maximize a political preference function 
consisting of producer’s surplus, consumer’s surplus and taxpayer’s expenditures by choosing 
the optimal domestic producer and consumer prices. The political preference function for the 
policymaker in the three rice sectors is: 
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( )∫  + λG {[PD D(PD) -  PS S(PS)] 
   - [ PW(D(PD)-  S(PS)) ]},             (4.2.1) 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no intertemporal storage activity.  Assuming no stock 
changes, the net imported quantity for Japan and South Korea (the net exported quantity for the 
U.S.) can be expressed as D(PD) - S(PS).  Consumer and producer prices are the policy 
variables.  Then, the optimal price policy can be obtained by differentiating the political 
preference function with respect to producer price, PS and consumer price, PD, respectively.  To 
solve the optimization problem, the governments must choose the instruments PS and PD so as to 
satisfy the following necessary conditions: 
SP
PPF
∂
∂
= S(PS)( λP - λG) - S’(PS)* λG (PS - PW) = 0         (4.2.2) 
DP
PPF
∂
∂
= D(PD)(λG - λC) + D’(PD)* λG (PD - PW) = 0         (4.2.3) 
To be consistent with the maximization hypothesis, second-order conditions require that 
the Hessian matrix be negative semi-definite at the optimal producer price (PS) and consumer 
price (PD), i.e., .00 2
2
2
2
≤
∂
∂≤
∂
∂
DS P
PPF
and
P
PPF
  In addition, we have additional normalization 
equations such that λP + λC + λG = 3 and λG = 1 in order to compare with the social welfare 
function that has unit equal weight to each interest group (λP = λC = λG = 1) and for simplicity. 
Once we have established functional relations between the political weights and the 
levels of rice policies, we can derive the formulas for describing endogenous domestic prices 
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for producers and consumers. Arranging the above first order conditions (4.2.2) and (4.2.3), we 
have the following equations for endogenous price determination:  
PS* = PW + )(’
)(
*
S
S
G
GP
PS
PS
λ
λλ −
            (4.2.4) 
PD* = PW + )(’
)(
*
D
D
G
GC
PD
PD
λ
λλ −
            (4.2.5) 
From these equations, it is possible to evaluate how political and economic factors 
contribute to the establishment of endogenous price levels. First, the border price for rice 
impacts domestic pricing policies. Second, the domestic market situations in terms of the 
production and consumption functions also have impacts on the formation of producer and 
consumer prices. Third, the above equations imply that political weights of the producer, 
consumer and taxpayer are all involved in the process of rice price decisions. For example, a 
larger political weight for producers relative to taxpayers would increase the producer price.  
Moreover, if we move the border price variable to the left-hand side of equations (4.2.4) 
and (4.2.5), we can see how political economic factors influence the difference between the 
domestic and border prices in (4.2.6) and (4.2.7): 
PS*- PW = )(’
)(
*
S
S
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            (4.2.6) 
PD* - PW = )(’
)(
*
D
D
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PD
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λλ −
            (4.2.7) 
These equations suggest the potential role of the political weights in evaluating the level 
of domestic protection in the three rice sectors. For example, if the producers’ welfare is valued 
higher than the taxpayers’ welfare, the domestic producer price would be above the 
international price, which is likely to lead to an increase in the level of protection.  In addition, 
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we know that if all political weights are the same, λP = λC = λG, then PD* = PS* = PW.  In other 
words, the optimal domestic prices for consumer and producer are equal to the world price. 
Thus, if there are no special preferences among interests groups, free trade is the optimal policy. 
The difference between the domestic and world price only depends on the relative political 
weights. For example, if λP > λG then it would imply that PS* > PW, and λC > λG implies that PW 
> PD*. 
The difference between producer and consumer prices is not affected by the world price 
in equation (4.2.8): 
PS* - PD*  = )(’
)(
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         (4.2.8) 
The equation (4.2.8) implies that the price difference is purely determined by domestic 
supply and demand factors, and the relative political weights of producers and consumers to that 
of taxpayers. In particular, assuming supply and demand elasticities are constant, the optimal 
price wedges are derived as follows: 
α = (PS* - PW) / PS* = (λP - λG)/λG * (1/ε)          (4.2.9) 
β = (PD* - PW) / PD* = (λC - λG)/λG * (1/η)        (4.2.10) 
where α and β represent the optimal producer and consumer price wedge, ε and η denote the 
supply and demand elasticity.  The optimal price wedges are simple forms of implicit political 
weights and elasticities of demand and supply.  All of the elements of these optimal conditions, 
except the political weights, are typically observable either directly or from econometric 
estimates.  Therefore, assuming that policymakers have chosen the optimal level of a given 
policy tool so as to maximize an implicit political preference, one can easily determine the 
political weights used by policymakers.  The above equations show that the optimal price 
 102
wedges depend not only on the elasticity of supply and demand but also on the political 
weights.  The more inelastic the supply (or demand) and the more deviation of the producer (or 
consumer) political weight from the taxpayer weight, the more the optimal price wedges tend to 
diverge (Im, 2000, Gardner, 1987). 
Given the estimated elasticities of demand and supply from the domestic production and 
consumption functions, we can derive the political weights of the three major interest groups in 
the three countries’ rice economies.  The estimated results from the rice market models are 
shown in Table 4.3.  These estimates are the results of applying equations (4.2.9) and (4.2.10) 
with the normalization equations.  To derive these estimates, supply and demand elasticities 
were combined with annual producer and consumer price, and world price data from 1960 to 
1999.   
The estimated political weights as shown in Table 4.3 indicate that the Japanese and 
Korean policies have favored rice producers more than the other interest groups.  In the 
Japanese and Korean rice sectors, the political weights are particularly high for producers, 
lowest for consumers.  The average weights for producers exceed unity while those for 
consumers are less than unity.  Table 4.3 shows that a political willingness to redistribute 
income in favor of producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.  This implies that rice 
producers have generally been preferred to consumers and taxpayers.  In other words, the 
Japanese and Korean policymakers have placed more weights on the welfare of rice producers 
rather than those of consumers and taxpayers. 
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 Table 4.3 Political Weights for the Three Countries. 
                                          Japan                                    Korea                           U.S. 
           Year          Producer        Consumer       Producer      Consumer         Exporter 
          1960              1.08                 0.92               1.19                0.81                 1.15 
          1961              1.06                 0.94               0.92                1.08                 1.15 
          1962              1.06                 0.94               0.89                1.11                 0.87 
          1963              1.08                 0.92               1.14                0.86                 0.86 
          1964              1.10                 0.90               0.99                1.01                 0.85 
          1965              1.12                 0.88               0.81                1.19                 0.84 
          1966              1.13                 0.87               0.82                1.18                 0.82 
          1967              1.13                 0.87               0.87                1.13                 0.82 
          1968              1.15                 0.85               0.94                1.06                 0.87 
          1969              1.16                 0.84               1.04                 0.96                0.80 
          1970              1.16                 0.84               1.04                 0.96                1.18 
          1971              1.16                 0.84               1.10                 0.90                1.17 
          1972              1.17                 0.83               1.14                 0.86                1.08 
          1973              1.09                  0.91              0.68                 1.32                1.19 
          1974              1.09                 0.91               0.88                 1.12                1.19 
          1975              1.16                 0.84               1.07                 0.93                1.32 
          1976              1.20                 0.80               1.23                 0.77                1.25 
          1977              1.19                 0.81               1.16                 0.84                1.24 
          1978              1.22                 0.78               1.21                 0.79                1.36 
          1979              1.21                 0.79               1.24                 0.76                1.19 
          1980              1.19                 0.81               1.20                 0.80                1.17 
          1981              1.22                 0.78               1.34                 0.66                1.30 
          1982              1.23                 0.77               1.40                 0.60                1.22 
          1983              1.24                 0.76               1.39                 0.61                1.19 
          1984              1.24                 0.76               1.38                 0.62                1.22 
          1985              1.24                 0.76               1.38                 0.62                1.31 
          1986              1.26                 0.74               1.42                 0.60                1.56 
          1987              1.26                 0.74               1.40                 0.57                1.31 
          1988              1.26                 0.74               1.43                 0.55                1.29 
          1989              1.26                 0.74               1.45                 0.56                1.25 
          1990              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.56                1.30 
          1991              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.56                1.29 
          1992              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.59                1.41 
          1993              1.26                 0.74               1.41                 0.55                1.33 
          1994              1.27                 0.73               1.45                 0.55                1.31 
          1995              1.27                 0.73               1.44                 0.56                1.24 
          1996              1.26                 0.74               1.46                 0.54                1.23 
          1997              1.26                 0.74               1.46                 0.54                1.23 
          1998              1.26                 0.74               1.45                 0.55                1.19 
          1999              1.25                 0.75               1.37                 0.63                1.30 
       Average           1.19                 0.81               1.21                 0.79                1.17 
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In the meantime, the political weight for the U.S. rice exporters is derived at 1.17 on 
average.  It is higher than the weight for the taxpayers that we normalized at unity in order to 
compare with different interest groups.  Overall, table 4.3 illustrates the time trend in the 
political weight.  A change in the political weight could be interpreted as policymaker’s 
preferences changing overtime. 
4.3 Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis 
4.3.1 Game Theoretic Procedure 
In this section, the econometric estimation and the political weights are incorporated into 
the game theoretic analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium as a base.  Using the base as a 
foundation, a scenario analysis is conducted.  The base is an analysis with respect to the existing 
import and export policies in the three countries, which include tariffication and export 
programs.  The goal of this analysis is to look at the implications of changes from minimum 
access to tariffication of imports. 
4.3.2 The Base 
To develop the framework, it is necessary to determine the import tariff equivalents of 
Japan and Korea.  Import tariffs are defined as the difference between the domestic price and 
the world price.  For example, if the domestic price is $3000/MT and the world price is 
$500/MT, the tariff equivalent is the difference, which is $2500/MT.  Depending upon the 
world price path, future domestic prices are likely to decrease because the Japanese and Korean 
governments will have to reduce the import tariffs annually.  The domestic price is the world 
price plus the tariff equivalent, and the price that producers received is the government 
procurement price plus some type of producer support programs, such as direct payments for 
Japan and Korea.  For the U.S. price, we consider the world price plus the difference between 
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the loan rate and the world price for the base.  The reason is that the target-price/deficiency 
payment program has been a major policy instrument for supporting producer income by paying 
directly the amount of deficiency payment to rice farmers during the 1976-1995 period. The 
level of deficiency payment, the difference between the announced target price and actual 
market price (or loan rate) for rice, has been much higher than for other program commodities 
such as wheat and corn.  Due to the favorable incentives, the program participation rate has 
been over 90 percent for rice, which is much higher than for other program commodities.  
However, the 1996 FAIR Act terminated the target-price/deficiency payment program; the 
marketing loan program will continue to provide income support to rice producers by allowing 
them to pay back their nonrecourse loans at prices below the loan rate when USDA announces 
world trading prices are less than the loan rate (Childs, 1996).   
In terms of surplus, this study considers consumer, producer, and government surpluses 
for Japan and Korea in the base.  For the U.S., exporter surplus is considered in the base.  The 
equations are as follows: 
CSURPit = D p dP
Pw
Pd
( )∫              (4.3.1) 
PSURPit = S p dP
Pw
Ps
( )∫              (4.3.2) 
GSURPit = (TARIFit*IMPTit) – {(GPURPit*GPURit) + (EQUILit*GPURPit)}     (4.3.3) 
For U.S. exporter’s surplus, U.S. export revenue from Japan and Korea is taken into 
account because this study specifically looks at U.S. exports to Japan and Korea only.  The 
export surplus equation is the sum of exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea.  The export 
surplus equation is as follows: 
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UEXSURt = E p dP E p dPJ K
Pw
Ps
Pw
Ps
( ) ( )+ ∫∫             (4.3.4) 
where E p dPJ
Pw
Ps
( )∫  and E p dPK
Pw
Ps
( )∫  are the U.S. exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea, 
respectively.  In addition, the equilibrium is derived using the empirical econometric estimation 
equations for aggregated production and consumption for Japan and Korea and export demand 
for the U.S.  The other variables are exogenously given within the equation.  The equilibrium 
equation is as follows: 
EQUILit = PRODit + BESTKit + IMPTit – CONPit – EXPOTit  – ENSTKit      (4.3.5) 
where CSURPit = consumer surplus at time t in country i  
PSURPit = producer surplus at time t in country i  
GSURPit = government surplus at time t in country i  
GPURPit = government purchase price in country i 
GPURit = government purchase amount at time t in country i 
EQUILit = equilibrium quantity at time t in country i 
PRODit = total production at time t in country i 
BESTKit = beginning stock at time t in country i 
IMPTit = import at time t in country i 
CONPit = total consumption at time t in country i 
EXPOTit = export at time t in country i 
ENSTKit = ending stock at time t in country i 
UEXSURt = U.S. export surplus at time t 
In economic theory, the equilibrium should be zero in equilibrium.  However, in reality, 
that has not happened for the last four decades in Korea and Japan.  Therefore, we consider the 
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amount they need to import if the sign for the equilibrium is negative.  If the sign for the 
equilibrium is positive we consider the amount either to be in year ending stock or for foreign 
aid.  The reason is that there is no country that would be able to import rice from Japan and 
Korea due to the high prices, which are almost five to ten times higher than the world price.  For 
U.S. equilibrium, this study incorporates equation (4.1.7) into the equilibrium identity including 
U.S. exports to Japan and Korea. 
Depending upon the surplus and equilibrium, we consider the political weights derived in 
the previous section for the payoff functions.  The payoff functions include surplus, equilibrium 
quantity, and political weights to obtain the Nash equilibrium for the base. 
Vpi = Wci*CSURPit (PDi)+ Wpi* PSURPit (PSi)+ Wgi * GSURPit(SQi)      (4.3.6) 
where Vpi is the political payoff in country i, SQi is decoupled producer support (or direct 
payment) in region i.  Political weights are Wpi for producer, Wci for consumers, and Wgi  for 
government. 
Using GAMS, the simulation results for the base are presented in Table 4.4.  GAMS is 
useful because it can substantially expand the extent and usefulness of mathematical 
programming applications in policy analysis and decision making. 
The base year is 1999 because the year represents an important turning point for Japan 
and South Korea for the next negotiation, and because Japan adopted a tariffication policy in 
1999.  In the meantime, Korea is assumed to follow the tariffication policy since it has had 
tremendous political pressure from the major exporters.  As a result, we assume that the two 
countries’ major import policy is tariffication. 
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 Table 4.4 Simulation Results of the Payoff Functions for the Base. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8356               4635               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8720               4750               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                      200                      0               1804* 
        Import (1000MT)                                      170**                52**             321 
        Ending Stock (1000MT)                         1210                    73                 867 
        Beginning Stock (1000MT)                    1302                  137                 694 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -22                    99                 600 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)               21.133               6.489                   5.1*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)               38.25                   7.2                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)         54.853             13.369                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3428                1385                N/A 
        Payoffs                                                   2.508               0.572                6.63 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
 
As seen in Table 4.4, Japanese and Korean production is estimated at 8356 thousand MT 
and 4635 thousand MT, respectively.  The 200 thousand MT of Japanese export is for foreign 
aid to North Korea and some countries in Africa.  The Japanese and Korean imports are derived 
at 170 thousand MT and 52 thousand MT, respectively.  The imports are from the U.S. only.  
This study does not take imports from the ROW into account because it focuses on trade flow 
between the U.S. and Japan and Korea.  The equilibrium quantity for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. 
are –22 thousand MT, 99 thousand MT, and 600 thousand MT, respectively.  The U.S. export 
quantity is derived at 1804 thousand MT, including exports to Japan, Korea, and the rest of the 
world (ROW).  In the meantime, the payoffs for Japan and Korea are derived at 2.508 and 
0.572, respectively.  And the U.S. export payoff from U.S. exports to Japan and Korea is 
derived at 6.63. 
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4.3.3 Scenario Analysis 
The next round of negotiations will likely require that the import requirements be made 
more transparent through tariffication.  Based on these requirements, several realistic scenarios 
are developed.  According to WTO agreement, Japan has to reduce import tariffs by 36%, and 
continue to reduce its import tariff by 6% annually.  However, the tariff reduction will likely 
change in the next negotiation.  The possible range of the reduction would be from 2% to 8% 
annually.  Therefore, this possibility of reduction is taken into account for scenario analysis.  
Under MA, Japan would have increased imports by 8%-12% of domestic consumption, from 
2001 to 2006, and 12%-14% by 2010.  However, the Japanese government announced that they 
replaced the existing minimum access policy for tariffication beginning April 1, 1999.  Thus, 
the import policy scenario for Japan focuses on tariffication.  In the meantime, Korean 
government tends to maintain the minimum access policy until 2004.  However, as mentioned 
earlier, the government has had tremendous political and economic pressure from major 
exporters such as the U.S. and CAIRNS group.  Therefore, tariffication policy is considered in 
the scenario analysis for Korea as well.  For the U.S., the existing CCC Credit Guarantee 
Programs (CCC), Market Access Program (MAP), and Foreign Market Development Program 
(FMDP) are considered in the scenario analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium. 
The normal-form representation of an extensive-form game is a summarized description 
of the extensive form.  The normal form is a collection of the pure strategies available to each 
player at each of his/her information sets in the extensive form (Tirole, 1989).  Therefore, the 
normal-form representation is used for the scenario analysis.  In this study, there are three 
players in the game: the United States (US), Japan (JP), and Korea (KO).  Let Ak denote the set 
of actions available to player k, for k = US, JP, and KO, and let Ak denote an arbitrary member 
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of this action set.  Let (AJP, AKO, AUS) denote a combination of actions, and let Pk denote player 
k’s payoff function where Pk(AJP, AKO, AUS) is player k’s payoff resulting from action (AJP, 
AKO, AUS).   
Definition 4.1: The normal-form representation of a two-player game specifies the 
player’s action spaces A1, A2 and their payoff functions P1, P2.  
This game is denoted by G = {A1, A2 ; P1, P2}. 
The solution to each game will involve the concept of elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies.  At each stage, the elimination of dominated strategies for some players at the 
previous stage uncovers dominated strategies for other players.  The process stops when no 
more dominated strategies can be found. 
Definition 4.2: In the normal-form game G = { A1, A2 ; P1, P2} let A1i, and A1j, ∀ 
i ≠ j, be feasible strategies for player 1, i.e., A1i, and A1j are 
members of A1.  Action A1j is strictly dominated by A1i if, for all 
actions available to the other player, player 1’s payoff from 
playing A1j is strictly less than the payoff from playing A1i, such 
that: P1(A1j, A2i) < P1(A1i, A2i) ∀ A2i ∈  A2. 
If a unique solution to a two-player normal-form game non-cooperative game is to be 
found, it must be self-enforcing.  Since there are no appropriate authorities to enforce 
international agreements, this is clearly the situation in any international trade negotiation.  
Thus, each player’s predicted action must be that player’s best response to the predicted action 
of the other player.  This is the Nash equilibrium definition (Kennedy, 1994). 
Definition 4.3: In the two-player normal-form game G = {A1, A2 ; P1, P2}, the 
actions (A1*, A2*) are a Nash equilibrium if, for players 1 and 2, 
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A1* is player 1’s best response to the actions specified for the 
other player, 2, and vice versa, such that P1(A1j, A2i) < P1(A1i, A2i) 
∀ A2i ∈  A2. 
In this three-payer, normal-form, noncooperative dynamic game, defined by G = {AJP, 
AKO, AUS ; PJP, PKO, PUS}, each country chooses some action Ak ∈  Ak in order to maximize its 
payoff function given the action choices of the other countries.  The action space AUS = 
{CCCUS, MAPUS, FMPUS, CMPUS, CFPUS, MFPUS} for the U.S., and AC = {T2C, T4C, T6C, 
T8C} for C = Japan, Korea.  The scenario analysis includes six U.S. actions and four actions of 
Japan and Korea.  The actions of each country are as follows: 
CCCUS: U.S. Credit Guarantee Programs 
MAPUS: U.S. Market Access Program 
FMPUS: U.S. Foreign Market Development Program 
CMPUS: combination of U.S. CCC and MAP 
CFPUS: combination of U.S. CCC and FMP 
MFPUS: combination of U.S. MAP and FMP 
T2C: 2% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents 
T4C: 4% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents 
T6C: 6% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents 
T8C: 8% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents. 
The simulation results for the scenario analysis of each country’s action are presented 
from Table 4.5 to Table 4.17.  For the purpose of comparison, the payoffs for the two countries 
are presented under each U.S. action, and the Nash equilibrium is obtained for each U.S. action. 
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Moreover, ten-year average political weights are used, five years prior to WTO 
agreement implementation and five years after the implementation.  The political weights used 
for Japan are 1.261 and 0.739 for the producer and consumer groups, respectively.  For Korea, 
1.436 and 0.564 for the producer and consumer groups, respectively, are used for the scenario 
analysis.  The political weight for U.S. exporter group is 1.283.   
 Table 4.5 Simulation Payoffs under CCCUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 1.38 ; 0.24 
(5.42) 
1.38 ; 0.27 
(5.47) 
1.38 ; 0.28 
(5.49) 
1.38 ; 0.36 
(5.52) 
Japan T4JP 1.71 ; 0.24 
(5.50) 
1.71 ; 0.27 
(5.53) 
1.71 ; 0.28 
(5.57) 
1.71 ; 0.36 
(5.62) 
 T6JP 1.72 ; 0.24 
(5.85) 
1.72 ; 0.27 
(5.89) 
1.72 ; 0.28 
(5.92) 
1.72 ; 0.36 
(5.96) 
 T8JP 2.25 ; 0.24 
(5.95) 
2.25 ; 0.27 
(6.01) 
2.25 ; 0.28 
(6.08) 
2.25 ; 0.36 
(6.14) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
Under the U.S. action of CCCUS, this study considers U.S. export programs through the 
Commodity Credit Corporation Credit guarantee programs (CCC), including Export Credit 
Guarantee Program and Supplier Credit Guarantee Program with changes in Japanese and 
Korean tariff equivalents from 2% to 8% annually.  The results of the simulation for the U.S. 
Credit guarantee programs are presented in Table 4.5.  The results under the CCC credit 
guarantee programs, as indicated by the Nash equilibrium, show that the U.S. would be better 
off if Japan and Korea reduce their tariff equivalent by 8%.  The Nash equilibrium solution is 
shown in bold letters of the results tables.  In the Nash equilibrium, Japanese and Korean 
payoffs are 2.25 and 0.36, respectively, and U.S. payoff is 6.14. 
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 Table 4.6 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CCCUS. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8173               4532               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8306               4403               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                       171                     0               1804* 
        Import (1000MT)                                        97**                21**             321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -23                    50                 320 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)               23.183               5.762                4.79*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)             34.247               6.455                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)         52.291             11.555                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3154                1274                N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
 
Under the Nash equilibrium for U.S. action, CCCUS, Japanese and Korean production is 
derived at 8173 thousand MT and 4532 thousand MT, respectively (Table 4.6).  The two 
importing countries’ consumption is derived at 8306 thousand MT and 4403 thousand MT.  In 
the meantime, Japanese and Korean imports are decreased by 73 thousand MT and 31 thousand 
MT, respectively, compared to the base.  That causes U.S. exporter’s surplus decrease slightly 
by 0.22 million dollars.  However, Japanese and Korean total surpluses are increased by 0.61 
and 0.342 million dollars, respectively.  In addition, the U.S., Japanese, and Korean payoffs are 
decreased slightly by 0.49, 0.258, and 0.212, respectively. 
In U.S. actions of MAPUS, this study considers Market Access Program (MAP) with 
changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually.  The results of 
MAPUS presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  A Nash equilibrium is obtained at an 8% reduction of 
Japanese and Korean tariff rate.  The Japanese and Korean payoffs are derived at 16.1 and 3.7, 
respectively, and the U.S. payoff is derived at 16.74. 
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 Table 4.7 Simulation Payoffs under MAPUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 13.5 ; 1.8 
(15.1) 
13.5 ; 3.2 
(15.3) 
13.5 ; 3.6 
(15.5) 
13.5 ; 3.7 
(15.6) 
Japan T4JP 14.8 ; 1.8 
(15.5) 
14.8 ; 3.2 
(15.7) 
14.8 ; 3.6 
(15.9) 
14.8 ; 3.7 
(16.0) 
 T6JP 16.0 ; 1.8 
(15.8) 
16.0 ; 3.2 
(16.0) 
16.0 ; 3.6 
(16.2) 
16.0 ; 3.7 
(16.26) 
 T8JP 16.1 ; 1.8 
(16.3) 
16.1 ; 3.2 
(16.45) 
16.1 ; 3.6 
(16.57) 
16.1 ; 3.7 
(16.74) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
 Table 4.8 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under MAPUS. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8154               4500               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8210               4653               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                      178                      0               2484* 
        Import (1000MT)                                      116**                27**             321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -20                   101                295 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)               34.253                  6.85               13.05*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)             32.547                  6.92                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)           51.15                10.04                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3154                 1274                 N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
Under the U.S. action, MAPUS, Japanese and Korean production is derived at 8154 
thousand MT and 4500 thousand MT, respectively.  Japanese and Korean production is 
decreased by 202 thousand MT and 135 thousand MT, respectively, compared to the base.  
Regarding the two countries’ consumption, Japanese consumption is decreased to 8210 
 115
thousand MT.  Also, Korean consumption is decreased to 4653 thousand MT from 4750 
thousand MT, compared to the base.  Meanwhile, U.S. total export is increased by 680 thousand 
MT.  However, U.S. exports to Japan and Korea are decreased by 54 thousand MT and 25 
thousand MT, respectively.  Due to an increase in U.S. total export, U.S. exporter’s surplus is 
increased to 13.05 million dollars from 5.1 million dollars, compared to the base.  
 Table 4.9 Simulation Payoffs under FDPUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 17.6 ; 3.4 
(52.2) 
17.6 ; 3.1 
(52.8) 
17.6 ; 3.3 
(53.1) 
17.6 ; 3.4 
(53.3) 
Japan T4JP 17.2 ; 3.4 
(52.9) 
17.2 ; 3.1 
(53.4) 
17.2 ; 3.3 
(54.2) 
17.2 ; 3.4 
(54.9) 
 T6JP 14.2 ; 3.4 
(53.0) 
14.2 ; 3.1 
(53.9) 
14.2 ; 3.3 
(54.7) 
14.2 ; 3.4 
(55.6) 
 T8JP 16.7 ; 3.4 
(54.5) 
16.7 ; 3.1 
(55.1) 
16.7 ; 3.3 
(55.3) 
16.7 ; 3.4 
(56.0) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
In the U.S action of FDPUS, a dominant strategy for Japan is obtained at the 2% of tariff 
reduction.  The payoff is derived at 17.6.  Also, two dominant strategies for Korea are obtained 
at both a 2% reduction and a 8% reduction with the payoff of 3.4.  As a result, there exist 
multiple equilibria under the U.S. action of FDPUS at both a 2% and a 8% reduction of Japanese 
and Korean tariff equivalents.  The FDPUS action has the largest payoffs for the U.S., compared 
to the base, CCCUS, and MAPUS, but the payoffs for Japan and Korea are almost the same as the 
other two U.S. actions and the base.  Thus, the U.S. would be better off under the action of 
FDPUS dealing with Japanese and Korean import policies, compared to the previous two actions 
in terms of single policy action. 
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 Table 4.10 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under FDPUS. 
                                                                  Japan           Korea         U.S.(T2C)     U.S.(T8C) 
        Production (1000MT)                        8146            4116           6502               6502  
        Consumption (1000MT)                    8320            4550           3846               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                     0                  0           1906*             1973* 
        Import (1000MT)                                 475**          134**         321                 321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)          -20                49             453                 386 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)            38.33             7.23          40.69***         41.54*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)          32.52             6.58            N/A                 N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)    55.663           10.66            N/A                 N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
 
Table 4.10 shows the simulation results of the Nash equilibrium under the U.S. action of 
FDPUS.  The results show that Japanese production is decreased slightly by 110 thousand MT, 
but Korean production is decreased dramatically by 513 thousand MT, compared to the base.  
Possibly, this dramatic change in production causes some structural changes in the Korean rice 
industry.  For example, the Korean government would attempt to increase its target diversion 
program on the production side, which is basically an increase in planted area reduction 
program.  The government diversion program has caused a positive impact on area harvested 
due to the fact that farmers tend to divert paddy fields of lower productivity from rice 
production, thus improving the average rice yields of the remaining rice land (Lee, 1997).  
However, as time has gone and they divert more paddy fields to plant high-revenue crops and 
vegetables, farmers had to divert higher productivity paddy fields.  As a result, the government 
diversion program became a negative impact on rice production (MAFF, 2000). 
Japanese and Korean total consumption is decreased substantially by 400 thousand MT 
and 200 thousand MT, respectively.  Producer surplus in Japan and Korea is increased by 17.2 
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million dollars and 0.741 million dollars, respectively.  However, consumer surplus in Japan 
and Korea is decreased by 5.73 million dollars and 0.62 million dollars, respectively.  In the 
meantime, Japanese government surplus is increased slightly, but Korean government surplus is 
decreased by 2.709 million dollars, compared to the base. 
For the U.S., the payoff with T8C is larger than that of T2C under FDPUS.  In addition, 
U.S. total export is increased slightly with T8C.  This may reflect the fact that the higher tariff 
rates would result in lower exports. 
 Table 4.11 Simulation Payoffs under CMPUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 9.9 ; 2.3 
(30.8) 
9.9 ; 3.0 
(30.9) 
9.9 ; 4.6 
(31.1) 
9.9 ; 2.5 
(31.4) 
Japan T4JP 13.3 ; 2.3 
(30.9) 
13.3 ; 3.0 
(31.4) 
13.3 ; 4.6 
(31.9) 
13.3 ; 2.5 
(32.2) 
 T6JP 21.1 ; 2.3 
(31.6) 
21.1 ; 3.0 
(32.2) 
21.1 ; 4.6 
(32.7) 
21.1 ; 2.5 
(32.7) 
 T8JP 17.1 ; 2.3 
(32.0) 
17.1 ; 3.0 
(32.4) 
17.1 ; 4.6 
(32.55) 
17.1 ; 2.5 
(32.7) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
Under the U.S. action of CMPUS, CCC and MAP with changes in Japanese and Korean 
tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% are taken into account.  The results of the action are presented 
in Tables 4.11 and 4.12.  The results under the action show that the U.S. would be better off if 
Japan and Korea reduce their tariff equivalent by 8% or 6%.  The U.S. payoffs do not change 
under the 8% and 6% reduction with the payoff of 32.7.  A dominant strategy for Japan is a 6% 
reduction of its tariff equivalent with a payoff of 21.1.  In addition, a dominant strategy for 
Korea is a 6% reduction of tariff equivalent with a payoff of 4.6 as well.  However, the Nash 
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equilibrium is obtained at a 6% of reduction strategy for both the U.S. and the two importing 
countries with the payoffs of 32.7 and 25.7, respectively. 
 Table 4.12 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CMPUS. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8156               4432               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8287               4518               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                           0                     0               2484* 
        Import (1000MT)                                      252**                32**             321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -22                    50                 270 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)                 36.23                 6.42               25.49*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)               34.89                 7.83                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)         54.365               11.14                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3222               1302                 N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
Japanese production as well as consumption is almost the same as under the single 
actions of CCCUS and MAPUS.  However, the sum of payoffs for Japan and Korea is increased 
under the combination of CCCUS and MAPUS.  That means the two importing countries would 
be better off under the U.S. action of both CCCUS and MAPUS together by a payoff of 3.29.  In 
terms of total surplus, Japan and Korea would be worse off by 4.034 million dollars under the 
combination of CCCUS and MAPUS.  However, the U.S. total exporter’s surplus is increased by 
7.65 million dollars.  Moreover, U.S. export to Japan is increased by 39 thousand MT under the 
combination as opposed to Korea that would import 16 thousand MT less.   
Comparing with the base, Japanese and Korean production is decreased by 200 thousand 
MT and 203 thousand MT, respectively.  In addition, Japanese and Korean consumption is 
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decreased as well, by 433 thousand MT and 232 thousand MT, respectively.  However, the sum 
of the two countries’ surplus is increased by almost 20 million dollars. 
 Table 4.13 Simulation Payoffs under CFPUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 16.7 ; 3.0 
(68.1) 
16.7 ; 3.4 
(68.3) 
16.7 ; 2.8 
(68.6) 
16.7 ; 2.6 
(67.3) 
Japan T4JP 17.5 ; 3.0 
(68.2) 
17.5 ; 3.4 
(69.8) 
17.5 ; 2.8 
(70.6) 
17.5 ; 2.8 
(71.0) 
 T6JP 17.0 ; 3.0 
(70.2) 
17.0 ; 3.4 
(70.5) 
17.0 ; 2.8 
(71.3) 
17.0 ; 2.8 
(71.9) 
 T8JP 17.1 ; 3.0 
(71.6) 
17.1 ; 3.4 
(72.2) 
17.1 ; 2.8 
(72.5) 
17.1 ; 2.8 
(73.0) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
In U.S. action CFPUS, CCCUS and FDPUS are taken into account with change in Japanese 
and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually.  The results are presented in Tables 4.13 
and 14.  The Nash equilibrium under the action is obtained at a 4% reduction of Japanese and 
Korean tariff equivalents.  The U.S. payoff in the Nash equilibrium is 69.8, and Japanese and 
Korean payoffs are 17.5 and 3.4, respectively.  The U.S. payoff under CPFUS is increased 
substantially to 69.8 from 6.63 under the base.  Even though Japanese and Korean payoffs are 
increased to 17.5 and 3.4, respectively, the payoffs are similar to those under FMPUS. 
Looking at the Table 4.14, which presents the simulation results under CFPUS, we can 
realize that Japanese production is decreased slightly, but Korean production is decreased by 
519 thousand MT along with an decrease in consumption by 333 thousand MT.  However, the 
two countries’ imports from the U.S. are increased substantially by 407 thousand MT.  That 
causes U.S. exporter’s surplus to increase by 50.47 million dollars, compared to the base.  In 
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addition, the sum of the two countries’ surplus is increased by 13.21 million dollars, compared 
to the base. 
 Table 4.14 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under CFPUS 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8225               4116               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8006               4417               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                       200                     0               1906* 
        Import (1000MT)                                       481**             148**             321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)                -20                   50                 629 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)                  51.83                8.32              55.57*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)                48.23                6.23                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)            83.89              12.66                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3222               1302                 N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
 
Under the final action, MFPUS, MAP and FMDP are taken into account with change in 
Japanese and Korean tariff equivalent from 2% to 8% annually.  The outcome of the action is 
presented in Tables 4.15 and 4.16.  MAP and FADP are major programs in U.S. market 
development program.  These two programs benefit U.S. farmers, processors, and exporters by 
assisting their organizations in developing new markets and increasing market share in existing 
markets.  These programs support growth in U.S. agricultural exports by enlisting private sector 
involvement and resources in coordinated efforts to promote U.S. products to foreign buyers. 
In this action, the Nash equilibrium is obtained at a 4% reduction.  The U.S. payoff is 
derived at 140.6, and Japanese and Korean payoffs are obtained at 45.0 and 14.7, respectively.  
Comparing to the base, the U.S. payoff is increased substantially by 133.97.  Also, Japanese and 
Korean payoffs are increased dramatically by 42.5 and 14.128, respectively.  However, a 
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dominant strategy for the U.S. is an 8% reduction with a payoff of 147.1, and a dominant 
strategy for Japan and Korea is a 4% reduction with payoffs of 45.0 and 14.7, respectively.  
 Table 4.15 Simulation Payoffs under MFPUS. 
   Korea   
 Action T2KO T4KO T6KO T8KO 
 T2JP 34.1 ; 8.2 
(137.4) 
34.1 ; 14.7 
(138.3) 
34.1 ; 13.7 
(139.2) 
34.1 ; 12.3 
(140.3) 
Japan T4JP 45.0 ; 8.2 
(139.5) 
45.0 ; 14.7 
(140.6) 
45.0 ; 13.7 
(141.2) 
45.0 ; 12.3 
(142.0) 
 T6JP 43.9 ; 8.2 
(142.2) 
43.9 ; 14.7 
(142.9) 
43.9 ; 13.7 
(143.8) 
43.9 ; 12.3 
(145.3) 
 T8JP 40.2 ; 8.2 
(144.9) 
40.2 ; 14.7 
(145.7) 
40.2 ; 13.7 
(146.2) 
40.2 ; 12.3 
(147.1) 
  Note: numbers in a solution cell represent Japanese and Korean payoffs, respectively. 
            numbers in parentheses represent U.S. payoffs. 
 
In terms of production and consumption in the two importing countries, some substantial 
changes can be found (Table 4.16).  Firstly, both countries’ production is decreased 
dramatically due to an increase in import.  An increase in import primarily causes domestic 
production to decrease.  If they would keep the levels of production in both countries, the 
governments would have to deal with over-supply, which is eventually becoming burdensome 
stock.  A result of this burdensome stock would incur rice surpluses in both countries, requiring 
expensive acreage diversion programs to help curb the over-supply.  However, secondly, the 
main beneficiary would be the U.S. since the exporter’s surplus is increased substantially.  
Similarly, the two countries total surplus is increased dramatically as well, compared to the 
base. 
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 Table 4.16 Simulation Results of the Nash Equilibrium under MFPUS. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              7760               3863               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          7953               4390               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                           0                     0               1906* 
        Import (1000MT)                                      659**              221**             321 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -18                    40                 456 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)                 75.67                 18.82           112.08*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)               48.93                 11.94                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)           87.69                 20.05                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3222                 1302                 N/A 
  *: total U.S. exports. 
  **: imports from the U.S. 
  ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
  N/A: not available. 
 
 Table 4.17 Payoff Summary. 
   J & K*   
 Action T2C T4C T6C T8C 
 CCCUS 5.42 ; 1.62 5.53 ; 1.98 5.92 ; 2.0 6.14 ; 2.61 
 MAPUS 15.1 ; 15.3 15.7 ; 18.0 16.2 ; 19.5 16.4 ; 19.7 
U.S. FDPUS 52.2 ; 20.5 53.4 ; 20.3 54.7 ; 17.5 56.0 ; 20.1 
 CMPUS 30.8 ; 12.2 31.4 ; 16.3 32.7 ; 25.7 32.7 ; 19.6 
 CFPUS 68.1 ; 19.7 69.8 ; 20.4 71.3 ; 19.8 73.0 ; 19.9 
 MFPUS 137.4 ; 42.3 140.6 ; 59.7 143.8 ; 57.6 147.1 ; 52.5 
 *: represents sum of Japanese and Korean payoffs. 
 
Overall, Table 4.17 reports a summary of the entire U.S. actions.  Each action has a Nash 
equilibrium with changes in Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents.  Table 4.17 shows that the 
overall Nash equilibrium for both trade parties is obtained at a 4% tariff reduction under 
MFPUS.   
For Japan and Korea, a dominant strategy is 4% reduction with the payoff of 59.7.  Since 
they have tried to protect their import markets, they would try to keep their tariff rates as high as 
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possible to restrict their import markets.  For the U.S., a dominant strategy is 8% reduction with 
the payoff of 147.1.  It is preferable for the U.S. to export to Japan and Korea with lower tariff 
rates because the higher tariff rates would result in lower U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.   
Under the MAP and FMDP programs, according to USDA, the U.S. can advertise U.S. 
rice through the Japanese telecommunication channels, such as national television and radio 
commercials (USDA, 2000).  That means the U.S. rice federation can promote U.S. rice 
throughout the nation, which increases opportunities for U.S. rice exports to Japan.  
Unfortunately, promotional activities are not yet allowed in Korea.  However, the main question 
for U.S. exports to Japan and Korea is how to handle heavy competition with major exporters 
such as Australia, China, and other exporters in both markets and how to penetrate Japanese and 
Korean domestic markets and consumer table competition. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the research, states conclusion remarks, and describes the 
research limitations and future research opportunities.  The organization of the Chapter is as 
follows: section 5.1 summaries the entire research and makes some concluding remarks.  In 
section 5.2, the limitations of the study and future research opportunities are stated. 
5.1 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
As a result of WTO agreement on agricultural commodities, the impact of trade 
liberalization on the international rice market is profound because rice trade has been highly 
restricted in both developed and developing countries.  In addition, another round of the WTO 
trade negotiations has started and the impacts of potential policy changes on rice production and 
trade flows in the world rice industry are unknown. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations resulted in an agreement by Japan and South Korea to 
relax their rice import bans with minimum access requirements.  Japan agreed to imports equal 
to 4% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 8% by the year 2001.  Korea agreed to a minimum 
access of 1% of consumption in 1995, increasing to 2% by 2000 and 4% by 2004 based on the 
consumption of the year of 1986-88. 
However, in December 1998, the Japanese government notified the WTO of its decision 
to introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999.  Under tariffication, a specific duty of 
351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA volume.  In and after 
Japanese fiscal year 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen per kg was applied to 
imports outside of MA. 
The impact of the UR agreement on the U.S. rice industry has been favorable.  The major 
benefit has been access to the Japanese market.  The U.S. share of this market has been about 
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50% as opposed to the Korean market, in which its market share is zero.  However, the U.S. 
share of the Japanese market has gradually decreased and been unstable due to strong 
competition with major exporters.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. rice industry can potentially increase its market share in Japanese 
and Korean rice import markets, given that both countries will likely be required to expand their 
imports in the next round of the WTO negotiations.  Expanded market access remains one of the 
most important issues for rice trade. 
Looking at the historical and recent structural changes in both countries, it is useful for 
the U.S. rice industry, especially the export market, to examine how much market share the U.S. 
can potentially obtain in the Japanese and Korean markets.  In addition, it is important to 
examine how changes in Japanese and Korean rice policies, as related to their WTO 
commitments, will impact U.S. export industry. 
The general objective of this study was to determine the potential for U.S. rice exports to 
Japan and Korea.  The goal of the analysis was to determine the implications for U.S. export 
policies.  The specific objectives to accomplish this were to estimate econometric models of 
supply and consumption behavior, to determine the political weights of relevant interest groups, 
to conduct a game theoretic analysis to determine the optimal policy options for U.S. rice 
exports. 
Chapter two described Japanese and Korean rice economies and U.S. export situation.  A 
general feature of both countries is an aging farm population (generally over 55) with rice 
farming being mostly a part-time farming operation with high dependence on off-farm income.  
Currently these two countries have high rice production costs compared to border prices due to 
the small-scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, and high land costs.  The farm structure 
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is dominated by small-scale rice farms and mostly operator-owned rather than rented rice farms.  
They produce high quality japonica medium-grain rice as a staple food.  During the past several 
decades, they have been experiencing a decrease in per capita rice consumption, and normally 
produce rice surpluses as a result of highly protectionist government programs.  
Rice supply and demand in Japan and Korea share many similarities. The production 
structure and policies for the rice sector have many common characteristics.  As these countries 
have become more wealthy industrial countries, they have experienced a similar long-term 
decline in per capita rice consumption. 
In terms of production, rice is the major crop grown in Japan and Korea, accounting for 
37 percent and 56 percent of the total planted acreage in 1999, respectively.  Although rice 
production has been relatively stable during the past 20 years, it has come from improved yield.  
The supply of paddy land for rice production has been stable over time due to the limited 
availability of land, as well as the low substitutability in land use between paddy and upland.  
Improvements in rice yields are mainly due to the adoption of new varieties, mechanization, and 
improved production practices in both countries. 
On the consumption side, an increase in per capita income created a change in food 
consumption patterns in both countries. In addition, as per capita income has grown, per capita 
consumption of rice has declined gradually.  This is mainly due to the change in the dietary 
pattern of consumers in favor of protein food such as meat and vegetables.  However, the total 
consumption in rice has been stable in both countries due to an increase in population and 
higher demand in processing industries.   
The U.S. is a leading exporter of rice in the international market, accounting for about 12 
percent of global rice trade although the U.S. accounts for less than 2 percent of global rice 
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production.  The U.S. currently ranks fourth among major exporters, behind Thailand, Vietnam, 
and China.  More than 40 percent of the U.S. rice crop is exported each year, making the U.S. 
market sensitive to movements in international prices.  
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. rice 
exports supplied 65% of that market-mostly from California.  However, by the mid-1980’s, 
Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to generous government programs, and imports were 
essentially banned.  After losing its largest importer, Korea, in 1983, California accumulated 
rice stocks, relative to the southern states. Since 1983, the U.S. exported no rice to Korea.  
In the meantime, Japan accounts for the bulk of U.S. medium grain brown rice exports.  
In 1999/2000, Japan imported nearly 150 thousand MT of medium grain brown rice from the 
U.S., down from a year earlier record 250 thousand MT.  Japan divides its rice purchases 
between milled and brown rice, with each type’s share varying each year.  The U.S. typically 
supplies half of Japan’s total rice purchases.  The U.S. exports about 10 thousand to 14 
thousand MT of short grain brown rice each year.  Japan accounts for two-thirds, most of it sold 
under the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) portion of their total WTO commitments.     
There are four types of government programs for U.S. rice exports.  First, under PL 480, 
the U.S. sells rice on concessional credit terms and donates rice to needy countries either 
bilaterally or through the World Food Program.  Second, USDA provides Credit Guarantee 
Program such as export credit guarantees (GSM-102) and intermediate Export Credit Guarantee 
(GSM-103) for commercial financing of U.S. agricultural exports.  Third, the Market Access 
Program facilitates U.S. rice sales to markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized exports 
from other countries.  Finally, USDA funds Foreign Market Development Program, which is for 
the creation, expansion, and maintenance of foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products. 
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In Chapter three, the theoretical framework was considered.  The dynamic econometric 
model specified in this study was characterized by a combination of a partial adjustment process 
both in supply and demand, and cobweb type price expectations in supply response. The long-
run adjustment responses were embodied in this model due to factor fixity in supply and habit 
formation in demand.  
Supply and demand responses for rice were specified in terms of domestic production 
and consumption. The dynamics and the relationship between short-run and long-run responses 
can be seen by the specified market model within the partial adjustment model framework. 
For the study, the supply parameters were estimated using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS).  The demand equations, per capita consumption and U.S. export demand, are estimated 
by ordinary least square (OLS). 
Given the estimated elasticities of demand and supply from the domestic production and 
consumption functions, we could derive the political weights of the three major interest groups 
in the three countries’ rice economies.  The policy analysis in the game theoretic approach 
looked specifically at the behavior of the rice price, import policy, and export policy variables. 
This study addressed policy analysis including several reasonable scenarios with respect to 
tariff equivalents.  Overall, a game theoretic approach was adopted to determine politically 
feasible policy options for U.S. exports on each policy change in Japan and Korea.   
In Chapter four, the empirical results were presented.  Based on the theoretical 
considerations and the market structure concerning the dynamic commodity model in the 
previous section, the empirical econometric models for the three countries’ rice markets were 
specified for the period 1960-1999. 
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The results of the acreage response estimation showed the expected signs for all 
explanatory variables that were implied in the theory of production.  Except for the constant 
terms, all parameter estimates were different from zero at the 5% level of significance.  The 
prices received by rice farmers in both countries had a positive impact on the acreage response, 
as expected.  The production costs for Japan and the diversion program for Korea had a 
negative impact on the supply response.  The coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent 
variables showed a stable geometric lag process and supported the existence of a lagged 
distribution of the dependent variables.  The short-run supply elasticities with respect to the 
output at the mean for Japan and Korea were 0.11 and 0.13, respectively.  However, the long-
run supply elasticities were estimated as 0.75 and 0.89, respectively. 
Except for the constant terms, all independent variables in the per capita consumption 
equations showed strong statistical significance and expected signs.  All coefficient estimates 
were significant at the 5% level of significance.  Rice consumption was negatively related to 
own price as well as income, which implied that rice is an inferior good in Japan and Korea.  
This is a phenomenon, which has been experienced over the last decade in Japan and Korea as 
their income levels have risen.  The coefficients on the one year lagged dependent variables 
were also significant at the 5% level of significance.  It implies that there exist gradual changes 
in diet patterns, which impact rice consumption.  In fact, the increases in the income levels have 
transformed the Japanese and Korean diet by substituting rice with consumption of meats, 
fruits, and vegetables.  The price elasticities for Japan and Korea were -0.096 and -0.23, 
respectively.  The income elasticities were also computed at -0.029 and -0.56, respectively. 
For the equation of U.S. export demand, all of the independent variables were 
statistically significant at the 5% level except for government export program.  U.S. export 
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demand estimation showed the expected signs for all explanatory variables.  When the gap 
between world price and domestic price received by producers are widened, the producers’ 
willingness to export rice tends to be higher. 
The validation statistics showed that the models basically did a good job of representing 
the rice economies.  The rms and Theil-U measures indicated that the models simulated the data 
well over the historical period.  The rms indicated that the models had rms from 0.26% root-
mean-square error to 5.01%.  And UM, US, UC and Theil-U illustrated that we were able to use 
the models to explain the historical rice economies with very low values for UM reflecting no 
systematic bias in the models. 
The estimated political weights as shown in Table 4.3 indicated that the Japanese and 
Korean policies have favored rice producers more than the other interest groups.  In the 
Japanese and Korean rice sectors, the political weights were particularly high for producers, 
lowest for consumers.  The average weights for producers exceeded unity while those for 
consumers were less than unity.  Table 4.3 showed a political willingness to redistribute income 
in favor of producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.  This implies that rice 
producers have generally been preferred to consumers and taxpayers.  In other words, the 
Japanese and Korean policymakers have placed more weights on the welfare of rice producers 
rather than those of consumers and taxpayers.  In the meantime, the political weight for the U.S. 
rice exporters was derived at 1.17 on average.  It was higher than the weight for the taxpayers 
that we normalized at unity in order to compare with different interest groups.  Overall, table 
4.3 illustrated the time trend in the political weight.  A change in the political weight could be 
interpreted as policymaker’s preferences changing overtime.  
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Using GAMS, the simulation results for the base were presented in Table 4.4.  The year 
1999 was selected as the base because it was an important turning point for Japan and South 
Korea for the next negotiation is the year 1999 and because Japan has adopted tariffication 
policy in 1999.  In the meantime, Korea was assumed to follow the tariffication policy since it 
has had tremendous political pressure from the major exporters.  As a result, we assumed that 
the two countries’ major import policy was the tariffication policy. 
Under the base, Japanese and Korean production was estimated at 8356 thousand MT 
and 4635 thousand MT, respectively.  The Japanese and Korean imports were derived at 450 
thousand MT and 150 thousand MT, respectively.  The imports were from the U.S. only.  The 
equilibrium quantity for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. were –22 thousand MT, 99 thousand MT, 
and 600 thousand MT, respectively.  The U.S. export quantity was derived at 1804 thousand 
MT, including exports to Japan, Korea, and the rest of the world (ROW).  In the meantime, the 
payoffs for Japan and Korea were derived at 2.508 and 0.572, respectively.  And the U.S. export 
payoff was derived at 6.63. 
The scenario analysis included six U.S. actions.  The actions were 1) CCC with 2% to 
8% reduction in Japan and Korea (CCCUS), 2) Market Access Program with 2% to 8% reduction 
in Japan and Korea (MAPUS), 3) Foreign Market Development Program with 2% to 8% 
reduction in Japan and Korea (FDPUS), 4) CCC and Market Access Program with 2% to 8% 
reduction in Japan and Korea (CMPUS), 5) CCC and Foreign Market Development Program 
with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea (CFPUS), and 6) Market Access Program and 
Foreign Market Development Program with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea (MFPUS). 
Moreover, ten-year average political weights were used, five years prior to WTO 
agreement implementation and five years after the implementation.  The political weights used 
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for Japan were 1.261 and 0.739 for producer group and consumer group, respectively.  For 
Korea, 1.436 and 0.564 for producer group and consumer group, respectively, were used for the 
scenario analysis.  The political weight for U.S. exporter group was 1.283. 
The results under the CCCUS showed that a Nash equilibrium was obtained at an 8% 
reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff rate.  In the Nash equilibrium, Japanese and Korean 
payoffs were 2.25 and 0.36, respectively, and U.S. payoff was 6.14.  In U.S. action of MAPUS, a 
Nash equilibrium was obtained at an 8% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff rate.  The 
Japanese and Korean payoffs were derived at 16.1 and 3.7, respectively, and the U.S. payoff 
was derived at 16.74.  Under the MAPUS, Japanese and Korean production was decreased by 
202 thousand MT and 135 thousand MT, respectively.  However, U.S. exports to Japan and 
Korea were decreased by 54 thousand MT and 25 thousand MT, respectively.  Due to an 
increase in U.S. total exports, U.S. exporter’s surplus was increased to 13.05 million dollars 
from 5.1 million dollars, compared to the base.  In FDPUS, a dominant strategy for Japan was 
obtained at the 2% of tariff reduction.  Also, two dominant strategies for Korea were obtained at 
both a 2% reduction and an 8% reduction with the payoff of 3.4.  As a result, there existed 
multiple equilibria under FDPUS at both a 2% and an 8% reduction.  The FDPUS action had the 
largest payoffs for the U.S., compared to the base, CCCUS, and MAPUS, but the payoffs for 
Japan and Korea were almost the same as the other two U.S. actions and the base.  The results 
under FDPUS showed that Japanese production was decreased slightly by 110 thousand MT, but 
Korean production was decreased dramatically by 513 thousand MT, compared to the base.  
Possibly, this dramatic change in production causes some structural changes in the Korean rice 
industry.  Under the U.S. action of CMPUS, the U.S. payoffs did not change under the 8% and 
6% reduction with the payoff of 32.7.  A dominant strategy for Japan was a 6% reduction of its 
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tariff equivalent with a payoff of 21.1.  In addition, a dominant strategy for Korea was a 6% 
reduction of tariff equivalent with a payoff of 4.6 as well.  However, the Nash equilibrium was 
obtained at a 6% of reduction strategy for both the U.S. and the two importing countries with 
the payoffs of 32.7 and 25.7, respectively.  In U.S. action of CFPUS, the Nash equilibrium under 
the action was obtained at a 4% reduction of Japanese and Korean tariff equivalents.  The U.S. 
payoff in the Nash equilibrium was 69.8, and Japanese and Korean payoffs were 17.5 and 3.4, 
respectively.  The U.S. payoff under CPFUS was increased substantially to 69.8 from 6.63 under 
the base.  Under the final action, MFPUS, the Nash equilibrium was obtained at a 4% reduction.  
The U.S. payoff was derived at 140.6, and Japanese and Korean payoffs were derived at 45.0 
and 14.7, respectively.  Comparing to the base, the U.S. payoff was increased substantially by 
133.97.  Also, Japanese and Korean payoffs were increased dramatically by 42.5 and 14.128, 
respectively.   
Table 4.17 showed that the overall Nash equilibrium for all trade parties was a 4% tariff 
reduction under MFPUS.  For Japan and Korea, a dominant strategy was a 4% reduction with the 
payoff of 59.7.  Since they have tried to protect their import markets, they would try to keep 
their tariff rates as high as possible to restrict their import markets.  For the U.S., an 8% 
reduction on the part of Japan and Korea is preferable, given the payoff of 147.1.  This is logical 
given that the U.S. would prefer to export to Japan and Korea with lower tariff rates because the 
higher tariff rates would result in lower U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.   
Moreover, the U.S. actions that included the Foreign Market Development Programs 
(FMDP) dominated the other actions that did not include the FMDP.  The payoffs of the actions 
with FMDP were larger than those of the actions without FMDP for the U.S.  Even though, 
under the U.S. actions of CFPUS and MFPUS, the Nash equilibrium was obtained at a 4% 
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reduction, which is not preferable to the U.S., the payoffs were increased substantially, 
compared to the other actions and the base.  In addition, under the single action scenarios, 
FDPUS dominated the other single policy scenarios, CCCUS and MAPUS.  Therefore, the 
implication of the findings would be the U.S. policy priority on U.S. rice exports to Japan and 
Korea.  These findings suggest that the U.S. policy makers on U.S. exports to Japan and Korea 
might need to weigh more on the U.S. export policy options than the tariff reduction of Japan 
and Korea. 
This study has analyzed the impacts of Japanese and Korean import policies on U.S. 
exports, including various changes in Japanese and Korean tariff rates.  In addition, it has 
analyzed the possible policy options for U.S. exports with respect to the changes in Japanese 
and Korean tariff rates, incorporating econometric estimation and political weights for the 
interest groups into a game theoretic analysis.   
Since Japan and South Korea became regular importers by the WTO agreement, the two 
governments had to reallocate their agricultural resources due to either international pressures 
or internal problems, which exist within their rice industries.  Therefore, the U.S. export 
industry has to take those changes into account.  This study concludes with some suggestions 
regarding Japanese and Korean import policy changes for U.S. exports. 
Both Korea and Japan strictly implemented the WTO commitments on rice.  However, 
several issues arose from how these countries managed rice imported.  The State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs) of both countries kept most imported rice away from domestic consumers.  
The Food Agency of Japan allocated rice across national suppliers with results roughly 
mimicking commercial trade.  Japan also used markups to keep imported rice away from 
domestic consumers.  In Korea, rice has been imported through tenders where the lowest bidder 
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wins.  This results in low-quality rice imports from suppliers who were unlikely to have been 
successful in commercial trade.  As a result, consumer benefits are reduced, and allocation 
across import suppliers has been affected.  The next round of WTO negotiations will face these 
issues if quantitative market access is to improve in the interim while tariffs are reduced.  
Subsequent meetings will also face STE issues regarding possible manipulations within 
approved market methods and the ways to encourage market results through market 
mechanisms. 
The best export policy option from the scenario analysis turned out to be the combination 
of MAP and FMDP for U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.  However, it depends on how the 
policies are implemented by the U.S. in Japanese and Korean domestic markets.  There are 
many obstacles in the two markets such as STEs and implicit trade barriers.  The implicit trade 
barriers are even worse than STEs because the consumers are willing to buy domestic rice at a 
higher price than the border price due to cultural and traditional backgrounds.  To overcome 
those obstacles, the U.S. has to investigate some new marketing strategies in the domestic 
markets, including wide variety of advertisements and private commercial contract with 
franchise restaurants and convenient stores along with political and economic pressures on the 
Japanese and Korea governments.  However, the U.S. could not be able to export any rice to 
Korea since 1980s.  Korea has imported its WTO commitments mostly from India and China 
because of lower prices and transportation costs.  Many international trade experts have 
expected that China will be a major exporter to Korea.  However, according to WTO 
agreement, Korea is supposed to import from 154 thousand MT in 2002 to 205 thousand MT in 
2004.  That means that every rice exporters still have chances to export to Korea, including the 
U.S. 
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In addition, when making political decisions, economic studies of this nature can help 
policy makers to determine the welfare impacts of various policy actions.  However, it must be 
kept in mind that empirical analyses are not the only criterion available in the policy making 
process.  Empirical studies can provide input for policy makers facing various decision-
makings.  If the study suggests that a policy action causes changes that may be acceptable, 
alternative policies can be used as well.   
5.2 Study Limitations and Further Research Opportunities 
This study attempted to analyze U.S. export policy options to Japan and Korea.  
However, it has faced some limitations that must be considered for future research.  One 
limitation was analyzing rice trade between the U.S. and the two countries by rice type and 
quality because there is no standard classification to differentiate among rice products in use 
and because of data unavailability on U.S. exports to Japan and Korea by type and quality. 
The second limitation of the study is that it did not consider the entire U.S. rice industry.  
This study focused on the political and economic relationships between U.S. exports to Japan 
and Korea and the two importing countries.  If this study considered the entire U.S. export 
industry, the world import markets would have had to be considered since the U.S. has exported 
rice to the world, including some countries in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and East 
Asia.  That is not within the scope of this study.  In addition, there needs to be a more detailed 
specification of U.S. export demand in the model.  World ending stock and the relative price 
ratio could be endogenized by rice type and quality.  However, due to data availability, this 
study considered those variables exogenous. Therefore, there remains considerable room to 
improve the specification of U.S. export demand.  
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The third limitation of the study is the data structure of the model.  Although most of the 
data was obtained from USDA and Japanese and Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery, and 
Forestry, some financial and specific regional data were very difficult to obtain due to some 
language barriers and official confidentiality. 
The fourth limitation of the study is that it used a linear additive political preference 
function with unequal weights assigned to three interest groups.  However, in principle, the 
nature and the number of interest groups that can be included in a political preference function 
is unrestricted.  Thus, if possible, it is required to consider various functional forms and 
potential interest groups, which might be influenced by the policy. 
Lastly, there is no previous research attempting to incorporate econometric estimation 
and PPF analysis into a game theoretic analysis.  Therefore, it was hard to justify the framework 
theoretically and empirically.  However, the idea of the combination of the three methodologies 
was worth performing the model for the export market.  In addition, this study did not consider 
potential cooperative game behavior that might change the Nash equilibrium solution in the 
scenario analysis.  For example, the overall Nash equilibrium would be at a 6% reduction under 
the cooperative game, which would be Pareto superior to the solution under the noncooperative 
game.   
In addition to those limitations, this study can be extended to examine U.S. export policy 
options with respect to Japanese and Korean import policies if their import policies are known.  
As long as we can forecast econometric estimation and political weights, this study can examine 
any type of policy options for the exporting and the importing countries’ policy options as well.  
However, examining additional policy options are beyond the scope of the study.  It is now left 
for future research. 
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APPENDIX 1. GAMS PROGRAM USED FOR THE MODEL 
$title game theoretic approach on U.S. rice exports to Japan and Korea 
sets 
i  country     /Japan, Korea, US/ 
y  year        /1960*1999/; 
 
*****parameter declaration********** 
parameters 
 
********production parameters************ 
jarharvo           area harvested in Japan(1000ha) 
jprodpo            Japanese producer price(yen MT) 
jlarharvo          lagged area harvested in Japan(1000ha) 
jprodco            Japanese production cost(yen MT) 
jyieldo             yield in Japan(MT ha) 
jtecho              Japanese technology 
jydummyo       Japanese yield dummy 
jprodo              Japanese production (1000MT) 
karharvo          Korean area harvested (1000ha) 
klarharvo         Korean lagged area harvested (1000ha) 
kprodo             Korean production (1000MT) 
kgpurpo           Korean government purchase price(won MT) 
kdiverto           Korean diversion program (ha) 
kyieldo            Korean yield (MT ha) 
klyieldo           Korean lagged yield (MT ha) 
ktecho             Korean technology 
kydummyo      Korean yield dummy 
uprodjo            us japonica production 
 
*********Consumption parameters*************** 
jpconpo           Japanese per capita consumption(kg person) 
ljpconpo          Japanese lagged per capita consumption(kg person) 
jretpo              Japanese retail price(yen MT) 
jincomo          Japanese income (billion yen) 
jcothero          Japanese other consumption (1000MT) 
jpoconpo        Japanese processing consumption(1000MT) 
jadconpo        Japanese foreign aid consumption(1000MT) 
jgovconpo      Japanese government use(1000MT) 
jconpo            Japanese consumption (1000 MT) 
jpopo              Japanese population(million) 
lkpconpo        lagged Korean per capita consmption 
kpconpo         Korean per capita consumption(kg person) 
Kincomo         Korean income (billion won) 
Kretpo             Korean retail price(won MT) 
Kcdummyo     Korean consumption dummy 
kcothero         Korean other consumption (1000MT) 
kpoconpo       Korean processing consumption(1000MT) 
kadconpo       Korean aid consumption (1000MT) 
kconpo           Korean consumption (1000 MT) 
kpopo             Korean population(million) 
uconpo           us total consumption (1000MT) 
uadconpo       us aid consumption (1000MT) 
uexdemo        us export demand(1000MT) 
woldpjo          world price of japonica($ MT) 
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uexotpjo         us export price of japonica($ MT) 
uexotpio         us export price of indica($ MT) 
woldpio          world price of indica($ MT) 
upl480o          us PL480(1000MT) 
uccco              us CCC(1000MT) 
ueepo              us EEP(1000MT) 
uothero           us other programs(1000MT) 
ugexpo           us government export programs (1000MT) 
uxdummyo     us export dummy 
 
**********price parameters**************** 
woldpjo          world price of japonica($ MT) 
jtarif1o            Japanese tariff(percent) 
jtarif2o            Japanese tariff ($) 
ktarif1o           Korean tariff(percent) 
ktarif2o           Korean tariff ($) 
jgpropo           Japanese government procurement price(yen MT) 
jdirecto           Japanese direct payment (yen MT) 
jgselpo            J gov selling price 
kprodpo          Korean producer price (won MT) 
kdirecto          Korean direct payment (wonn MT) 
kgselpo           Korean gov selling price 
uretpo             us retail price ($ MT) 
uprodpjo         us producer price of japonica($ MT) 
uprodpio         us producer price of indica($ MT) 
utarpo             us target price($ MT) 
uloano            us loan rate ($ MT) 
utranspo         us transition payment($ MT) 
uexpp1o         us first export price ($ MT) 
uexpp2o          us second export price ($ MT) 
 
***********welfare parameters**************** 
jpwelo             Japanese producer welfare 
jpprinto           Japanese producer price intercept 
jcwelo             Japanese consumer welfare 
jcprinto           Japanese consumer price intercept 
jgwelo             Japanese government welfare 
jgovpuro          Japanese government purchase amount(MT) 
jscosto             Japanese social cost 
kpwelo             Korean producer welfare 
kpprinto           Korean producer price intercept 
kcwelo             Korean consumer welfare 
kcprinto            Korean consumer price intercept 
kgwelo             Korean government welfare 
kgovpuro          Korean government purchase amount(MT) 
kscosto             Korean social cost 
uexwel1o          us export welfare of the first 
uexwel2o          us export welfare of the second 
uexwel3o          us export welfare of the third 
uexwel4o          us export welfare of the fourth 
jequilo               Japanese equilibrium 
kequilo              Korean equilibrium 
uexinto              us export intercept 
upwelo              us producer welfare 
upprinto            us producer price intercept 
ucwelo              us consumer welfare 
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ucprinto            us consumer price intercept 
ugwelo              us government welfare 
ugovpuro          us government purchase amount(MT) 
uscosto              us social cost 
 
**********us export capacity parameters********** 
uexpotjo             us export to Japan (1000MT) 
uexpotko            us export to Korea (1000MT) 
uexpotj1o           us export to Japan estimated 
uexpotk1o          us export to Korea estimated 
uexpotwo           us export to row 
uprodo                us production (1000MT) 
ubestko               us beginning stock (1000MT) 
uimpoto              us imports (1000MT) 
utconpo              us total consumption (1000MT) 
uenstko               us ending stock (1000MT) 
utexpto               us total exports (1000MT) 
utexpt1o             us export demand 
uojkto                 us export capacity under tariff (1000MT) 
uojkqo                us export capacity under quota (1000MT) 
jquotao               Japanese quota (1000MT) 
kquotao              Korean quota (1000MT) 
woenstko            world ending stock(1000MT) 
jimpotwo            J import from row 
jimpotuo             J import from us 
kimpotwo           k import from row 
kimpotuo            k import from us 
 
******equilibrium parameters********** 
jprodo                Japanese production (1000MT) 
jbestko               Japanese beginning stock (1000MT) 
jimpoto              Japanese imports (1000MT) 
jimpotuo            J import from row 
jenstko               Japanese ending stock (1000MT) 
jexpoto              Japanese exports (1000MT) 
kprodo               Korean production (1000MT) 
kbestko             Korean beginning stock (1000MT) 
kimpoto             Korean imports (1000MT) 
kenstko              Korean ending stock (1000MT) 
kexpoto              Korean exports (1000MT) 
 
**********payoff parameters************* 
jpayo                  Japanese payoff 
jpoweico            Japanese consumer political weights 
jpoweipo            Japanese producer political weights 
jpoweigo            Japanese government political weights 
kpayo                 Korean payoff 
kpoweico           Korean consumer political weights 
kpoweipo           Korean producer political weights 
kpoweigo           Korean government political weights 
upayo                 us payoff 
upoweieo           export producer political weights 
jquota1o             Japanese first quota(1000MT) 
jquota2o             Japanese second quota(1000MT) 
uexequilo           us export equil 
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******elasticity************ 
jpelaso              Japanese price elasticity 
jinelaso             Japanese income elasticity 
jimdelaso          Japanese import demand elasticity 
kpelaso             Korean price elasticity 
kinelaso            Korean income elasticity 
kimdelaso         Korean import demand elasticity 
uexdelaso         us export demand elasticity 
 
******demographic parameters******** 
jexchano          Japanese exchange rate to a dollar(yen $) 
jfpopo              Japanese farm population(1000) 
kexchano         Korean exchange rate to a dollar(won $) 
upopo              us population(1000) 
jgnpdo             Japan gnp deflator 
kgdpdo            Korea gdp deflator 
 
********fixed parameter declaration*********** 
jazero             Japanese area harvested intercept 
jaone              Japanese area harvested parameter on lagged 
jatwo              Japanese area harvested parameter on producer price(cpi) 
jathree            Japanese area harvested parameter on prod cost(cpi) 
kazero            Korean area harvested intercept 
kaone             Korean area harvested parameter on lagged 
katwo             Korean area harvested parameter on diversion area 
uxzero            us export demand intercept 
uxone             us export demand parameter on log world ending stock 
uxtwo             us export demand parameter on w price(j) procuer price(J) 
uxthree          us export demand parameter on log export program(ccc+eep) 
uxfour           us export demand parameter on 8094 dummy 
jyzero            Japanese yield intercept 
jyone             Japanese yield parameter on tech 
jytwo             Japanese yield parameter on 8093 dummy 
kyzero           Korean yield intercept 
kyone            Korean yield parameter on tech 
kytwo            Korean yield parameter on 8093 dummy 
jczero            Japanese per capita consumption intercept 
jcone             Japanese per capita consumption parameter on log lagged 
jctwo             Japanese per capita parameter on log retail price(gnp defla) 
jcthree           Japanese per capita parameter on log income(nominal) 
kczero           Korean per capita consumption intercept 
kcone            Korean per capita parameter on log lagged 
kctwo            Korean per capita parameter on log income(cpi) 
kcthree          Korean per capita parameter on log retail(gdp defla) 
uekzero         us ex to ko intercept 
uekone          us ex to ko us japonica production 
uektwo          us ex to ko price difference 
uekthree        us ex to ko tariff 
uejzero          us ex to ja intercept 
uejone           us ex to ja price difference 
uejtwo           us ex to ja ccc+eep 
uejthree         us ex to ja tariff 
 
parameter fixed(*) /jazero = 294.176, jaone = 0.843, jatwo = 0.175, jathree = -0.027, kazero = 50.76, kaone =  
0.932, katwo = 0.000059, kathree = -0.006, uxzero = 2.680757, uxone = 0.490176, 
uxtwo = 0.036, uxthree = 0.031, uxfour = 0.274, jyzero = 3.5579, jyone = 0.0313, 
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jytwo = -0.8874, kyzero = 3.741473, kyone = 0.02928, kytwo = -0.83687, jczero = 1.8133 
jcone   = 0.8202, jctwo = -0.0963, jcthree = -0.0291, kczero  = 5.461, kcone   = 0.7203, 
kctwo = -0.023, kcthree = -0.56, kcfour = 0.2073, uekzero = -38.5617, uekone = 6.6703,  
uektwo = 3.6268, uekthree = -1.3318, uejzero = -31.7671, uejone = 6.1103, uejtwo =  
3.7505, uejthree = 0.9217, jpprint = 802.6, kpprint = 76.6, kcprint = 157.4, jpelas  = -0.0291 
jinelas = -0.0963, kpelas = -0.0268, kinelas = -0.1064, uexprint = 73.3552, uexdelas =  
0.036/; 
 
**********data tables************** 
DATA 
 
***************parameter assignment******************* 
jarharvo(y) = arha("jarharv", y); jprodpo(y) = price("jprodp", y)/demo("jcpi",y); 
jlarharvo(y) = arha("jlarharv", y); jprodco(y) = prodt("jprodc", y)/demo("jcpi", y); 
jyieldo(y) = yield("jyield", y); jtecho(y)  = dummy("jtech", y); 
jydummyo(y) = dummy("jydummy", y); jprodo(y)  = prodt("jprod", y); 
karharvo(y) = arha("karharv", y); klarharvo(y) = arha("klarharv", y); 
kdiverto(y) = arha("kdivert", y); kprodo(y) = prodt("kprod", y); 
kgpurpo(y) = price("kgpurp", y)/demo("kcpi", y); kyieldo(y) = yield("kyield", y); 
klyieldo(y) = yield("klyield", y); ktecho(y) = dummy("ktech", y); 
kydummyo(y) = dummy("kydummy", y); uprodjo(Y)  = prodt("uprodj", y); 
jpconpo(y)  = conp("jpconp", y); ljpconpo(y) = conp("ljpconp", y); 
jretpo(y)   = price("jretp", y)/demo("jgnpd", y); jincomo(y)  = demo("jincom", y); 
jpoconpo(y) = conp("jpoconp", y); jadconpo(y) = conp("jadconp", y); 
jgovconpo(y) = conp("jgovconp", y); jconpo(y) = conp("jconp", y); 
jpopo(y)   = demo("jpop", y); kpconpo(y) = conp("kpconp", y); 
lkpconpo(y) = conp("lkpconp", y); kincomo(y)  = demo("kincom", y)/demo("kcpi", y); 
kretpo(y)   = price("kretp", y)/demo("kgdpd", y); 
kcdummyo(y) = dummy("kcdummy", y); kpoconpo(y) = conp("kpoconp", y); 
kadconpo(y) = conp("kadconp", y); kconpo(y)   = conp("kconp", y); 
utconpo(y)   = conp("utconp", y); uadconpo(y) = conp("uadconp", y); 
utexpto(y)  = export("utexpt", y); uexdemo(y)  = export("uexdem", y); 
jimpotwo(y)  = impot("jimpotw", y); utconpo(y)  = conp("utconp", y); 
woldpjo(y)  = price("woldpj", y); uexotpio(y) = price("uexotpi", y); 
upl480o(y)  = export("upl480", y); uccco(y)    = export("uccc", y); 
ueepo(y)    = export("ueep", y); uothero(y)  = export("uother", y); 
uxdummyo(y)  = dummy("uxdummy", y); 
jgpropo(y)   = price("jgprop", y)/demo("jcpi", y);  
jdirecto(y)  = price("jdirect", y)/demo("jcpi", y); 
kprodpo(y)   = price("kprodp", y)/demo("kcpi", y); 
kgpurpo(y)   = price("kgpurp", y)/demo("kcpi", y); 
kdirecto(y)  = price("kdirect", y)/demo("kcpi", y); 
uprodpjo(y)  = price("uprodpj", y); uprodpio(y)  = price("uprodpi", y); 
utarpo(y)    = price("utarp", y); uloano(y)    = price("uloan", y); 
utranspo(y)  = price("utransp", y); uretpo(y) = price("uretp", y); 
kgselpo(y) = price("kgselp", y)/demo("kcpi", y); 
jgselpo(y) = price("jgselp", y)/demo("jcpi", y); 
uprodo(y)  = prodt("uprod", y); uexpotjo(y) = export("uexpotj", y); 
uexpotj1o(y) = export("uexpotj1", y); uexpotko(y)  = export("uexpotk", y); 
uexpotk1o(y) = export("uexpotk1", y); uexpotwo(y)  = export("uexpotw", y); 
ubestko(y) = stock("ubestk", y); uimpoto(y) = impot("uimpot", y); 
woenstko(y) = stock("woenstk", y); uenstko(y) = stock("uenstk", y); 
utexpto(y) = export("utexpt", y); utexpt1o(y) = export("utexpt1", y); 
jquota1o(y) = gdemo("jquota1", y); jquota2o(y) = gdemo("jquota2", y); 
kquotao(y)  = gdemo("kquota", y); jtarif1o(y)  = gdemo("jtarif1", y); 
jtarif2o(y)  = gdemo("jtarif2", y); ktarif1o(y)  = gdemo("ktarif1", y); 
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ktarif2o(y)  = gdemo("ktarif2", y); jexpoto(y)  = export("jexpot", y); 
kexpoto(y)  = export("kexpot", y); uexequilo(y) = export("uexequil", y); 
kimpotwo(y)  = impot("kimpotw", y); kimpotuo(y)  = impot("kimpotu", y); 
jbestko(y) = stock("jbestk", y); jimpoto(y) = impot("jimpot", y); 
jenstko(y) = stock("jenstk", y); jexpoto(y) = export("jexpot", y); 
kbestko(y) = stock("kbestk", y); kimpoto(y) = impot("kimpot", y); 
kenstko(y) = stock("kenstk", y); kexpoto(y) = export("kexpot", y); 
jexchano(y) = demo("jexchan", y); kexchano(y) = demo("kexchan", Y); 
jpoweico(y) = polweights("jpoweic", y); jpoweipo(y) = polweights("jpoweip", y); 
jpoweigo(y) = polweights("jpoweig", y); kpoweico(y) = polweights("kpoweic", y); 
kpoweipo(y) = polweights("kpoweip", y);  
kpoweigo(y) = polweights("kpoweig", y); 
upoweieo(y) = polweights("upoweie", y); 
jazero = fixed("jazero"); jaone = fixed("jaone"); jatwo   = fixed("jatwo"); 
jathree = fixed("jathree"); kazero = fixed("kazero"); kaone = fixed("kaone"); 
katwo = fixed("katwo"); uxzero = fixed("uxzero"); uxone = fixed("uxone"); 
uxtwo = fixed("uxtwo"); uxthree = fixed("uxthree"); uxfour = fixed("uxfour"); 
jyzero = fixed("jyzero"); jyone = fixed("jyone"); jytwo = fixed("jytwo"); 
kyzero = fixed("kyzero"); kyone = fixed("kyone"); kytwo = fixed("kytwo"); 
jczero = fixed("jczero"); jcone = fixed("jcone"); jctwo = fixed("jctwo"); 
jcthree = fixed("jcthree"); kczero = fixed("kczero"); kcone = fixed("kcone"); 
kctwo = fixed("kctwo"); kcthree = fixed("kcthree"); uekzero = fixed("uekzero"); 
uekone = fixed("uekone"); uektwo = fixed("uektwo"); uekthree = fixed("uekthree"); 
uejzero = fixed("uejzero"); uejone = fixed("uejone"); uejtwo = fixed("uejtwo"); 
uejthree = fixed("uejthree"); 
 
**************Variable Definition******** 
VARIABLES 
Z                                objective function 
JARHARV(y)           area harvested in Japan(1000ha) 
JPRODP(y)               Japanese producer price(yen MT) 
JLARHARV(y)        lagged area harvested in Japan(1000ha) 
JPRODC(y)              Japanese production cost(yen MT) 
JYIELD(y)               yield in Japan(MT ha) 
JTECH(y)                 Japanese technology 
JYDUMMY(y)         Japanese yield dummy 
JPROD(y)                 Japanese production (1000MT) 
KARHARV(y)         Korean area harvested (1000ha) 
KLARHARV(y)       Korean lagged area harvested (1000ha) 
KPROD(y)               Korean production (1000MT) 
KDIVERT(Y)          Korean divertion area(ha) 
KGPURP(y)            Korean government purchase price(won MT) 
KYIELD(y)             Korean yield (MT ha) 
KLYIELD(y)           Korean lagged yield (MT ha) 
KTECH(y)              Korean technology 
KYDUMMY(y)      Korean yield dummy 
UPRODJ(y)            U.S. japonica production 
JPCONP(y)             Japanese per capita consumption(kg person) 
JLPCONP(y)          Japanese log per capita consumption(kg person) 
LJPCONP(y)          Japanese lagged per capita consumption 
JRETP(y)               Japanese retail price(yen MT) 
JINCOM(y)           Japanese income (billion yen) 
JCOTHER(y)         Japanese other consumption (1000 MT) 
JPOCONP(y)         Japanese processing consumption(1000MT) 
JADCONP(y)        Japanese foreign aid consumption(1000MT) 
JGOVCONP(y)     Japanese government use(1000MT) 
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JCONP(y)             Japanese consumption (1000 MT) 
JTCONP(y)           Japanese total consumption (1000 MT) 
JPOP(y)                 Japanese population(million) 
KLPCONP(y)        Korean log per capita consumption(kg person) 
LKPCONP(y)        lagged Korean per capita consumption 
KPCONP(y)          Korean per capita consumption(kg person) 
KCONP(y)            Korean consumption (1000MT) 
KINCOM(y)         Korean income (billion won) 
KRETP(y)             Korean retail price(won MT) 
KCDUMMY(y)    Korean consumption dummy 
KCONTHER(y)    Korean other consumption (1000MT) 
KPOCONP(y)       Korean processing consumption(1000MT) 
KADCONP(y)      Korean foreign aid consumption(1000MT) 
KCONP(y)            Korean consumption (1000 MT) 
KTCONP(y)         Korean total consumption (1000 MT) 
KPOP(y)               Korean population(million) 
UTEXPT(Y)         U.S. total export (1000MT) 
UEXDEM(y)        U.S. export demand(1000MT) 
WOLDPJ(y)         world price of japonica($ MT) 
UEXOTPJ(y)        U.S. export price of japonica($ MT) 
UEXOTPI(y)        U.S. export price of indica($ MT) 
WOLDPI(y)          world price of indica($ MT) 
UPL480(y)            U.S. PL480(1000MT) 
UCCC(y)               CCC(1000MT) 
UEEP(y)                EEP(1000MT) 
UOTHER(y)          other programs(1000MT) 
UGEXP(y)             government export programs (1000MT) 
UXDUMMY(y)     export dummy 
JRETP(y)               Japanese domestic retail price (yen MT) 
WOLDPJ(y)          world price of japonica($ MT) 
JTARIF1(y)           Japanese tariff(percent) 
JTARIF2(y)           Japanese tariff($) 
KRETP(y)             Korean domestic retail price (won MT) 
KTARIF1(y)         Korean tariff(percent) 
KTARIF2(y)          Korean tariff($) 
JPRODP(y)            Japanese producer price (yen MT) 
JGPROP(y)            Japanese government procurement price(yen MT) 
JGSELP(y)             J GOV SELLING PRICE 
JDIRECT(y)           Japanese direct payment (yen MT) 
KPRODP(y)           Korean producer price (won MT) 
KGPURP(y)           Korean government purchase price(won MT) 
KGSELP(y)            K GOV SELLING PRICE 
KDIRECT(y)          Korean direct payment (won MT) 
URETP(y)               U retail price ($ MT) 
UPRODPJ(y)          U producer price of japonica($ MT) 
UPRODPI(y)          U producer price of indica($ MT) 
UTARP(y)              U target price($ MT) 
ULOAN(y)             U loan rate ($ MT) 
UTRANSP(y)         U transition payment($ MT) 
UEXPP1(y)             U first export price ($ MT) 
UEXPP2(y)             U second export price ($ MT) 
KIMPOTW(y)         K IMPORT FROM ROW 
KIMPOTU(Y)         K IMPORT FROM US 
JIMPOTW(y)           J IMPORT FROM ROW 
JPWEL(y)                Japanese producer welfare 
JCWEL(y)                Japanese consumer welfare 
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JGWEL(y)                Japanese government welfare 
JGOVPUR(y)           Japanese government purchase amount(MT) 
JSCOST(y)               Japanese social cost 
JTOWEL(y)             Japanese total welfare 
KPWEL(y)               Korean producer welfare 
KCWEL(y)              Korean consumer welfare 
KGWEL(y)              Korean government welfare 
KGOVPUR(y)         Korean government purchase amount(MT) 
KSCOST(y)             Korean social cost 
KTOWEL(y)            Korean total welfare 
UEXWEL1(y)          us export welfare of the first 
UEXWEL2(y)          us export welfare of the second 
UEXWEL3(y)          us export welfare of the third 
UEXWEL4(y)          us export welfare of the fourth 
JEQUIL(y)                Japanese equilibrium 
KEQUIL(y)              Korean equilibrium 
UEXEQUIL(y)         us export equilibrium 
UEXINT(y)              us export intercept 
UPWEL(y)               us producer welfare 
UPPRINT(y)            us producer price intercept 
UCWEL(y)               us consumer welfare 
UCPRINT(y)            us consumer price intercept 
UGWEL(y)               us government welfare 
UGOVPUR(y)          us government purchase amount(MT) 
USCOST(y)              us social cost 
UEXPOTJ(y)            us export to Japan (1000MT) 
UlEXPOTJ(y)           us log 
UEXPOTJ1(y)          us export to Japan estimated 
UEXPOTK(Y)          us export to Korea (1000MT) 
UleXPOTK(y)          us log to Korea 
UEXPOTK1(y)         us export to Korea estimated 
UEXPOTW(y)          us export to row 
UPROD(y)                us production (1000MT) 
UBESTK(y)              us beginning stock (1000MT) 
UIMPOT(y)              us imports (1000MT) 
UTCONP(y)             us total consumption (1000MT) 
UENSTK(y)             us ending stock (1000MT) 
UTEXPT(y)              us total exports (1000MT) 
UlTEXPT(y)             us log ex demand 
UTEXPT1(y)            us export demand 
UOJKT(y)                 us export capacity under tariff (1000MT) 
UOJKQ(y)                us export capacity under quota (1000MT) 
JQUOTA1(y)            Japanese first quota (1000MT) 
JQUOTA2(y)            Japanese second quota (1000MT) 
KQUOTA(y)             Korean quota (1000MT) 
JEXPOT(y)               Japanese export(1000MT) 
KEXPOT(y)              Korean export (1000MT) 
JPROD(y)                 Japanese production (1000MT) 
JBESTK(y)               Japanese beginning stock (1000MT) 
JIMPOT(y)               Japanese imports (1000MT) 
JTCONP(y)              Japanese total consumption (1000MT) 
JENSTK(y)              Japanese ending stock (1000MT) 
JTEXPT(y)               Japanese total exports (1000MT) 
KPROD(y)               Korean production (1000MT) 
KBESTK(y)             Korean beginning stock (1000MT) 
KIMPOT(y)             Korean imports (1000MT) 
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KTCONP(y)            Korean total consumption (1000MT) 
KENSTK(y)            Korean ending stock (1000MT) 
KTEXPT(y)            Korean total exports (1000MT) 
WOENSTK(y)         world ending stock (1000MT) 
JPAY(y)                   Japanese payoff 
JPOWEIC(y)            Japanese consumer political weights 
JPOWEIP(y)            Japanese producer political weights 
JPOWEIG(y)            Japanese government political weights 
KPAY(y)                 Korean payoff 
KPOWEIC(y)         Korean consumer political weights 
KPOWEIP(y)          Korean producer political weights 
KPOWEIG(y)         Korean government political weights 
UXPAY(y)              us export payoff 
UPOWEIE(y)          export producer political weights 
JEXCHAN(y)          Japanese exchange rate to a dollar(yen $) 
JFPOP(y)                 Japanese farm population(1000) 
KEXCHAN(y)         Korean exchange rate to a dollar(won $) 
KFPOP(y)                Korean farm population (1000) 
UPOP(y)                  us population(1000); 
 
**********varialbe initialization**************** 
JARHARV.L(y) = JARHARVO(y); JPRODP.L(y) = JPRODPO(y); 
JLARHARV.L(y) = JLARHARVO(y); JPRODC.L(y) = JPRODCO(y); 
JYIELD.L(y) = JYIELDO(y); JTECH.L(y) = JTECHO(y); 
JYDUMMY.L(y) = JYDUMMYO(y); JPROD.L(y) = JPRODO(y); 
KARHARV.L(y) = KARHARVO(y); KLARHARV.L(y) = KLARHARVO(y); 
KPROD.L(y) = KPRODO(y); KDIVERT.L(y) = KDIVERTO(y); 
KGPURP.L(y) = KGPURPO(y); KYIELD.L(y) = KYIELDO(y); 
KLYIELD.L(y) = KLYIELDO(y); KTECH.L(y) = KTECHO(y); 
KYDUMMY.L(y) = KYDUMMYO(y); 
JPCONP.L(y) = JPCONPO(y); LJPCONP.L(y) = LJPCONPO(y); 
JRETP.L(y) = JRETPO(y); JINCOM.L(y) = JINCOMO(y); 
JPOCONP.L(y) = JPOCONPO(y); JADCONP.L(y) = JADCONPO(y); 
JGOVCONP.L(y) = JGOVCONPO(y); JCONP.L(y) = JCONPO(y); 
JPOP.L(y) = JPOPO(y); LKPCONP.L(y) = LKPCONPO(y); 
KPCONP.L(y) = KPCONPO(y); KINCOM.L(y) = KINCOMO(y); 
KRETP.L(y) = KRETPO(y); KCDUMMY.L(y) = KCDUMMYO(y); 
KPOCONP.L(y) = KPOCONPO(y); KADCONP.L(y) = KADCONPO(y); 
KCONP.L(y) = KCONPO(y); UEXDEM.L(y) = UEXDEMO(y); 
WOLDPJ.L(y) = WOLDPJO(y); UTEXPT.L(y) = UTEXPTO(y); 
UEXOTPI.L(y) = UEXOTPIO(y); UPL480.L(y) = UPL480O(y); 
UCCC.L(y) = UCCCO(y); UEEP.L(y) = UEEPO(y); UOTHER.L(y) = UOTHERO(y); 
UXDUMMY.L(y) = UXDUMMYO(y); 
JRETP.L(y) = JRETPO(y); WOLDPJ.L(y)  = WOLDPJO(y);  
JTARIF1.L(y) = JTARIF1O(y); JTARIF2.L(y) = JTARIF2O(y); 
KRETP.L(y) = KRETPO(y); KTARIF1.L(y) = KTARIF1O(y); 
KTARIF2.L(y) = KTARIF2O(y); JPRODP.L(y) = JPRODPO(y); 
JGPROP.L(y) = JGPROPO(y); JGSELP.L(y) = JGSELPO(y); 
JDIRECT.L(y) = JDIRECTO(y); KPRODP.L(y) = KPRODPO(y); 
KGPURP.L(y) = KGPURPO(y); KGSELP.L(y) = KGSELPO(y); 
KDIRECT.L(y) = KDIRECTO(y); URETP.L(y) = URETPO(y); 
UPRODPJ.L(y) = UPRODPJO(y); UPRODPI.L(y) = UPRODPIO(y); 
UTARP.L(y) = UTARPO(y); ULOAN.L(y) = ULOANO(y); 
UTRANSP.L(y) = UTRANSPO(y); 
UPROD.L(y) = UPRODO(y); UPRODJ.L(y) = UPRODJO(y); 
UEXPOTJ.L(y) = UEXPOTJO(y); UEXPOTJ1.L(y) = UEXPOTJ1O(y); 
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UEXPOTK.L(y) = UEXPOTKO(y); UEXPOTK1.L(y) = UEXPOTK1O(y); 
UEXPOTW.L(y) = UEXPOTWO(y); UBESTK.L(y) = UBESTKO(y); 
UIMPOT.L(y) = UIMPOTO(y); UTCONP.L(y) = UTCONPO(y); 
UENSTK.L(y) = UENSTKO(y); UTEXPT.L(y) = UTEXPTO(y); 
UTEXPT1.L(y) = UTEXPT1O(y); JIMPOTW.L(y) = JIMPOTWO(y); 
JQUOTA1.L(y) = JQUOTA1O(y); JQUOTA2.L(y) = JQUOTA2O(y); 
KQUOTA.L(y) = KQUOTAO(y); UEXEQUIL.L(y) = UEXEQUILO(y); 
JBESTK.L(y) = JBESTKO(y); JIMPOT.L(y) = JIMPOTO(y); 
JENSTK.L(y) = JENSTKO(y); KPROD.L(y) = KPRODO(y); 
KBESTK.L(y) = KBESTKO(y); KIMPOT.L(y) = KIMPOTO(y); 
KENSTK.L(y) = KENSTKO(y); WOENSTK.L(y) = WOENSTKO(y); 
JEXPOT.L(y) = JEXPOTO(y); KEXPOT.L(y) = KEXPOTO(y); 
KIMPOTW.L(y) = KIMPOTWO(y); KIMPOTU.L(y) = KIMPOTUO(y); 
JEXCHAN.L(y) = JEXCHANO(y); KEXCHAN.L(y) = KEXCHANO(y); 
JPOWEIC.L(y) = JPOWEICO(y); JPOWEIP.L(y) = JPOWEIPO(y); 
JPOWEIG.L(y) = JPOWEIGO(y); KPOWEIC.L(y) = KPOWEICO(y); 
KPOWEIP.L(y) = KPOWEIPO(y); KPOWEIG.L(y) = KPOWEIGO(y); 
UPOWEIE.L(y) = UPOWEIEO(y); 
 
equations 
EQZ                           objective function 
eJARHARV(y)          area harvested in Japan(1000ha) 
eJYIELD(y)               yield in Japan(MT ha) 
eJPROD(y)                Japanese production (1000MT) 
eKARHARV(y)        Korean area harvested (1000ha) 
eKPROD(y)              Korean production (1000MT) 
eKYIELD(y)             Korean yield (MT ha) 
eJPCONP(y)              Japanese per capita consumption(kg person) 
eJLPCONP(y)           Japanese log per capita consumption 
eJCONP(y)               Japanese consumption (1000MT) 
eJTCONP(y)            Japanese total consumption (1000 MT) 
eKLPCONP(y)        Korean log per capita consumption 
eKPCONP(y)           Korean per capita consumption(kg person) 
eKCONP(y)             Korean capita consumption 
eKTCONP(y)           Korean total consumption (1000 MT) 
eUGEXP(y)              us govt export program (1000MT) 
eULEXDEM(y)        us log export demand (1000MT) 
eUEXDEM(y)          us export demand(1000MT) 
eUEXPOTK(Y)        us export to Korea(1000MT) 
eULEXPOTK(y)      log of export to Korea 
eULEXPOTJ(y)       log of export to Japan 
eUEXPOTJ(y)          us export to Japan(1000MT) 
eJRETP(y)                Japanese domestic retail price (yen MT) 
eKRETP(y)              Korean domestic retail price (won MT) 
eJPRODP(y)             Japanese producer price (yen MT) 
eKPRODP(y)           Korean producer price (won MT) 
eUEXPP1(y)             us first export price ($ MT) 
eUEXPP2(y)             us second export price ($ MT) 
ejequil(y)                  Japanese equilibrium (1000MT) 
ekequil(y)                Korean equilibrium (1000MT) 
euexequil(y)             us export equilibrium (1000MT) 
eJPWEL(y)              Japanese producer welfare 
eJCWEL(y)              Japanese consumer welfare 
eJGWEL(y)              Japanese government welfare 
eJSCOST(y)             Japanese social cost 
eJTOWEL(y)           Japanese total welfare 
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eKPWEL(y)             Korean producer welfare 
eKCWEL(y)             Korean consumer welfare 
eKGWEL(y)            Korean government welfare 
eKSCOST(y)           Korean social cost 
eKTOWEL(y)          Korean total welfare 
eUEXWEL1(y)        us export welfare 
eUEXWEL2(y)        us export welfare to Korea ; 
eJPAY(y)                 Japanese payoff 
eKPAY(y)               Korean payoff; 
eUXPAY(y)             us export payoff; 
 
EQZ..             Z =e= (uexwel1(y)*upoweie(y)); 
ejprodp(y)..   JPRODP(y) =e= JGPROP(y) + DIRECT(y); 
ekprodp(y)..  KPRODP(y) =e= KGPURP(y) + KDIRECT(y); 
ejarharv(y)..  JARHARV(y) =e= jazero + jaone*JLARHARV(y) + jatwo*JPRODP(y) + jathree*JPRODC(y); 
ejyield(y)..     JYIELD(y) =e= jyzero + jyone*JTECH(y) + jytwo*jydummy(y); 
ejprod(y)..     JPROD(y) =e= JARHARV(y)*JYIELD(y); 
ekarharv(y).. KARHARV(y) =e= kazero + kaone*KLARHARV(y) + katwo*KDIVERT(y); 
ekyield(y)..   KYIELD(y) =e= kyzero + kyone*KTECH(y) + kytwo*kydummy(y); 
ekprod(y)..    KPROD(y) =e= KARHARV(y)*KYIELD(y); 
ejretp(y)..      JRETP(y) =e= WOLDPJ(y) + JTARIF2(y); 
ekretp(y)..     KRETP(y) =e= WOLDPJ(y) + KTARIF2(y); 
ejlpconp(y).. JLPCONP(y)  =e=jczero+(jcone*log(LJPCONP(y))) + (jctwo*log(JRETP(y))) 
                                                  + (jcthree*log(JINCOM(y))); 
ejpconp(y)..  JPCONP(y) =e= exp(JLPCONP(y)); 
ejconp(y)..    JCONP(y) =e= JPCONP(y)*JPOP(y); 
ejtconp(y)..   JTCONP(y) =e= JCONP(y)+ JGOVCONP(y) + JPOCONP(y) +JADCONP(y); 
eklpconp(y)..    KLPCONP(y) =e= kczero+kcone*log(LKPCONP(y)) + kctwo*log(KINCOM(y)) 
                                                      + kcthree*log(KRETP(y)); 
ekpconp(y)..   KPCONP(y) =E= EXP(KLPCONP(y)); 
ekconp(y)..     KCONP(y) =e= KPCONP(y)*KPOP(y); 
ektconp(y)..    KTCONP(y) =e= KCONP(y)+ KADCONP(y) + KPOCONP(y); 
eugexp(y)..     UGEXP(y) =e= UCCC(y) + UEEP(y); 
euexpp1(y)..   UEXPP1(y) =e= ULOAN(y); 
euexpp2(y)..   UEXPP2(y) =e= ULOAN(y) + UTRANSP(y); 
eulexdem(y).  ULTEXPT(y) =e= uxzero + uxone*log(WOENSTK(y)) + uxtwo*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y)) 
                                                   + uxthree*log(UGEXP(y))+ uxfour*(UXDUMMY(y)); 
euexdem(y)..   UTEXPT(y) =E= EXP(ULTEXPT(y)); 
euLexpotj(y).. ULEXPOTJ(y) =e= uejzero + uejone*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y)) + uejtwo*log(UGEXP(y)) 
                                                       + uejthree*log(JTARIF2(y)); 
euexpotj(y)..    UEXPOTJ(y) =e= exp(ulexpotj(y)); 
euLexpotk(y).. ULEXPOTK(y) =e= uekzero + uekone*log(UPRODJ(y))  
                                                         + uektwo*log(WOLDPJ(y)/UPRODPJ(y)) + uekthree*log(KTARIF2(y)); 
euexpotk(y)..    UEXPOTK(y) =e= exp(ulexpotk(y)); 
ejequil(y)..      JEQUIL(y) =e= JPROD(y) - JTCONP(y) + JBESTK(y) - JENSTK(y) + UEXPOTJ1(y) 
                                                 + JIMPOTW(y) - JEXPOT(y); 
ekequil(y)..     KEQUIL(y) =e= KPROD(y) - KTCONP(y) + KBESTK(y) - KENSTK(y) + UEXPOTK1(y) 
                                                  + KIMPOTW(y) - KEXPOT(y); 
euexequil(y).. UEXEQUIL(y) =e= UPROD(y) + UIMPOT(y) + UBESTK(y) – UTCONP(y) - UENSTK(y) 
                                                        - UEXPOTK1(y)-UEXPOTJ1(y) - UEXPOTW(y); 
ejpwel(y)..   JPWEL(y) =e= (JPRODP(y)*JPROD(y)); 
ejcwel(y)..   JCWEL(y) =e= (JRETP(y)*JCONP(y)); 
ejgwel(y)..   JGWEL(y) =e= (JTARIF2(y)*UEXPOTJ1(y))  
                                            - ((JGSELP(y)-JGPROP(y))*(JPROD(y)*0.15)*(jequil(y))); 
ejscost(y)..  JSCOST(y) =e= (JRETP(y) - JPRODP(y))*0.5*(JPROD(y) - JTCONP(y)); 
ekpwel(y)..  KPWEL(y) =e= (KPRODP(y)*KPROD(y)); 
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ekcwel(y)..  KCWEL(y) =e= (KRETP(y)*KCONP(y)); 
ekgwel(y)..  KGWEL(y) =e= (KTARIF2(y)*UEXPOTK1(y)) + ((KGPURP(y) 
                                               - KGSELP(y))*(KPROD(y)*0.15)*(kequil(y))); 
ekscost(y)..  KSCOST(y) =e= (KRETP(y) - KPRODP(y))*0.5*(KPROD(y) - KTCONP(y)); 
ejtowel(y)..   JTOWEL(y) =e= JCWEL(y) + JPWEL(y) - JGWEL(y); 
ektowel(y)..  KTOWEL(y) =e= KCWEL(y) + KPWEL(y) - KGWEL(y); 
euexwel1(y)..  UEXWEL1(y) =e= (UEXPOTK1(y)+ UEXPOTJ1(y))*WOLDPJ(y); 
euexwel2(y)..  UEXWEL2(y) =e= (UEXPP1(y) - UEXPRINT)*UEXPOTK(y)*0.5; 
ejpay(y)..    JPAY(y) =e= (jpoweic(y)*jcwel(y)) + (jpoweip(y)*jpwel(y)) - (jpoweig(y)*jgwel(y)); 
ekpay(y)..   KPAY(y) =e= (kpoweic(y)*kcwel(y)) + (kpoweip(y)*kpwel(y)) - (kpoweig(y)*kgwel(y)); 
euxpay(y).. UXPAY(y) =e= (UEXPOTJ(y) + UEXPOTK(y)*upoweie(y)) + (uexwel1(y)); 
 
********variable bounds******** 
ARHARV.LO(y)  = 0.001; JPRODP.LO(y) = 0.001; JLARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JPRODC.LO(y) = 0.001; JYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001; JTECH.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JYDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001; JPROD.LO(y) = 0.001; KARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KLARHARV.LO(y) = 0.001; KPROD.LO(y) = 0.001; KDIVERT.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KGPURP.LO(y) = 0.001; KYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001; KLYIELD.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KTECH.LO(y) = 0.001; KYDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.0001; 
JPCONP.LO(y)   = 0.001; LJPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JRETP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JINCOM.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JADCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JGOVCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
LKPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KPCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KINCOM.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KRETP.LO(y) = 0.001; KCDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001; KPOCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KADCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; KPOP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UEXDEM.LO(y) = 0.001; WOLDPJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UTEXPT.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UEXOTPI.LO(y)  = 0.001; UPL480.LO(y) = 0.001; UCCC.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UEEP.LO(y) = 0.001; UOTHER.LO(y) = 0.001; UXDUMMY.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JTARIF1.LO(y) = 0.001; JTARIF2.LO(y) = 0.001; KTARIF1.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KTARIF2.LO(y) = 0.001; JGPROP.LO(y) =0.001; JGSELP.LO(Y) = 0.001; 
JDIRECT.LO(y) = 0.001; KPRODP.LO(y) = 0.001; KGPURP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KGSELP.LO(y) = 0.001; KDIRECT.LO(y) = 0.001; URETP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UPRODPJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UPRODPI.LO(y) = 0.001; UTARP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
ULOAN.LO(y) = 0.001; UTRANSP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
PROD.LO(y) = 0.001; UPRODJ.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTJ.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UEXPOTJ1.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UEXPOTK1.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; UTCONP.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; UTEXPT1.LO(y) = 0.001; JIMPOTW.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JQUOTA1.LO(y) = 0.001; JQUOTA2.LO(y) = 0.001; KQUOTA.LO(y) = 0.001; 
UEXEQUIL.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; JIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; JENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KBESTK.LO(y) = 0.001; KIMPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; KENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; 
WOENSTK.LO(y) = 0.001; JEXPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; KEXPOT.LO(y) = 0.001; 
KIMPOTW.LO(y) = 0.001; KIMPOTU.LO(y) = 0.001; 
JEXCHAN.LO(y) = 0.001; KEXCHAN.LO(y) = 0.001; JPOWEIC.LO(y) = 0. 0.001; 
JPAY.LO(y) = 0.0001; KPAY.LO(y) = 0.0001; Z.LO  = 0.0001; 
 
option limrow = 0; 
option limcol = 0; 
option reslim = 2000; 
option iterlim = 1000; 
option solprint = off; 
model SBASE99/all/; 
option decimals = 4; 
Sbase99.optfile = 1; 
solve SBASE99 using NLP maximizing Z; 
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DISPLAY JARHARV.L, JARHARV.L, JPRODP.L, LARHARV.L JPRODC.L, JYIELD.L, JTECH.L, 
JYDUMMY.L, JPROD.L, KARHARV.L, KLARHARV.L, KPROD.L, KDIVERT.L, KGPURP.L, KYIELD.L, 
KLYIELD.L, KTECH.L, KYDUMMY.L, JPCONP.L, LJPCONP.L, JRETP.L, JINCOM.L,  
JPOCONP.L, JADCONP.L, JGOVCONP.L, JCONP.L, JPOP.L, LKPCONP.L, KPCONP.L, KINCOM.L, 
KRETP.L, KCDUMMY.L, KPOCONP.L, KADCONP.L, KCONP.L, UEXDEM.L, WOLDPJ.L, UTEXPT.L, 
UEXOTPI.L, UPL480.L, UCCC.L, UEEP.L, UOTHER.L, JRETP.L, WOLDPJ.L, JTARIF1.L, JTARIF2.L, 
KRETP.L, KTARIF1.L, KTARIF2.L, JPRODP.L, JGPROP.L, JGSELP.L,  
JDIRECT.L, KPRODP.L, KGPURP.L, KGSELP.L, KDIRECT.L, URETP.L, UPRODPJ.L, UPRODPI.L, 
UTARP.L, ULOAN.L, UTRANSP.L, UPROD.L, UPRODJ.L, UEXPOTJ.L, UEXPOTJ1.L, UEXPOTK.L, 
UEXPOTK1.L, UEXPOTW.L, UBESTK.L, UIMPOT.L, UTCONP.L, UENSTK.L, UTEXPT.L, UTEXPT1.L, 
JIMPOTW.L, JQUOTA1.L, JQUOTA2.L, KQUOTA.L, UEXEQUIL.L,  
JBESTK.L, JIMPOT.L, JENSTK.L, KPROD.L, KBESTK.L, KIMPOT.L, KENSTK.L, WOENSTK.L, JEXPOT.L, 
KEXPOT.L, KIMPOTW.L, KIMPOTU.L, JEXCHAN.L, KEXCHAN.L, JPOWEIC.L, JPOWEIP.L, JPOWEIG.L, 
KPOWEIC.L, KPOWEIP.L, KPOWEIG.L, UPOWEIE.L; 
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APPENDIX 2. SAS PROGRAM USED FOR THE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
 
Appendix 2. SAS Program for Japan 
 
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’; 
data Japan; 
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27 
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34 x35 x36 x37 x38 x39 x40 x41 x42; 
tech = x1-1959; x2_=lag(x2); x3_=lag(x3); if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0; 
if x1=1993 then dm93=1; else dm93=0; dm8093=dm80+dm93; x10_=x10/x36; x19_=x19/x36; 
x19r = lag(x19_); lx42=log(x42); lx42_=lag(lx42); x42_=lag(x42); x11_=x11/x35; lx11_=log(x11_); 
x34_=x34/x36; lx34_=log(x34_); X34R = LOG(X34); 
cards; 
; 
run; 
data test; 
set japan; 
keep X11 X11_ X34 x42 LX11_ X34r; 
run; 
proc print data=test; 
run; 
 
proc model data=japan; 
parameters a1-a5 b1-b5 c1-c5; 
model1: x3 = a1 + a2*tech + a3*dm8093; 
model2: x2 = b1 + b2*x2_ + b3*x10_ + b4*x19r; 
fit x3 x2 /2sls DW gf=1 white breusch=(tech dm8093 x2_ x10_ x19r lx42_ lx11_ x34r) normal 
OUTEST=OUTEST1; 
proc autoreg data=japan; 
model lx42 =lx42_ lx11_ x34r/normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=lx42_ archtest godfrey=1;      
solve x3 x2 lx42/DYNAMIC THEIL  DETAILS  STATS  OUTACTUAL  OUTPREDICT OUT=OUT1 ; 
run;   
 
/*proc syslin 2sls data=japan outest=x3; 
endogenous x2 x3; 
instruments tech x2_ x3_ x4 x10;*/ 
/*proc autoreg data=japan; 
model x3 = dm8093 tech/normal dw=1 dwprob archtest godfrey=1; 
      hetero x3/link=linear std=nonneg test=lm; 
model x2 = x2_ x10_ x19r/normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x2_ archtest godfrey=1; 
      hetero x2/link=linear std=nonneg test=lm;*/ 
goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0 
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=; 
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join; 
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue; 
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red; 
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 2000 by 2 width=2.0 style=1; 
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1; 
axis3 color=black width=2.0; 
proc gplot data=work.japan; 
plot x3*x1; 
plot x2*x1; 
plot x42*x1; 
run; 
quit; 
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Appendix 2. SAS Program for Korea 
 
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’; 
data korea; 
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27 
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34 x35 x36 x37 x38 x39 x40 x41 x42 x43 x44 x45 x46 x47 x48 x49 x50 ; 
tech = x1-1959; x2_=lag(x2); x3_=lag(x3); x4_ = lag(x4); X10_ = lag(x10); x17_ = x17/x33;  
x33_ = lag(x33); x10r = x10_/x33_; x15_ = x15/x33; lx27= log(x27); x27r = lag(lx27); lx28 = log(x28); 
x28_ = lag(x28); x28r = log(x28_); x18_ = x18/x31; lx18_ = log(x18_); rx32 = log(x32); x32_=x32/x33; 
x42_=x42/x33; x29_=x29/x31; x43_ = x43/x33; lx43_ = log(x43_); x48_=x48/x33; lx48_=log(x48_); 
rx28=1/x28_; lx29_=log(x29_); lx32=log(x32_); lx42_=log(x42_); x26_=x26/x33; 
if x1=1970 then dm70=1; else dm70=0; if x1=1971 then dm71=1; else dm71=0; 
if x1=1972 then dm72=1; else dm72=0; if x1=1973 then dm73=1; else dm73=0; 
if x1=1974 then dm74=1; else dm74=0; if x1=1975 then dm75=1; else dm75=0; 
if x1=1976 then dm76=1; else dm76=0; if x1=1977 then dm77=1; else dm77=0; 
dm1=dm70+dm71+dm72+dm73+dm74+dm75+dm76; 
dm7677=dm76+dm77; 
if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0; if x1=1993 then dm93=1; else dm93=0; 
dm8093=dm80+dm93; if x1=1996 then dm96=1; else dm96=0; if x1=1997 then dm97=1; else dm97=0; 
dm9697=dm96+dm97; 
cards; 
run; 
; 
data test; 
set korea; 
keep lx27 x27r  x18 x18_ lx18_ lx32; 
run; 
proc print data=test; 
run; 
proc model data=korea; 
parameters a1-a5 b1-b5 d1-d5; 
model1: x3 = a1 + /*a2*x3_ +*/ a3*tech + a4*dm8093; 
model2: x2 = b1 + b2*x2_ /*+ b3*x16*/ + b4*x38; 
model: lx27 =d1 + d2*x27r + d3*lx32 + d4*lx18_; 
fit x3 x2 lx27/2sls DW=1 gf=1 white breusch=(tech dm8093 x2_ x38) normal OUTEST=OUTEST1; 
solve x3 x2 lx27/DYNAMIC THEIL  DETAILS  STATS  OUTACTUAL  OUTPREDICT OUT=OUT1 ; 
run; 
/*proc syslin 2sls data=korea outest=x3; 
endogenous x2 x3; 
instruments tech x2_ x3_ x4 x10;*/ 
/*proc autoreg data=korea; 
model lx27 = x27r lx32 lx18_ /normal nlag=1 dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x28r archtest godfrey=1; 
run; 
quit;*/ 
goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0 
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=; 
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join; 
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue; 
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red; 
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 1999 by 2 width=2.0 style=1; 
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1; 
axis3 color=black width=2.0; 
proc gplot data=work.korea; 
plot x3*x1; 
plot x2*x1; 
polt x27*x1; 
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/*parameters ko1-ko10; 
x3 = ko1 + ko2*x3_ + ko3*tech + ko4*dm8093; 
x2 = ko6 + ko7*x2_ + ko8*x17_ + ko9*x38; 
fit x3 x2/2sls hausman dw=1 dwprob lagdep=x2 godfrey=1  ;*/ 
/*model x3=x3_ tech/stats dw ;*/ 
/*proc reg data=korea; 
model x2=x2_ x4 x10; 
output out=b p=x2hat; 
data c; 
x2hatlag=x2hat; 
set b; 
retain x2hat; 
proc autoreg data=c; 
model x2=x2hatlag x4 x10/nlag=1;*/ 
run; 
quit; 
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Appendix 2. SAS Program for the U.S. 
 
dm ’log;clear;output;clear’; 
data us; 
input x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12 x13 x14 x15 x16 x17 x18 x19 x20 x21 x22 x23 x24 x25 x26 x27 
x28 x29 x30 x31 x32 x33 x34; 
tech = x1-1959; lx6 = log(x6); x23_ = x23/x24; lx23_ = log(x23_); x15_ = x23/x15; lx15_ = log(x15_); 
lx30 = log(x30); x30_=x28+x30+x31; lx30_ = log(x30_); if x1=1960 then lx6=1;  
if x1=1960 then lx12_=1; if x1=1980 then dm80=1; else dm80=0; if x1=1991 then dm91=1; else dm91=0; 
if x1=1985 then dm85=1; else dm85=0; if x1=1994 then dm94=1; else dm94=0; 
dm1=dm80+dm85; dm2=dm91+dm94; dm3=dm80+dm94; lx6 =log(x6); lx23_ = log(x23_); 
lx30_ = log(x30_); lx12 = log(x12); lx28 = log(x28); lx30 = log(x30); lx31 = log(x31); 
x33_ = x33+x34; 
 
cards;  
; 
run; 
 
data test; 
set us; 
keep lx6 lx12 lx23_ lx30_ ; 
run; 
proc print data=test; 
run; 
/*proc autoreg data=us; 
model lx6 = lx12 lx23_ lx30_ dm3/normal nlag=1 dw=2 dwprob archtest godfrey=1;*/ 
 
proc model data=us; 
parameters a1-a5;  
model1: lx6 = a1 + a2*lx12 + a3*lx23_ + a4*lx30 + a5*dm3; 
fit lx6/OLS  DETAILS  DW=1 gf=1 white breusch=(lx12 lx23_ lx30 dm3) normal OUTEST=OUTEST1; 
solve lx6/DYNAMIC THEIL  DETAILS  STATS ; 
/*goptions reset=(axis,legend,pattern,symbol,title,footnote) hpos=0 
norotate vpos=0 htext= ctext= target= gaccess= gsfmode=; 
goptions device=win ctext=black interpol=join; 
symbol1 c=default l=1 ci=blue v=plus cv=blue; 
symbol2 c=default l=1 ci=red v=plus cv=red; 
axis1 major=(n=2) minor=(n=2) color=black order=1960 to 1999 by 2 width=2.0 style=1; 
axis2 color=black width=2.0 style=1; 
roc gplot data=work.us; 
plot x6*x1; 
run; 
quit;*/ 
run;   
quit; 
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APPENDIX 3. DATA USED IN THE STUDY 
 Table 1 Appendix 3. Japanese Data.  
   YEAR    JARHAV    JYIELD    JPROD     JIMOPT    JEXPOT      JCONP      JENSTK 
    1960        3308           3.54          11700           140               0            11900           1426 
    1961        3301           3.42          11301           173               0            11090             991 
    1962        3285           3.60          11838           177               0            12115             891 
    1963        3272           3.56          11659           410               0            12061             899 
    1964        3260           3.51          11451           880               0            12186           1044 
    1965        3255           3.47          11292           893               0            11880           1349 
    1966        3254           3.56          11598           475               0            11700           1722 
    1967        3263           4.03          13152           298               0            11555           3617 
    1968        3280           4.01          13148             52           300            11187           5330 
    1969        3274           3.89          12743             15           508            10480           7100 
    1970        2923           3.95          11547             10           910            11690           6057 
    1971        2695           3.68            9907               0           217            12459           3288 
    1972        2640           4.10          10819             24           572            11829           1730 
    1973        2622           4.22          11056             57           305            11017           1521 
    1974        2724           4.11          11186             35             42            10924           1776 
    1975        2764           4.33          11980             20               0            10700           3076 
    1976        2779           3.85          10713             21               0            10466           3344 
    1977        2757           4.32          11916             64             91            10026           5207 
    1978        2584           4.43          11456             18           467            10299           5915 
    1979        2497           4.36          10882             14           648            10102           6061 
    1980        2377           3.73            8873             75           909            10100           4000 
    1981        2278           4.10            9337             66           304            10642           2457 
    1982        2257           4.14            9346             14           223            10774             820 
    1983        2273           4.15            9433           169           230            10192                 0 
    1984        2315           4.67          10809             18               0            10199             628 
    1985        2342           4.53          10612             20               0            10150           1110 
    1986        2303           4.60          10599             17               0              9706           2020 
    1987        2146           4.51            9671             16               0              9805           1902 
    1988        2110           4.31            9041             16               0              9619           1340 
    1989        2097           4.49            9416             18               0              9720           1054 
    1990        2074           4.61            9554             17               0              9620           1005 
    1991        2049           4.27            8740             18               0              9523             240 
    1992        2106           4.57            9621             18               0              9500             379 
    1993        2139           3.33            7129         2623               0              9400             731 
    1994        2212           4.93          10903           250           410              9350           2534 
    1995        2118           4.62            9781           500           200              9300           3354 
    1996        1977           4.76            9413           500             30              9320           3246 
    1997        1953           4.67            9123           499           574              9200           3094 
    1998        1801           4.53            8154           554           210              9100           2492 
    1999        1788           4.67            8350           639           200              9450           1831 
 JARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), JYIELD = yield(MT/ha), JPROD = production(1000MT), 
 JIMOPT = import(1000MT), JEXPOT = export(1000MT), JCONP = consumption(1000MT),  
 JENSTK = ending stock(100MT). 
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 Table 2 Appendix 3. Japanese Data. 
   YEAR    JPRODP    JRETP     JGSELP  JEXCHAN   JGPROP   JDIVERT   JPRODC 
    1960         N/A         99000       72517        360              69367               0          177120 
    1961         N/A.        97000       72100        360              73683               0               N/A  
    1962       55000        98000       71900        360              81100               0               N/A 
    1963       65000      110000       80317        360              87800               0               N/A 
    1964       72000      118000       79717        361.97         99750               0               N/A 
    1965       83000      136000       93867        361.49       108967               0          292445 
    1966       87000      146000     101783        362.35       119000               0               N/A 
    1967       93000      151000     100150        362.15       129950               0               N/A 
    1968     102000      170000     115650        360.55       137600               0               N/A 
    1969     108000      181000     124950        358.37       137600               0               N/A 
    1970     109000      186000     124033        358.07       137867               0          534599 
    1971     108000      188000     122950        347.86       142350           541               N/A 
    1972     114000      192000     130767        303.17       149233           566               N/A 
    1973     109000      207000     130100        271.7         171683           562          672186 
    1974     167000      232000     170933        292.08       226917           313          865433 
    1975     193000      299000     203417        296.79       259500           264        1022738 
    1976     216000      342000     224183        296.55       276200           194        1220303 
    1977     238000      379000     246183        268.51       287200           212        1289654 
    1978     246000      403000     256517        210.44       287517           438        1416261 
    1979     242000      408000     264850        219.14       287983           472        1487741 
    1980     253000      414000     264850        226.74       294567           585        1580378 
    1981     273000      425000     273183        220.54       295933           668        1660005 
    1982     278000      440000     283883        249.08       299183           672        1698227 
    1983     281000      448000     294550        237.51       304433           639        1745699 
    1984     294000      464000     305450        237.52       311133           620        1740072 
    1985     293000      479000     309967        238.54       311133           594        1766866 
    1986     263000      483000     309967        168.52       311133           618        1777043 
    1987     259000      483000     302167        144.64       292617           791        1773142 
    1988     258000      477000     302167        128.15       279050           794        1755655 
    1989     279050      478000     306600        137.96       279050           795        1735190 
    1990     275000      496300     306600        144.11       275000           849        1748910 
    1991     272870      494466     303383        134.43       274100           852        1683110 
    1992     271090      548900     302050        126.53       273200           751        1670290 
    1994     271090      564400     302050        111.20       273200           713        1726330 
    1994     271090      695300     302050        102.21       273200           588        1667990 
    1995     271090      570000     302050          94.06       273200           659        1692045 
    1996     271090      537400     302050        108.78       270280           673        1689245 
    1997     268200      521800     297180        120.99       263420           685        1678978 
    1998     262350      499500     294100        130.91       258800           955        1678930 
    1999     259170      487800     294100        130.91       256820           950        1700270 
 JPRODP = producer price(yen/MT), JRETP = retail price(yen/MT), JGSELP = government selling rice(yen/MT), 
 JEXCHAN = exchange rate(yen/$), JGPROP = government procurement price(yen/MT), 
 JDIVERT = diversion program(ha), JPRODC = production costs(yen/ha) 
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 Table 3 Appendix 3. Japanese Data. 
   YEAR  JPCONP    JPOP   JPOCONP   JINCOM   JGCONP   JADCON  JTARIF  JCPI 
    1960      114.9        93.4         470            17859             0                0             78       45.9 
    1961      117.4        94.3         535            18965             0                0             58       47.0 
    1962      118.3        95.2         536            21547             0                0             53       47.3 
    1963      117.3        96.2         597            26512             0                0             85       48.6 
    1964      115.8        97.2         609            29895             0                0           108       49.9 
    1965      111.7        98.3         606            33765             0                0           154       50.3 
    1966      105.8        99.1         636            38085             0                0           179       52.0 
    1967      103.4      100.2         714            44629             0                0           188       52.1 
    1968      100.1      101.4         707            52922             0            300           238       55.2 
    1969          97       103.0         640            62260             0            508           271       56.8 
    1970       95.1       103.7         712            75299         252            910           282       59.6 
    1971       93.1       105.0         718            80701       1474            217           297       61.3 
    1972       91.5       107.3         744            92394       1254            572           373       67.6 
    1973       90.8       108.7         807          122498         480            305           228       69.0 
    1974       89.7       110.1         754          134244             0              42           234       70.6 
    1975         88        111.9         758          152362             0                0           552       71.2 
    1976      86.2        112.2         729          166573             0                0           783       72.5 
    1977      83.4        113.2         676          185622             0              91           931       73.1 
    1978      81.6        114.3         685          204404             0            467         1473       73.5 
    1979      79.8        115.3         685          221547             0            648         1349       74.3 
    1980      78.9        117.1         711          245547             0            909         1215       76.3 
    1981      77.8        117.0         697          257363          192           304         1465       80.0 
    1982      76.4        118.0         671          269629          829           223         1416       82.3 
    1983      75.7        119.0         671          280257          510           230         1546       93.8 
    1984      75.2        119.3         625          297948            10               0         1617       85.7 
    1985      74.6        121.1         570          324159            33               0         1663       87.4 
    1986      73.4        121.0         628          330024            75               0         2580       88.0 
    1987      71.9        121.4         643          343422              0               0         2968       88.0 
    1988         71        122.0         677          365087              0               0         3355       88.6 
    1989      70.4        123.0         671          402311              0               0         3107       90.7 
    1990         70        123.6         650          432588              0               0         3089       93.5 
    1991      69.9        123.6         659          455888              0               0         3282       96.5 
    1992      69.7        124.5         643          464191              0               0         3943       98.1 
    1993      69.2        124.0         665          466764              0               0         4589       99.4 
    1994      66.3        124.3         602          470030              0           410         6412     100.1 
    1995      67.8        125.5         598          514390              0           200         5595     100.0 
    1996      67.3        125.4         359          459550          208             30         4509     100.1 
    1997      66.7        125.6         461          419510            24           574         3900     100.9 
    1998      65.2        126.3         543          419510              0           210         3323     102.5 
    1999      64.5        126.8         621          419510              0           200         3428     102.2 
 JPCONP = per capita consumption(kg/person), JPOP = population (million people), JPOCONP = processing  
 Consumption(1000MT), JINCOM =income(billion yen), JGCONP = government consumption(1000MT), 
 JADCON = additional consumption(1000MT),  JTARIF = tariff equivalent($/MT), JCPI = consumer price index. 
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 Table 4 Appendix 3. Korean Data. 
  YEAR    KARHAV   KYIELD   KPROD   KIMOPT   KEXPOT    KCONP     KENSTK 
   1960        1121             2.72         3047             5                4               3121               39 
   1961        1128             3.07         3463             0              60               3442                 0 
   1962        1139             2.65         3015         117                5               3127                 0 
   1963        1155             3.25         3758             0              13               3740                 5 
   1964        1195             3.31         3954             0              19               3913               27 
   1965        1228             2.85         3501           18              40               3444               62 
   1966        1231             3.18         3919         139                0               4119                 1 
   1967        1235             2.92         3603         247                0               3811               40 
   1968        1151             2.78         3195         631                0               3866                 0 
   1969        1220             3.35         4090         254                0               4271               73 
   1970        1203             3.27         3939         937                0               4945                 4 
   1971        1190             3.36         3998         584                0               3973             613 
   1972        1191             3.32         3957         437                0               4296             711 
   1973        1182             3.56         4212         206                0               4641             488 
   1974        1204             3.69         4445         489                0               4707             715 
   1975        1218             3.83         4669         168                0               4699             906 
   1976        1215             4.29         5215           55                0               5100           1076 
   1977        1230             4.88         6006             0              80               5784           1218 
   1978        1230             4.71         5797         501                0               6764             752 
   1979        1233             4.17         5136         580                0               5786             682 
   1980        1233             3.24         4000       2245                0               5402           1495 
   1981        1224             4.14         5063         269                0               5404            423 
   1982        1188             4.36         5175         216                0               5404          1511 
   1983        1228             4.40         5404             7            135               5303          1247 
   1984        1231             4.62         5682             0                0               5540          1432 
   1985        1237             4.55         5626             0                0               5501          1251 
   1986        1236             4.54         5607             0                0               5805          1158 
   1987        1262             4.35         5493             1                0               5617          1146 
   1988        1260             4.80         6053             2                0               5611          1610 
   1989        1257             4.69         5898           11                1               5602          2050 
   1990        1244             4.51         5606             2              17               5444          2151 
   1991        1209             4.45         5385             1                2               5478          2141 
   1992        1157             4.61         5331             1                2               5524          1999 
   1993        1136             4.18         4750             4                0               5509          1820 
   1994        1103             4.59         5060             3            150               5414          1156 
   1995        1056             4.45         4694         115                0               5244            245 
   1996        1050             5.07         5320             0                0               5178            390 
   1997        1052             5.18         5450           77                0               5112            805 
   1998        1059             4.82         5100         113                0               5038            980 
   1999        1066             4.94         5263         115                0               5003          1355 
 KARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), KYIELD = yield(MT/ha), KPROD = production(1000MT), 
 KIMOPT = import(1000MT), KEXPOT = export(1000MT), KCONP = consumption(1000MT),  
 KENSTK = ending stock(100MT). 
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 Table 5 Appendix 3. Korean Data. 
  YEAR    KPRODP   KRETP   KGPURP    KGSELP   KPRODC   KPCONP    KINCOM 
   1960        12000        19000          10000         11597           N/A             N/A             243 
   1961        15000        23000          14000         12000           N/A             N/A             291 
   1962        16000        24000          15000         15000           N/A              110             352 
   1963        25000        38000          19000         16000         58630             110             500 
   1964        31000        46000          24000         25000         80660             127             711 
   1965        29000        44000          28000         31000         93450          121.8             798 
   1966        34000        46000          30000         29000         97070          113.9           1024 
   1967        40000        50000          32000         31000       109230          131.1           1259 
   1968        49000        58000          38000         34000       126600          117.8           1630 
   1969        55000        72000          46000         40000       145870          119.7           2130 
   1970        69000        80000          63000         49000       171600          130.4           2771 
   1971        88000      100000          79000         55000       200080          134.8           2898 
   1972      133000      135000          89000         69000       241780          134.5           4210 
   1973      168000      135000        102000         88000       271850          129.4           5420 
   1974      203000      187000        142000       133000       376440          127.8           7669 
   1975      224000      253000        197000       162500       532910          123.6         10302 
   1976      263000      303000        243750       209125       706350          120.1         14101 
   1977      341000       324000       290000       243750       889200          126.4         18074 
   1978      441000       343000       325000       280000     1036030          134.7         24327 
   1979      501000       438000       375000       331250     1254300          135.6         31323 
   1980      518000       574000       457500       400000     1437520          132.4         38041 
   1981      642000       811000       571875       550000     1781690          131.5         47482 
   1982      667939       888000       652000       666000     1999930          130.2         54443 
   1983      742300       865000       699625       653500     2274440          129.5         62574 
   1984      758675       865000       699625       650000     2394210          130.1         71332 
   1985      764550       928000       720625       678250     2521400          128.1         79170 
   1986      810525       999000       756625       612500     2640820          127.7         92638 
   1987      890650     1043000       802000       689000     2778850          126.2       109588 
   1988      926912     1142000       914250       620125     3231700          124.8       131061 
   1989    1224210     1192000     1060500       597125     3603140          121.4       147770 
   1990    1073550     1213520     1209000       694000     3858510          119.6       178628 
   1991    1189450     1302150     1329875     1150000     4000650          116.3       216303 
   1992    1216140     1402000     1423000     1207500     3972960          112.9       245388 
   1993    1246025     1473750     1508375     1207500     3975340          110.2       277108 
   1994    1341350     1549583     1583750     1306250     4005020          108.3       322812 
   1995    1430375     1638917     1583750     1306250     4119750          106.5       376316 
   1996    1708600     1858333     1583750     1550000     4424410          104.9       417108 
   1997    1773950     1984250     1647125     1562500     4582400          102.4       450853 
   1998    1857400     2067250     1647125     1650000     5107920            99.2       437871 
   1999    1998425     2211500     1737750     1815000     5227000            96.9       478251 
 KPRODP = producer price(won/MT), KRETP = retail price(won/MT), KGPURP = government purchase  
 price(won/MT), KGSELP = government selling price(won/MT), KPRODC = production costs(won/ha), 
 KPCONP = per capita consumption(kg/person), KINCOM = income(billion won). 
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 Table 6 Appendix 3. Korean Data. 
 YEAR  KPOP  KGDPD  KCPI   KEXCHAN  KDIVRT   KPOCON   KADCON  KTARIF 
  1960     24.70       N/A       11.1          63.13             0                0                  4          103.65 
  1961     25.42       N/A       11.3        124.79             0                0                60                   0  
  1962     26.51       N/A       11.5        130.00             0                0                  5                   0  
  1963     26.90       N/A       11.7        130.00             0                0                13            71.85 
  1964     27.68       N/A       12.0        213.85             0                0                19                   0 
  1965     28.70       N/A       12.2        266.40             0                0                40                   0 
  1966     28.96       N/A       12.8        271.34             0                0                  0                   0 
  1967     30.13       N/A       13.2        270.52             0                0                  0                   0 
  1968     30.84       N/A       13.5        276.65             0                0                  0                   0 
  1969     31.54       N/A       14.0        288.16             0                0                  0            16.17 
  1970     32.24       N/A       15.2        310.56             0                0                  0            20.60 
  1971     32.88       5.50       16.2        340.15             0                0                  0            50.38 
  1972     33.51       6.42       16.5        392.89             0                0                  0            83.46 
  1973     34.10       7.98       17.0        398.32             0                0                  0                   0 
  1974     34.69       9.80       17.6        404.47             0                0                  0                   0 
  1975     35.28     12.40       18.2        484.00         515                0                  0            67.48 
  1976     35.85     14.20       23.2        484.00         590                0                  0          255.88 
  1977     36.41     18.60       27.8        484.00         690                0                80          188.82 
  1978     36.97     23.40       32.2        484.00         774                0                  0          267.10 
  1979     37.53     28.20       36.5        484.00         869                0                  0          391.73 
  1980     38.12     31.80       40.4        607.43         975                0                  0          333.63 
  1981     38.72     35.80       43.9        681.03       1521                0                  0          729.2 
  1982     39.33     38.20       49.0        731.08       1233                0                  0          863.67 
  1983     39.93     43.90       54.3        775.75       1987                0              135          774.66 
  1984     40.46     46.40       55.5        805.98       1933                0                  0          737.03 
  1985     40.80     48.50       56.8        870.02       2122                0                  0          721.18 
  1986     41.18     51.00       58.4        881.45       2563                0                  0          846.98 
  1987     41.58     53.90       60.2        822.57       3542              16                  0          896.72 
  1988     41.98     58.00       64.5        731.47       4844              29                  0        1193.73 
  1989     42.38     61.30       68.2        671.46       7096              21                  1        1417.87 
  1990     42.87     67.90       74.0        707.76     10593              33                17        1360.09 
  1991     43.30     75.20       80.9        733.30     11861            114                  2        1379.57 
  1992     43.75     81.00       86.0        780.60     12255            245                  2        1400.77 
  1993     44.20     86.70       90.1        802.60     13207            304                  0        1349.44 
  1994     44.64     93.30       95.7        803.60     11984            278              150        1538.09 
  1995     45.09   100.00     100.0        771.00     16274            144                  0        1660.75 
  1996     45.55   103.90     104.9        804.80     16611            140                  0        1878.28 
  1997     45.99   107.20     109.6        951.10     15395            150                  0        1673.79 
  1998     46.43   112.60     117.8      1398.90     15141            123                  0          985.04 
  1999     46.86   110.80     118.8      1189.50     12017            210                  0        1384.53 
 KPOP = population(million people), KGDPD = GDP deflator, KCPI = consumer price index, KEXCHAN =  
 exchange rate(won/$), KDIVRT = diversion program(ha). KPOCON = processing consumption(1000MT), 
 KADCON = additional consumption(1000MT), KTARIF = tariff equivalent($/MT). 
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 Table 7 Appendix 3. U.S. Data. 
  YEAR   UARHAV  UYIELD   UPROD     UIMOPT   UEXPOT   UCONP    UENSTK 
   1960          N/A           N/A           N/A            N/A            N/A           N/A             N/A 
   1961          643           2.74          1763              13              936             997             173 
   1962          718           2.97          2133                1            1119             937             251 
   1963          717           3.20          2295                1            1385             917             245 
   1964          723           3.30          2386              15            1387           1008             251 
   1965          725           3.44          2497              22           1418           1081              271 
   1966          796           3.52          2805                0           1719           1079              278 
   1967          797           3.70          2950                0           1816           1190              222 
   1968          952           3.63          3459                0           1729           1420              532 
   1969          861           3.49          3003                7           1786           1220              536 
   1970          734           3.81          2796              48           1461           1308              611 
   1971          736           3.86          2838              36           1804           1309              372 
   1972          736           3.84          2828              17           1726           1324              167 
   1973          878           3.46          3034                7           1604           1349              255 
   1974        1024           3.58          3667                0           2194           1496              232 
   1975        1140           3.60          4099                0           1732           1394            1205 
   1976        1004           3.77          3781                3           2097           1618            1274 
   1977          910           3.43          3120                3           2270           1248              879 
   1978        1202           3.55          4271                3           2431           1708            1014 
   1979        1161           3.72          4324                3           2706           1794              841 
   1980        1340           3.61          4838                7           3028           2113              545 
   1981        1535           3.89          5974              13           2682           2248            1602 
   1982        1320           3.75          4948              21           2219           2049            2303 
   1983          878           3.66          3216              27           2272           1793            1481 
   1984        1134           3.86          4382              51           1960           1911            2043 
   1985        1008           4.30          4332              70           1885           2078            2482 
   1986          955           4.51          4307              83           2719           2493            1660 
   1987          944           4.35          4109              95           2289           2580              995 
   1988        1174           4.42          5186            121           2786           2649              867 
   1989        1087           4.68          5087            139           2537           2690              866 
   1990        1142           4.46          5098            151           2331           2981              803 
   1991        1125           4.53          5096            169           2128           3064              876 
   1992        1267           4.50          5704            195           2515           3008            1252 
   1993        1146           4.57          5240            220           2564           3283              865 
   1994        1342           4.95          6648            256           3322           3396            1051 
   1995        1252           4.49          5628            245           2694           3420              810 
   1996        1135           4.80          5453            334           2488           3243              866 
   1997        1256           4.58          5750            294           2755           3278              877 
   1998        1318           4.40          5798            336           2730           3587              694 
   1999        1421           4.58          6502            321           2804           3846              867 
 UARHAV = area harvested(1000ha), UYIELD = yield(MT/ha), UPROD = production(1000MT), 
 UIMOPT = import(1000MT), UEXPOT = export(1000MT), UCONP = consumption(1000MT),  
 UENSTK = ending stock(100MT). 
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 Table 8 Appendix 3. U.S. Data. 
  YEAR  UPRDI  URPDJ  WESTK  UPODPI  UPODPJ   ULOAN   UDIRT  UEXPOTK 
  1960       842         904         N/A       138.92      139.55        97.44        N/A              0 
  1961       803         969        8500       163.80      150.57      103.84        N/A              0 
  1962       943       1215      12500       160.65      160.97      103.84        N/A              0 
  1963       845       1453      16300       154.98      159.71      103.84        N/A              0 
  1964       896       1494      17200       153.41      154.98      103.84        N/A              0 
  1965     1072       1421      18100       156.87      153.72        99.21        N/A              0 
  1966     1156       1623      18600       151.20      149.63        99.21        N/A            67 
  1967     1426       1515      21300       161.28      152.46      100.31        N/A          235 
  1968     1603       1822      24500       154.35      173.57      101.41        N/A          376 
  1969     1472       1532      26400       167.58      151.20      104.06        N/A          251 
  1970     1350       1388      28800       170.42      158.13      107.14        N/A          397 
  1971     1474       1328      28000       177.03      165.06      111.77        N/A          500 
  1972     1402       1390      23800       226.80      215.15      116.18        N/A          245 
  1973     1400       1631      28800       481.95      349.65      133.82        N/A          252 
  1974     1829       1844      28000       359.10      368.55      166.23        N/A          415 
  1975     2159       1922      38800       269.01      240.98      187.83        N/A          156 
  1976     2290       1489      37800       209.48      217.67      136.46        N/A            54 
  1977    1977        1176      44200       252.63      288.23      136.46        N/A              0 
  1978    2695        1558      54100       265.86      222.39      141.10      17.20          144 
  1979    2639        1673      53700       343.35      333.90      149.69             0          787 
  1980    2877        1966      48500       393.75      418.95      156.96             0          859 
  1981    3607        2365      43300       305.55      253.89      176.59        6.17          223 
  1982    3053       1913       43500       269.64      217.67      179.46      59.74          216 
  1983    2066       1182       47900       294.84      224.60      179.46      61.07              0 
  1984    3052       1358       55600       272.79      209.79      176.36      82.90              0 
  1985    3235       1128       54400       212.63      184.91      176.36      85.98              0 
  1986    3129       1185       50700       120.33      111.83      158.73    103.62              1 
  1987    2829       1289       44800       244.76      200.34      150.79    106.26              0 
  1988    3844       1327       48800       219.24      203.81      146.16      95.02              0 
  1989    3570       1479       54500       239.09      211.37      143.30      78.48            11 
  1990    3525       1576       59200       218.61      194.99      143.30      91.71              0 
  1991    3517       1580       57200       246.65      220.50      143.30      67.68              1 
  1992    4070       1638       55200       184.91      186.17      143.30      92.81              0 
  1993    3414       1759       52500       249.80      254.84      143.30      87.74              0 
  1994    4424       2136       50400       216.41      211.05      143.30      83.55              0 
  1995    3978       1705       50400       295.16      277.83      143.30      70.99              8 
  1996    3610       1843       51200       333.90      263.66      143.30      61.07            18 
  1997    3954       1860       54700       321.30      268.38      143.30      59.75            14 
  1998    4425       1436       60000       321.30      268.38      143.30      64.37              0 
  1999    4825       1722       62600       189.00      201.60      143.30      62.17              0 
 UPRDI = indica production(1000MT), URPDJ = japonica production(1000MT), WESTK = world ending 
 Stock(1000MT), UPODPI = producer price of indica($/MT). UPODPJ = producer price of japonica($/MT), 
 ULOAN = loan rate($/MT), UDIRT = direct payment($/MT), UEXPOTK = export to Korea(1000MT). 
 
 
 171
 Table 9 Appendix 3. U.S. Data.  
  YEAR     WOLDPJ     UPL480     UCCC     UEEP     UMAP     UFMDP      UEPOTJ 
   1960         197.3             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1961         211.6             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1962         219.4             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1963         220.5             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A             106 
   1964         218.3             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A             290 
   1965         222.7             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A             156 
   1966         223.8             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A               99 
   1967         229.3             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 2 
   1968         233.7             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 2 
   1969         233.7             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 1 
   1970         237.0             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1971         243.6             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1972         260.1             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 0 
   1973         533.5             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A                 9 
   1974         560.0             N/A           N/A        N/A         N/A            N/A               16 
   1975         455.2             745             48             0           795           1419               11 
   1976         370.2             509             60             0           569           1315               11 
   1977         480.6             676             15             0           691           1570                 3 
   1978         441.6             502             50             0           552           1645                 2 
   1979         513.2             442             42             0           484           1849                 3 
   1980         611.3             500           168             0           668           2191                 1 
   1981         461.6             320           452             0           772           2225                 0 
   1982         351.0             332             14             0           346           2430                 2 
   1983         340.4             429           328             0           757           1452                 1 
   1984         336.2             366           571             0           986           1226                 1 
   1985         345.5             500           359             0         1039             869                 0 
   1986         286.4             411           476           23           887           1350               18 
   1987         371.3             370           636           28         1066           1346                 1 
   1988         367.5             338           443         120           810           1315                 1 
   1989         357.4             355           826           20         1181           1069                 1 
   1990         354.5             276           663             0           939           1562                 2 
   1991         396.2             210           183           76           397           2020                 2 
   1992         395.3             382           220         358           623           1656               30 
   1993         486.8             421           235         278           832           1878             481 
   1994         390.2             315           155           46           476           1958               66 
   1995         465.0             131           321         113           463           3300             215 
   1996         430.8             200           141           23           353           2473             232 
   1997         412.5             204             80             0           298           2262             213 
   1998         492.7             184           499             0           694           2616             311 
   1999         474.7             536           192             0            777          2299             350 
 WOLDPJ = world japonica price($/MT), UPL480 = PL480(1000MT), UCCC = credit guarantee(1000MT), 
 UEEP = export enhancement(1000MT), UMAP = export program(1000MT), UFMDP = outside specified export  
 program (1000MT), UEPOTJ = export to Japan(1000MT). 
 
 
 172
VITA 
Dae-Seob Lee, the youngest child of Seon-Ok Lee and Jeong-Sook Choi, received his 
bachelor of science in animal science from Kangwon National University, Chuncheon, Republic 
of Korea.  He continued his academic career in M.B.A at the same university, under advisor 
former Chancellor Seo-Hyun Ha and Professor Kyung-Ryang Kim.  He wrote a M.B.A. thesis 
titled “Improvement of Committed Farming Company in Kangwon Province.” 
He served in the Korean Army for two and a half years and was a unit leader in the first 
defense distribution transportation unit.  He came to the United States of America in 1994.  He 
took the intensive language course provided by the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, 
Arkansas.  After that, he enrolled in the master’s program in the University of Arkansas and 
finished it in 1997.  He conducted master’s thesis titled “East Asian Rice Economies,” under 
advisor Professor Eric J. Wailes.   
He got married to his wife, Young-Hee Jeong, in 1997 and entered a doctoral program at 
the Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, in 1998.  However, he decided to transfer to the 
Louisiana State University in 1998.  In addition, he was blessed to have a baby named Hana Lee 
in 1998 and another baby named Jeong-Hee Lee in 2000. 
He started pursuing his doctoral studies at the Louisiana State University in 1998, under 
Minnesota graduate Associate Professor Dr. P. Lynn Kennedy.  Dr. Kennedy recognized some 
academic achievements in his work and decided to let him receive his degree in Spring 2002. 
